Baroness Clark of Calton

Lynda Margaret Clark, QC, having been created Baroness Clark of Calton, of Calton in the City of Edinburgh, for life—Was, in her robes, introduced between the Lord Irvine of Lairg and the Baroness Scotland of Asthal, and made the solemn Affirmation.

Lord Soley

Clive Stafford Soley, Esquire, having been created Baron Soley, of Hammersmith in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Dubs and the Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, and made the solemn Affirmation.
	Lord Carr of Hadley—took the Oath.

EU Budget

Lord Barnett: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What changes in administrative expenditure have been agreed in the proposed new European Union budget.

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, no changes to administrative expenditure have yet been agreed as part of the negotiations on the next financial perspective.

Lord Barnett: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that there is at least one specific and significant saving in administrative expenditure that could be made; namely, stopping the nonsense of the European Parliament meeting in three different cities?
	Was my noble friend as surprised as I was at the Answer given by my noble friend Lord Triesman to my Written Question on 8 June? He said:
	"There has been no study of which we are aware of the financial costs and benefits of having multiple sites for the EP rather than a single site".—[Official Report, 8/6/05; col. WA 76.]
	Has the Minister had a word with the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, about a single benefit? Can he assure us that the Government will seek to have such a study and, more importantly, stop this nonsense?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question. I would certainly undertake to discuss the matter further with my colleague, my noble friend Lord Triesman. There is a balance in all of those things between making sure that there is access to those processes and the costs that are involved. But in the final analysis, although there are efficiencies that, we believe, can be reached in a number of areas of the budget, they are of relatively small cost in the total European Union budget.

Lord Lawson of Blaby: My Lords, does the noble Lord accept that there are also a number on these Benches who entirely agree with the very common-sense point put by the noble Lord, Lord Barnett? When the Minister says that there are balances, it is clear what the advantage is of cutting the cost and having only one site in Brussels. What are the arguments on the other side of the balance?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, as I understand it, to start with, a treaty change would be involved to change the current arrangements; we would need to weigh the impact of that. Perhaps I might further discuss with my noble friend Lord Triesman to give a more definitive answer on the benefits that balance the other side.

Lord Dykes: My Lords, is that not yet another example of where, if the United Kingdom and other countries agree to more majority voting as opposed to unanimity on most aspects, Strasbourg could have been removed years ago? On the broader aspects of the budget, will the Minister confirm the latest position with the 1 per cent ceiling objective? Is that still the Government's aim?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: Yes, my Lords. It is still the Government's aim that there should be the 1 per cent ceiling. Obviously, further consultations need to take place from where we are. However, specifically in relation to administrative expenditure, which was the import of this Question, the Government's position is that Commission administrative expenditure should be held capped in real terms over the life of the next financial perspective, but that the administrative expenditure of the remaining institutions should remain capped at the current nominal value of the 2006 level.
	In relation to the earlier point that was pressed, I am rightly advised that it was the government of John Major who signed up to the current arrangements in Europe.

Lord Peston: My Lords, bearing in mind that I am a person who has always said that he is sorry we did not join the European Community at the beginning, I realise now that there is one major benefit of the fact that we did not join all those years ago; namely, that we would have a European parliamentary building in London as well and the costs to which my noble friend referred would have been dramatically higher still. Does he at least think that there was one advantage for our not starting out in the Community?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, it would be a splendid idea to have another site in London, but we are where we are. I am not sure that it would imply that costs would be comparatively higher in London. I thought that the costs of operating the Parliament were relatively modest in the scheme of things.

Lord Renton of Mount Harry: My Lords, I think that the Minister said that the administrative expenses were a relatively small proportion of the budget. When the figures are available, will the Government at the same time publish what has happened to administrative expenditure here over the past 10 years? No. 12 has been taken over by No. 10. There has been great growth in the Cabinet Office. Surely, that would give us a yardstick by which we could judge the growth in EU administrative expenditure. If those figures are not immediately available, perhaps the Minister will circulate them to your Lordships.

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, we are straying somewhat from the original Question. The public expenditure plans of this Government are fully costed and affordable as a result of the economic success that the Government have engendered. The sound fiscal and monetary policies of this Labour Government have enabled us to fulfil our spending commitments in terms of social policy and all that goes with it.

Lord Harrison: My Lords, further to his penultimate response, will my noble friend acknowledge that at the December Edinburgh European Council Summit in 1992 the then British presidency, which was held under the premiership of John Major, a concession was made to the French that Strasbourg would be the enduring location of the European Parliament? Does he agree that we need to look to the Benches opposite for the crass spending and excessive bureaucracy of the European Parliament?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, I bow to my noble friend's superior knowledge of history in this matter, but I made the point earlier that "where we are" is something that was negotiated and put in place by the previous Conservative government.

Baroness Noakes: My Lords, no doubt the Minister will be aware that the administrative budget of the EU is around €7 billion euros which Members on these Benches do not think is a relatively small amount. Last year, the Treasury stated that the EU budget would have to be set with,
	"proper controls to minimise fraud and irregularity".
	Since then we have had another year and another set of qualified accounts. Does the Minister agree that we should not put a single additional euro into the Commission budget until that is sorted out?

Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, we have debated a Question on the issue of the certificate of assurance in relation to the accounts. What is clear is that the steps taken recently to ensure that we have in place a better accounting system in Europe and that we move forward on a system of integrated financial control should lead us towards the path of achieving a budget on which the European Court of Auditors can sign off. But one of the areas that the court has been able to sign off to date is that of administrative expenses. The court did not find irregularities in this area, and that is included in its report.

Casinos

Lord Greaves: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether they intend to propose the establishment of more than one regional casino in the first wave of casino approvals.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the Gambling Act makes provision, initially, for just one regional casino, and we are proceeding with implementation of the Act on this basis. We do not, however, rule out the possibility of asking Parliament to approve an increase in this number at some future point.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. Can he give us some idea of the timescale the Government have in mind? The independent advisory panel, which I understand is to be set up later this year, is to report its recommendation on where the single regional casino should be sited only by the end of next year. However, it is clear that the work involved in applying for licences, planning permission and, indeed, in building the new facility will take a long time. So I suggest that it is not likely that a new regional casino will be operating before the end of this Parliament. Can the Minister give a guarantee that no decision will be taken to extend the number up from one until the new regional casino has been in operation for at least some time so that its effects can be judged?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the noble Lord's guess at the timetable is not far out. The independent advisory panel will not report until the end of next year. So he is right to observe that it is unlikely that decisions both on the regional casino as well as on the other eight casinos will not be taken before 2007. However, I am not in a position to offer a guarantee in quite the way the noble Lord asks because I do not know the precise duration of this Parliament any more than he does. But it is certainly the case that Parliament takes the decision on whether there should be any additional regional casinos beyond the one. That decision will be subject to the affirmative resolution of both Houses, so the noble Lord has that guarantee.

Lord Taylor of Blackburn: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of what the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is asking for? He is asking for a decision that the regional casino should be sited in Blackpool and that no one else should have it until Blackpool has got it.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that interpretation never crossed my mind. We have to await the criteria to be established by the independent advisory panel. Beyond that, all applications for the regional casino will be judged on their merits.

Viscount Astor: My Lords, do the Government intend to bring forward a further affirmative order increasing the number of regional casinos before they have set up the proposed one regional casino and judged by the criteria the noble Lord mentioned whether or not that is a success?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, we have indicated all along that the Gambling Act contains important provisions for the control of gambling. After all, it updates gambling laws that are more than 30 years old. It is a necessary measure. As to the point raised by the noble Viscount, we will want to evaluate the effect of any casinos that are built and operating. He is therefore right that we do not expect to proceed with undue speed in regard to any future proposals.

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, is it the department's intention to put the matter to the new advisory panel or to the Gambling Commission for their opinion as to whether or not there should be an increase? Can the Minister confirm that if an increase is recommended and the Government choose to increase the numbers, and the matter is put to both Houses of Parliament, they will set out the clear criteria by which the decision to increase is to be judged?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that must be so. The independent advisory panel is there to produce clear criteria, not only for Parliament should it take a decision to increase the numbers at some future unknown date, but also to show to any applicants the basis on which licences will be awarded and judged.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, during the passage of the Gambling Act we were promised that there would be a statutory instrument making casinos a separate category under the planning Acts for development control purposes. When can we expect to see that statutory instrument?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the noble Lord is right. We have not yet reached a decision on the question of classification but we shall do so shortly.

Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: My Lords, since the Gambling Act was passed there has been the welcome news that the Olympics will be coming to London in 2012. Is it not important that a little flexibility should now be given to the London and greater metropolitan area, where we need changes in infrastructure, where we need funding and where we need all the support we can get to make the Olympics a success?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, as I have indicated, we intend to move cautiously, which is the way in which we introduced the Gambling Bill that became the Gambling Act. We recognise that we need to test public opinion and to assess the operation of the new casinos. We are keeping an open mind on whether there will be public interest in extending these facilities. My noble friend is right that it is likely that the excitement generated by the development of the Olympic Games proposals over the forthcoming years will give London a particular claim in expressing an interest. But I make the point that this will have nothing to do with the Olympic Games; the independent planning authorities in London will take any such decisions.

Legal Aid

Lord Goodhart: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What effect the measures proposed in the Lord Chancellor's Statement of 5 July will have on the justice system.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, the measures set out in A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid will enhance the justice system by reducing the disproportionate amount of money spent on defending the most expensive criminal cases. They will rebalance the whole legal aid system so that all criminal cases are dealt with swiftly and fairly and ensure greater flexibility to provide civil help and advice to those who need it. The measures will ensure that legal aid supports the objectives of the criminal justice system by, for example, supporting earlier preparation of cases and expeditious case management.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, why does not the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor accept that it is impossible to have a coherent system for civil legal aid until its funding is ring-fenced from that for criminal legal aid? As criminal legal aid cannot be cash limited, should not the burden of any overrun rest on taxpayers as a whole rather than on the unfortunate people who need civil legal aid to deal with their serious problems but cannot get it because the money has run out?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I do not believe the answer lies in ring-fencing civil legal aid but in getting hold of criminal legal aid expenditure. A small number of cases have caused a huge drain on the legal aid fund. One per cent of cases in the Crown Court involve 50 per cent of the Crown Court legal aid budget. We need to deal with such cases so that we can transfer money from those cases to other parts of the legal aid system, including crime and civil. The answer is not an artificial ring-fence but getting a grip on the expenditure.

Lord Renton: My Lords, to what extent, if at all, will the new system reduce the cost of legal aid?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, we intend to seek to redistribute the money. The judges have said, and I thoroughly agree, that criminal cases should not last longer than three months. Six months should be the absolute limit. In that way, we can redistribute money from the long criminal cases to civil legal aid and other parts of the criminal legal aid system. So it is not intended to reduce the expenditure.

Lord Henley: My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord remember the words he used in his consultation document A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid? On page 40, he said:
	"We are not in a position to reach any conclusion now on how these methods could best be delivered".
	Can the noble and learned Lord therefore give some assurance, since he is, in effect, proposing some very major changes to both civil and legal aid, that most of what he does will be done by means of primary rather than secondary legislation, so that it can be adequately discussed in this House and in another place?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, what I meant in that passage is that one needs a system which has the broad support of the people who depend on legal aid and the suppliers of legal aid. The announcement also involved asking my noble friend Lord Carter of Coles to look in detail at what is the best way to purchase criminal defence services and civil legal aid services. This is not a matter of primary or secondary legislation but of being on the ground, finding out operational methods with which to get a grip on the expenditure.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor accept that the legal aid scheme has been in crisis for a number of years and that, at the root of that crisis, is not only the issue that he correctly identifies of the balance between criminal and civil legal aid but the reward of solicitors in the civil legal aid system which in many cases has not been uprated for many years, leading to a flight of the most able legal aid solicitors from the legal aid scheme?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I accept the proposition at the heart of what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has said. I attended a gathering of civil legal aid solicitors the other day, and one of the most horrifying aspects was that they were all about my age. There are no young people coming into civil legal aid, and that is reflected in what has happened. Expenditure on criminal legal aid has gone up by 34 per cent; excluding asylum cases, expenditure on civil legal aid has gone down by 24 per cent. That is part of the explanation for the phenomenon described by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips.

Lord Filkin: My Lords, will my noble and learned friend clarify whether criminal legal aid expenditure is a product of increased volume or an increase in average costs and, if so, why so?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, there has been a small increase in volume which would not remotely explain the huge increase in criminal legal aid. The increase in costs has largely come from a few big cases. For example, last year £50 million was spent in criminal legal aid on 13 cases.

Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, in the context of the expenditure on criminal legal aid, has not the fundamental problem over the past 10 years been the tendency to lay multi-count indictments? The difficulty is that the old authority of the High Court judge who said "I will not try this—try the substance" has now gone. There ought to be a control of the indictments in some form which the noble and learned Lord could no doubt devise.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I accept that there is a problem about overloaded indictments with too many charges and too many defendants. The solution to the long case is not just about legal aid; it is also about judicial case management, appropriate charging and case management by prosecutors. But I believe that the judges, the prosecutors and now the legal aid arrangements are all bearing down on big trials to try to reduce their length and cost so that they are dealt with proportionately.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Arms Embargo

Baroness Northover: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What is their response to allegations made in Amnesty International's recent report on the involvement of British-based companies in the shipment of arms to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, the United Kingdom continues to observe and to support strongly the UN and EU arms embargoes on the Democratic Republic of Congo. We take seriously any allegations that UK entities may have been involved in the illicit supply of arms to embargoed destinations. Any evidence that we receive is passed promptly to the relevant United Kingdom authorities for their investigations. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the appropriate investigating body, made full inquiries into these allegations in 2003, but found no evidence of offences.

Baroness Northover: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. As he knows, terrible atrocities have been committed in the DRC and we heard only this week of women and children being rounded up and burned alive in their huts. Therefore, will he give the assurance that he will carry out a full and transparent inquiry, which he will make public, into the allegations in the Amnesty International report? If appropriate, will he follow that up with prosecutions? How many prosecutions in like cases have been carried through by the UK Government?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, as I said in my first response, these allegations go back to 2003 and a full investigation was made at the time. So that the House is fully in the picture, the transaction was between the Albanian and Rwandan Governments. The end user certificates were exchanged between them. No United Kingdom entity was involved in that process because, although the shipping company was a United Kingdom entity, it did not have an obligation to apply for any licences. However, I can tell the House that the Export Control Act 2002 came into force in May 2004, which introduced trade licences so that anyone who is trading, shipping or taking any part, would come under the purview of the United Kingdom.
	I apologise for a long answer, but this is a very grave matter. I believe that had we been in a position to have inspected that deal with the appropriate legislation at the time it is extremely unlikely that a licence would have been issued.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: My Lords, will the Minister also confirm that, during the period in which African International Airways was acting as the carrier for these arms and the investigation was under way, it was still undertaking work for Her Majesty's Government? Will he also confirm that, during that period, some 250 tonnes of arms—more than 5 million rounds of machine-gun ammunition and rocket propelled grenades—were shipped into the Democratic Republic of Congo? Will he also agree that if we are looking for weapons of mass destruction we need look no further than those kinds of arms in a conflict in which more than 3.5 million people have now died and 300,000 children are under arms.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, a huge number of small arms and ammunition for those arms unquestionably got into the Democratic Republic of Congo. That shows—if anything does—the importance of having a small arms treaty and one that can be enforced. In that sense, I share the sentiment expressed by the noble Lord. The company is not and has not for some time been engaged in any activity for which the United Kingdom Government have contracted it. If it is his wish, I will go back into earlier contracts, but I can tell noble Lords that there have certainly been no recent contracts.

Lord Judd: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the current global security threat is such that it emphasises that the arms trade in any form has the potential to be extremely dangerous? Would he not therefore agree that arms sales should take place only when there are convincing guarantees about the end use and there has been the most rigorous analysis of any political consequences? Will he also clarify whether brokering abroad by British residents or British citizens is beyond legal accountability in this country?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I certainly agree that it is of vital importance to establish who the end user is. Certainly, in the granting of any licences in the United Kingdom, that would be one of the principal considerations, and we would want to look at every possible potential political consequence. Of course, we cannot act between other governments, except when a British company is involved. As I understand the matter, if the entities are involved in trading, shipping, providing insurance or any associated activities for military, listed or restricted goods, they are now subject fully to legal restriction in a way that they were not at the time. We shall make full use of those powers to try to achieve the objectives that the noble Lord has described.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, are there not a number of serious allegations—apart from those made by Amnesty International—in the report of the group of experts appointed under Security Council Resolution 1533? Are we not obliged by Security Council Resolution 1596 to investigate the activities of our nationals when they are alleged to be involved in the operation of aircraft used for the transfer of arms? Does that not require us to launch investigations, rather than waiting for evidence to be submitted to us? Why has the United Nations not published the report of the group of experts which was meant to be submitted to it on 12 July? What is the reason for the delay?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I am not aware that there has been a delay in the publication of the report. The group of experts has continued its work, and the monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo to the DRC in the latter part of 2004 has been the subject of its most recent work. William Churchill was involved, and has criticised some of that early work. The report was made in March 2005, and the group's response is being examined by a committee of the United Nations Security Council. As I understand the matter, the group of experts is being encouraged to continue to observe the highest procedural and evidentiary standard in its work. It continues to work, and I believe that we should encourage it to do so.

Lord Garden: My Lords, did the investigation of 2003 also investigate the funding arrangements for these flights, given the concerns reflected in the Amnesty International report? Will the Minister undertake to publish in the public domain the investigation that cleared those airlines?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I do not believe that it is normal for Customs and Excise to publish reports in which it has concluded that it should not proceed to criminal proceedings. That would be an extremely unusual step to take. My understanding of the investigation that took place was that it went into all features of that transaction. I made the point that it was a transaction between two other sovereign countries; we had no input and, indeed, no evidence, about how they had funded the arrangement between the two of them. However, we looked at the British entity that was involved.
	All I can say—and when this is the case, it should be said—is that in the view of Customs and Excise no criminal act was committed. For those reasons it does not seem reasonable that the company should be exposed to any further report of that kind.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I do not know whether I should declare an interest, because my daughter works for the United Nations in the DRC. I want to take up a point made by my noble friend Lord Avebury in respect of the OECD experts' report, which covered wider issues of UK companies engaging in corrupt transactions in the DRC, which has led to its total state revenue being less than £1 billion. When will we devote the necessary resources at this end to the prosecution of the acts to which this Question relates and the prosecution of corruption by UK companies in the DRC, using the powers that the Government very properly took three years ago to prosecute extraterritorial corruption?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I do not believe that that question is difficult—or at least it is not as difficult as the one that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, nearly managed to direct at me earlier. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is quite right—the powers do exist, and a good deal of resource is put into that. That resource will be further focused because, as noble Lords know, one outcome of the Gleneagles discussions placed huge emphasis on eliminating corruption, not just by regimes in other countries, but with an obligation placed quite rightly on ourselves to eliminate corruption. I stand squarely behind that position.
	There are always difficulties in law in obtaining the sort of evidence that is required, but the effort to obtain it is very forceful indeed. If anybody is aware of any evidence that should be taken into account, I give a straightforward undertaking in this House that I will ensure that that evidence is placed in front of the prosecuting authorities.

Business of the House: Borough Freedom (Family Succession) Bill [HL]

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in the name of my noble friend the Lord President on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That leave be given to advance the Committee stage of the Borough Freedom (Family Succession) Bill from Wednesday 20 July to Tuesday 19 July.—(Lord Rooker.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Business of the House: Grand Committee Motions

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in the name of my noble friend on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That leave be given for the three Motions set down for today referring instruments to a Grand Committee to be moved en bloc.—(Lord Rooker.)

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I have a point of information. I have no intention of objecting to the Motion. It may be that as I have not given notice of this question the noble Lord is unable to answer it. However, am I right in thinking that these three Motions concern Scottish legislation and, if so, why are we dealing with orders emanating from Scottish legislation? Perhaps the noble Lord has the answer to that.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I do not but I presume that they are reserved matters for Westminster.

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the noble Lord has made an assumption. Will he follow that up with a letter to me, and place a copy in the Library of the House, confirming that that is the position? If this is amending English legislation, will it be dealt with by the appropriate departmental Minister rather than by the Scottish spokesman? Can that letter be sent to me before the matter is dealt with in the Moses Room?

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I shall send a letter immediately this exchange has finished. I understand that the referral has been agreed between the usual channels. Therefore, there must have been some debate. I believe that the orders will be taken next Tuesday by my noble and learned friend Lady Clark who was introduced today and who is a Minister dealing with Scottish affairs.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, I do not know whether it is great impertinence to assist the Deputy Leader of the House but I have studied the orders. It seems that they make amendments to United Kingdom Bills, which have been made necessary by decisions of the Scots Parliament on devolved matters. That is what I understand to be the case. I do not know whether that is of assistance.

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I am even more confused. Therefore, we shall be dealing with secondary legislation to make amendments to UK legislation, but emanating from legislation that has been passed in the Scottish Parliament, on which we have had no say. I find that rather strange. I am very much looking forward to the letter that the noble Lord will send to me.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2005

Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005 (Consequential Modifications) Order 2005

Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2005

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I beg to move the next three Motions standing in the name of my noble friend on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That the draft orders be referred to a Grand Committee.—(Lord Rooker.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Business of the House: Unstarred Question

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I beg to move the sixth Motion standing in the name of my noble friend on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That the following Unstarred Question be referred to a Grand Committee:
	The Viscount Astor—To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they will take to promote the art market in light of the proposed implementation of the European Union Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art.—(Lord Rooker.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Equality Bill [HL]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, on behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
	Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.
	House in Committee accordingly.
	[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]
	Clause 44 agreed to.
	Clause 45 [Religion and belief]:

Baroness Turner of Camden: moved Amendment No. 168:
	Page 25, line 22, leave out "means any religious or philosophical belief" and insert "has the same meaning as in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)"

Baroness Turner of Camden: In moving Amendment No. 168 I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 210 with which it is grouped and which covers the same point.
	We now come to the difficult area of defining religion and belief. It has been suggested to me by the Humanist Association, of which I am a vice-president, that a definition which diverges from that of the European Convention on Human Rights is liable to cause some difficulty. We would prefer wording that ensures that "belief" is interpreted in line with case law under the ECHR, making it clear that the beliefs intended are those that amount to a world view or life stance. The German text of the ECHR refers to Weltanschauung.
	We have discussed this before in the context of the Charities Bill. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated Article 9 of the ECHR into our law, and it says:
	"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance".
	There is therefore no need for a definition separate from that which "belief" already has in UK law as a result of the Human Rights Act. I beg to move.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness over her Amendments Nos. 168 and 210. Like her, we are not happy with the word "belief" as it appears in Clause 45 and Clause 47. However, we prefer our solution, which we mention in a later amendment, because the definition in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act is rather vague, and although it says various things, it could not be described as a definition.

Lord Brabazon of Tara: I must apologise to the House. I should have pointed out that if this amendment were agreed to, I would be unable to call Amendment No. 169.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I always feel depressed when I say anything in which I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden, especially in view of where she is coming from on this issue, but I agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its report, it said that the definition did not need to be altered in the way suggested. It welcomed the definition of the inclusive terms in the Bill, which reflect the protection afforded to religion and belief under Article 9 of the European Convention, which has been quoted by the noble Baroness. It pointed out that it makes it clear that protection is not dependent on similarity of belief. That was in the sixteenth report for 2004–05, paragraph 38.
	I agree, and although this is not in the amendment, I add that any attempt to try to define religion would create appalling problems, since those outside the definition would complain, and one would get into the vexed question of old religions, new religions, cults, and so on. For that reason, and with diffidence, I do not think that this amendment is needed.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: First, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Turner of Camden for putting forward Amendments Nos. 168 and 210. That has enabled us to discuss the definition of religion and belief, which we have introduced in Clause 45 and which, through Clause 77, will amend the definition currently contained in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. I recognise the expertise that my noble friend brings to this area as a former member of the EOC and as a vice president of the Humanist Association. Like the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I always find it difficult if I am about to disagree with her; but I am.
	With regard to Amendments Nos. 168 and 210, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not define religion or belief, so the effect of the amendment would be to leave the definition to human rights case law. The courts already take into account case law when they are called upon to decide whether something is a religion or belief for the purposes of Part 2 of the Bill. They already do that in relation to the employment regulations on religion and belief and in relation to religiously aggravated offences in criminal law. We believe therefore that there would be nothing to be gained from the amendments. Indeed, explicitly referring to the Human Rights Act might exclude the courts from taking into account case law arising from the criminal offences.
	It may be worth summarising what some of the key case law has provided. In X v UK in 1977, the main limitation on what constitutes a religion was that it must have a clear structure and belief system. In Campbell and Cosans v UK in 1982, "philosophical belief" was judged to be a belief that attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance that was worthy of respect in a democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity. In Baggs v Fudge from 2005—the most recent case—it was shown that a belief in the political views of the BNP should not be considered a belief for the purposes of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.
	It may also be worth reminding the Committee that a number of definitions exist in law in relation to religion and belief and that they reflect, to some extent, the different purposes that the laws are intended to have. In criminal law, the definition used is,
	"religious beliefs or lack of religious beliefs".
	The same definition is used in relation to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, which is currently being considered in the other place. In the Charities Bill, the definition is worded in terms of belief in God.
	What is, however, common with all those definitions is that none seeks to define what actual faiths or beliefs are covered by the law. That is left to the courts to decide, which is proper. We can see that there might be superficial attractions in seeking to define in the Bill what is or is not a religion or belief. It would help to ease concerns that some of the more outrageous beliefs might receive protection. However, that attraction is fairly superficial in nature.
	We believe that we have taken the right approach. The courts are best placed to make decisions on these difficult matters, taking into account all the information that they will have before them. That approach has worked well with existing legislation and we hope that it will have the support of everyone in relation to the Bill. I understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, prefers her own interpretation, but we think there may be difficulties ahead there too.

Baroness Turner of Camden: I thank my noble friend for that comprehensive answer. The briefing that I had from the British Humanist Association cites a number of cases in support of its case, including Campbell and Cosans v UK of 1982, which she cited. However, I note seriously what she said and also thank the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for his intervention. It is useful to have all this on record, and I am grateful to everybody who has participated, including the noble Baroness, Lady Miller. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: moved Amendment No. 169:
	Page 25, line 22, after "or" insert "similar"

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I note that both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, found it difficult to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. However, I have no doubt at all that the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will have no difficulty in disagreeing with me. I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 169 and 211 together. They are identical and slightly modify the definition of "belief" where it appears in Clauses 45 and 77. As drafted, the two clauses define "belief" as,
	"any religious or philosophical belief".
	My amendment proposes to insert "similar" before "philosophical", to make it clear that the type of belief protected is a sort of religious one.
	The Oxford English Dictionary defines a philosophy as,
	"the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality or existence".
	It also defines philosophy as,
	"a set of theories of a particular philosopher".
	It is, therefore, clear that, while it is true that every religious belief is based on some sort of philosophy, not every philosophy is religious. Marxism is a philosophy, as was national socialism. Those two examples alone should demonstrate the need to ensure that the sort of philosophy we wish to protect is a religious one.
	My thesaurus provides a long list of non-religious philosophies—from stoicism to transcendentalism and dialectical materialism. I have many other examples, but I shall not bore the House with them. I have been told that there is a legal rule of interpretation called ejusdem generis, which roughly means that items in a general list should be construed as including only things of the same type. However, it is important that we should make it clear that when we speak of "philosophies" in the same breath as "religion", we mean religious philosophies, not political ones, or the theories, as my dictionary states, of a particular philosopher or, again, according to the dictionary, merely the theoretical basis of a branch of knowledge.
	These amendments are not aimed at diminishing the two clauses, but are to tighten them by ensuring that they are not used by a person or group of people whose beliefs this Bill is not even remotely intended to protect.
	I hope that the Government—although I do not have much hope after listening to the Minister—will accept these two entirely constructive amendments, entailing the addition of one short word of just seven letters. It simply makes the issue clear to all lay people who do not know the law. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I find it equally difficult ever to say anything in disagreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon. In support of her amendment, it should be said that the Government thought she was correct regarding the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, which defined "religion or belief", to mean any religion, religious belief or similar philosophical belief. At that time a number of us were a little upset about that. People like me, who might best be classified as a passionate, disbelieving Jewish agnostics, had difficulty with being classified as having a "similar" philosophical belief to that of a religious person.
	That seemed strange and it is wrong that such regulations achieve exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, wants in the Bill. By forbidding discrimination based on religion or belief, it is important to cover those who have no belief and who are discriminated against because they have no belief; for instance, as agnostics, atheists and others. The Government have got it right in this definition, but wrong in the regulations. Somehow, the two need to be ironed out.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am now in the happy position that I have at last given pleasure to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and have given dissatisfaction to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, which she knows most people in this House, on all Benches, have difficulty with.
	Let me deal with the difference between the definition that we propose in Part 2 of the Bill and the definition that currently exists in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations. The difference, as Amendments Nos. 169 and 211 highlight, is that we have removed the word "similar", as the noble Baroness correctly identified, from the definition of "belief". It now reads,
	"any religious or philosophical belief",
	rather than, as in the regulations,
	"any religious or similar philosophical belief".
	I assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that there is no sinister motive in that. The intention behind the wording in Part 2 is identical to that in the employment regulations. However, in drafting Part 2, it was felt that the word "similar" added nothing and was, therefore, redundant. This is because the term "philosophical belief" will take its meaning from the context in which it appears; that is, as part of the legislation relating to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief.
	Given that context, philosophical beliefs must therefore always be of a similar nature to religious beliefs. It will be for the courts to decide what constitutes a belief for the purposes of Part 2 of the Bill, but case law suggests that any philosophical belief must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, must be worthy of respect in a democratic society and must not be incompatible with human dignity. Therefore an example of a belief that might meet this description is humanism, and examples of something that might not—I hope I do not give any offence to anyone present in the Chamber—would be support of a political party or a belief in the supreme nature of the Jedi Knights. I hope that this provides some assurance on the change of definition of "religion or belief" that we have adopted and I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore feel content to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I shall certainly withdraw the amendment in a moment, but whether I shall feel content about it is a different matter. I shall reflect upon what the Minister has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 45 agreed to.

Baroness Greengross: moved Amendment No. 169A:
	After Clause 45, insert the following new clause—
	"AGE
	In this Part "age" refers to a person's chronological age, or to a group of persons of similar chronological age to which a person is presumed to belong."

Baroness Greengross: In moving Amendment No. 169A, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 171A, 173B, 212V and 213A. These amendments extend protection from discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services on the grounds of age, marital status and transgender status. They are probing amendments to ask the Government to commit themselves to getting rid of the hierarchy of protection that exists. I know that there will have to be some exceptions. I am fully aware of that. This is a very complex issue, but I want to make sure that the commitment is there.
	I do not intend to move Amendment No. 173B.
	The Equality Bill will protect people from discrimination in these fields on the grounds of religion or belief. There is already protection on the grounds of race, gender or disability. But those who face similar discrimination on the grounds of their age, sexual orientation or transgender status do not receive protection. The Equality and Diversity Forum, with which I agree, urges the Government to harmonise this legislation across all strands so that people, whatever their characteristics or type of discrimination they face in, for example, healthcare, would receive the same protection. In introducing this legislation, it would be very unfair to leave people out because they do not comply with one strand but do with others. The amendment levels up the protection offered to all groups. It is in line with the commission's overall aim of tackling equality and diversity per se. We want to see well-thought-out legislation that will protect legitimate benefits or concessions, as I said at Second Reading.
	The forum welcomed the Labour Party manifesto commitment to a single equality Bill, the establishment of the discrimination law review and the Government's acknowledgement that more needs to be done to tackle ageism in financial services. But we do not know what the timetable for change will be and some action is needed urgently. So we hope that the single Equality Act, which presumably is where that legislation might lie, will be brought to Parliament as quickly as possible and, I hope, before the next Queen's Speech.
	In the field of age discrimination, which is the area that I am most interested in, current plans for legislation will extend only to discrimination, employment and training. However, evidence gathered by these amendments is intended to create the level playing field that I mentioned. We would like to see the Government use this Bill as an opportunity to outline their intention to introduce protection in the provision of goods, facilities and services. So we need a clear statement of intend from the Government.
	Help the Aged and Age Concern, among others, show that older people face discrimination in many areas, including social care, housing and hospital treatment, as well as with many commercial services. The forum believes that that is unacceptable and that older people are not protected from such discrimination. It is worrying that those who have changed their gender seem also not to be protected.
	There are no express provisions prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment in the other fields covered by the Sex Discrimination Act. So a member of the transgender community could claim discrimination under the SDA if he is refused a job, or sacked because of his transgender status, but if, for example, he is refused access to a hotel room or a drink in the pub there is currently no protection under the law. I know that amendments being proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and supported by Stonewall, will be aimed at bringing in legislation around sexual orientation. Those amendments cover the remaining two strands not currently protected by law.
	So, we would like to see the Government outlining their intention to introduce protection against discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services, with a clear statement of intend to tackle this issue, and with the recognition that there will be exceptions and that a lot of further work needs to be done in those areas. I beg to move.

The Duke of Montrose: Will the noble Baroness clarify her concern about the people who are affected by these transgender regulations? So far as I remember, when we passed the transgender legislation it was made clear that there was practically no way that anybody could pass on information that somebody was transgender. His birth certificate was going to be altered and it was going to be an offence to mention the fact to anybody. Is her concern perhaps—I know she mentioned medical treatment—because the medical records will still contain the information about the person being transgender? Is that the weakness?

Baroness Greengross: I thank the noble Duke for that question. To be honest, I am not sure because I come to this from the age point of view. The briefings I have say that there is nothing to prohibit discrimination of the sort I mentioned on the grounds of gender reassignment. I agree with the noble Duke that this could be very difficult to prove. I am not sure whether it is just recognising somebody or what it might be. We know of some very prominent people in many professions who are transgender, who obviously do not come up against that sort of prejudice. Maybe it is just if somebody knows, he knows, and then he is discriminatory. But people in this position need the same protection as everyone else and it would be a better law if it protected everyone.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I know that the noble Baroness seeks commitment from the Government. I understand that very well and I am sure that we have a lot of sympathy with her, but I am slightly puzzled by what she said and by the brief which Age Concern very kindly sent me. It says that one of the problems of age discrimination is what happens in care homes.
	I do not understand why that problem would be eased by legislation about age discrimination. I refer, for example, to care homes, where most people are old—they may not all be exactly the same age, but they are old—and where there is mistreatment, which we all know happens and which is very worrying; I entirely agree with Age Concern about that. That is not exactly discrimination; it is a case of a bad care home for looking after old people. How does that fit with the concept of discrimination against old people?

Baroness Greengross: I thank the noble Baroness for asking that question. In answering it, I think that she is referring to the public duty, which is in my later amendments. If it is a public body, such as a local authority, the Act introduces public duty. A later amendment that I shall move proposes to extend the public duty. The noble Baroness may be talking about that. Is her question specifically about care homes?

Baroness Turner of Camden: I am by no means certain that current legislation protects transgender people from discrimination. I recollect cases where people have been discriminated against in the job that they do after an operation to change gender. I received a briefing from the Equal Opportunities Commission, which stated that it did not think that the legislation or proposals before us covered transgender people and thought that the issue should be raised. I thank my noble friend Lady Greengross for raising it, because at least it means that we can discuss it and the Minister will respond.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My view is that all those areas of unfair treatment ought to be covered in a single Equality Bill. I spent four years with Professor Sir Robert Hepple and others seeking to produce such a Bill, which was approved by this House but died in the other place. So I have no doubt that the object of the amendment should be pursued.
	In a sense, the Government have made difficulties for themselves by including Part 2. It would have been wiser not to include religious discrimination at all, but there are obvious political reasons why that particular form of unfair discrimination was regarded as pressing. But by including Part 2, there is immediately the powerful argument from everyone else who is not covered in relation to goods, facilities and services: "What about these other strands?". There are no good reasons, other than technical reasons and lack of parliamentary time, why those other strands should not be included.
	Some of those strands would be technically easier to include than others. Gender reassignment would not be technically difficult to include; marital status would not be difficult. Age would be more difficult, especially, as we will find later, in the area of employment. There is also a powerful case to include sexual orientation discrimination, which we will consider later.
	I entirely liked the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, moved the amendment—a moderate and probing way. If ways can be found of including in the Bill some of the simpler examples in addition to religion—I am talking not about politics but about technique, drafting and getting it right—for marital status and gender reassignment, so much the better. If that cannot be done—no doubt the Minister will explain to us, now or hereafter, if that is the case—the Committee would need firm assurance that the discrimination law review, to which we all look forward, will lead to a Bill that one way or another covers all the main forms of unfair treatment that we call discrimination, and that that will be introduced during the lifetime of this Government.

Baroness O'Cathain: I strongly oppose the amendments because they would massively complicate a controversial area of law which was recently rewritten by the Government's Gender Recognition Act 2004. I fear that these amendments, which attempt to extend Part 2 to transsexualism, will reopen debates about forcing religious groups to compromise their doctrinal conviction that a person cannot change sex.
	We have already gone round this during the passage of the Gender Recognition Bill, when I quoted extensively from Parry v Vine Christian Centre. I have no intention of going into all that at the moment. But we know that some Churches have been threatened with legal action by transsexuals who are unhappy with the position of that Church. These amendments would create a new legal landscape in which we would see more legal actions of that sort.

Earl Ferrers: I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, on the courteous and gently probing way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, spoke to her amendments to find out what the Government think. It was done most graciously.
	I hope that the noble Baroness will be careful before going too far down the track of agreement, for the very reasons that my noble friend Lady O'Cathain has given. On the face of it, anything that is discriminatory appears wrong, but here we are dealing with cases of religious conviction, what people think, what Churches think and what is the cause of their doctrine. There are occasions when people have been deeply wounded and hurt by having things forced upon them by Acts of Parliament. We must be careful.
	I give the simple example of people who have changed sex and then wish to use ladies' lavatories and go to women's-only meetings. There may be excellent reasons why the individuals concerned should do that but one must also take into account the feelings of others who might find it harder to accept it and would be greatly offended if the law now forced something of that nature upon them. I do not wish to go into what is right or wrong, but I hope that the noble Baroness will bear that in mind before she goes too far down the road of compliance.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, for raising the issue, and all Members of the Committee who have participated in this short debate. It has clearly identified that there are some very difficult and important issues to be explored. But we have been frank in our acceptance that the existing discrimination law is not perfect.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, has described, there are many areas where the law does not protect people discriminated against on grounds such as age and gender reassignment. For instance, individuals are protected against discrimination, as the noble Duke recalled correctly, on grounds of gender reassignment status in employment and vocational training, but they are not currently protected against discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services. Those gaps in protection will be looked at as part of the discrimination law review.
	As we recognised those gaps and inconsistencies in the current framework and believe that there is a case for a simpler, fairer framework, taking in all the issues that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and the noble Earl have raised on the other part, we launched in February the discrimination law review to look at the scope and effect of that area of law.
	An important aim of the review will be to consider how more consistent and effective protection against discrimination can be provided. The issues relating to age discrimination are, as the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, made plain at Second Reading, quite comprehensive. We all recognise the difficulties. They are particularly complex, and they will require careful consideration. That is why we expect the discrimination law review to undertake the detailed work that I described in close consultation with experts and others who may be particularly and peculiarly interested in it.
	In May, the Government were elected on a manifesto commitment to introduce a single equality Act. The recommendations from the discrimination law review will lead to a single equality Bill, which we will introduce in the lifetime of this Parliament. The work of the review is under way, and we are committed to enacting a single equality Act in the lifetime of this Parliament.
	The only thing, I think, that stands between the noble Baroness's intentions and those of the Government, is timing. I hope that I have made it plain that we are not in any way resistant to undertaking the work but look forward to completing it.

Earl Ferrers: Would the noble Baroness be kind enough to explain that a little further? She said that there was not very much between her and the noble Baroness. Does that mean that she would like to put into statute all that the noble Baroness said, despite the reservations that some people have?
	I return to the Church matter that I referred to. If some people in a Church found it difficult to accept the use by transgender people of, for instance, ladies' lavatories or women-only meetings—that would be understandable—it would be a great pity if the Church were to be drawn into having to defend its beliefs and doctrines in a court of law because of something that may have been put inadequately into an Act of Parliament.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I say plainly that I understand the anxieties and concerns that the noble Earl raises. The purpose of the review is to examine the scope and effect of this area of law. We will have to debate and discuss it. When the review comes out with its conclusions, we will be able to give it full consideration. Indeed, when and if a Bill comes forward, we will have further opportunities for us all to discuss the issues and find a way through that will not be discriminatory against any other group but will be fair and honour the rights of all our people. All those issues will be important for us.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Will the Minister accept that there are anxieties the other way? There are the anxieties of a cautious, prudential kind about extension to matters of private life. Exceptions would have to be fashioned to deal with those objections, so that the law did not go too far.
	I take it that it is common ground that, subject to the difficult business of fashioning proper exceptions to balance equality against other values, such as personal privacy and religious freedom—I accept those—the review is predicated on the assumption that age discrimination in the provisions of goods, services and facilities; sexual orientation discrimination in that area; marital status discrimination; and transsexual or transgender discrimination will be covered, subject to appropriate exceptions and limitations. If that is not the position, we will have to come back to the matter rather more strongly at a later stage, without prejudice to all the necessary care and consultation on the exceptions. Is that, roughly, the Government's position?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is, because we are dealing with improper and unfair discrimination. The Government are absolutely committed to trying to eradicate as far as possible any improper and unfair discrimination. Perhaps I may invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Greengross: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 46 [Discrimination]:

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: moved Amendment No. 170:
	Page 25, line 31, leave out paragraph (a).

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I want to do this in an intelligible way. The grouping is such that it deals with two topics, which I need to unpack so that even I can understand what I am talking about.
	Amendment No. 170 focuses on the provision dealing with discrimination in Clause 46. Clause 46(1) defines as unlawful discrimination which is,
	"on grounds of religion or belief".
	Clause 46(2) has an exception clause, which states that in Clause 46(1),
	"the reference to religion or belief is a reference to—
	(a) a religion or belief of B or of any other person except A, and
	(b) a religion or belief to which B or any other person except A is thought to belong or subscribe".
	Amendment No. 170 concerns the following example. Let us suppose that a member of the liberal wing of the Jewish faith eats pork and a member of the orthodox wing of the Jewish faith strongly objects to any Jew or religious Jew eating pork. They are both members of the same religion—this is entirely hypothetical, which I am trying to explain with an example—but perhaps the orthodox Jew is a bigot who decides to discriminate against or to harass the less orthodox or unorthodox Jew for eating pork.
	The problem is whether the exception in Clause 46(2)(a) prevents the liberal Jew being protected against discrimination or harassment because the discriminator has the same religion as the alleged victim. This is where the matter gets complicated and I apologise for having to take it slowly so that I follow my argument. The problem is that normally in discrimination law the position of the discriminator vis-à-vis the victim does not matter.
	In other words, if I, or a woman, discriminate against a woman, the gender of the discriminator is irrelevant. If a victim is the victim of sex discrimination, the fact that the discriminator is of the same sex does not matter. The same is true of racial discrimination. It does not matter whether the perpetrator of race discrimination is of the same colour or ethnicity as the victim: if a black person discriminates against another black person because of the other person's ethnicity that would be unlawful.
	However, the Government have taken a different view on religion. In this provision they say that my example of the liberal and orthodox Jew is covered because the liberal Jew would be discriminated against on the basis of religion or belief as provided for in Clause 46(1). I know that the Government do not mean to do this and I am moving the amendment in order to press them to think harder about how to get it right. But the problem is that in most discrimination cases, the views and beliefs of the alleged discriminator are highly relevant in determining whether the reason for the less favourable treatment is forbidden ground, such as race or gender, or some other reason.
	If I am a publican and I refuse to serve a drink to a black person, but I say that I did not do so because he was not wearing a tie, the case is all about whether the true reason is because the person was not wearing a tie or because he was black. If I appear for the alleged victim, I will cross-examine the publican about his views. I would ask, "Is it not right, Mr Snodgrass, that you have expressed strongly racist views and made unpleasant remarks to your guests in the past? Does that not reveal that the true reason why you objected to serving the alleged victim was because of his colour?". So the views and beliefs of the discriminator are highly relevant in deciding whether the difference of treatment being complained of is a forbidden ground or something else.
	However, given how this paragraph is worded, unless the courts rewrite it—I am not in favour of asking courts to rewrite words that we can get right ourselves; not only because of the expense and delay, but also because the citizen is entitled to a statute which on its face says what should be said—I am worried that the liberal Jew in my hypothetical example would be met with the defence that he is of the same religion or belief as the alleged discriminator and therefore is taken out of the remit of Clause 46(1). That covers the first part of my concerns.
	The other amendments in the group deal with a quite different concern: that of the lack of definition of harassment. Clause 47(1) outlines a different kind of civil wrong, this time addressing not discrimination, but quite rightly turning to harassment. It states that,
	"a person . . . harasses another . . . if on the grounds of religion or belief A does anything which has the purpose or effect of . . . violating B's dignity".
	I am not worried about paragraph (b), which refers to,
	"creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment",
	because we can all understand those. But what is meant by "violating B's dignity"? It worries me because it is such a broad concept that it is capable of covering an enormous range of conduct which few sensible people would think should be covered.
	I know that the word "dignity" is rooted in international human rights law, European Union law and so forth, and I know that it is not defined. But in European human rights law, the concept of "dignity" normally relates inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment—that form of violation of one's dignity; or violating one's private life, which is another form of indignity. So my amendment seeks to give some kind of content to the word "dignity" in order to narrow it. Why does that matter? I want to narrow the concept—but not necessarily to my words because they may not be broad enough—to give it some definition and something that one can hang on to, in order that the exceptions to which I will come later are not over-broad.
	I hope that I have not bored the Committee stiff by trying to explain this. It is a very complicated subject but it is important that we should unpack these issues at this stage in order that we can all reflect further in the light of the Minister's response. I apologise for having taken so long. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I believe I understand the noble Lord's difficulty. Perhaps I should go through the areas where we agree and try to explain some of the issues at this stage. I should say to the noble Lord immediately that there may be a few areas where we can look again at the wording. This is not because I am convinced that we will find any better wording but because there is something here that we need to consider.
	If I understand the intention behind Amendments Nos. 170 and 173 correctly, it is to allow the courts to take into account the religion or belief of the person who has discriminated when deciding on cases involving discrimination and harassment. I now understand that the noble Lord is particularly concerned in relation to Clause 46(2) and how it could be used in cross-examination.
	Let me emphasise the areas where we do agree. I agree with the noble Lord that otherwise his Amendments Nos. 170 and 173 would appear to be at odds with the key principle of discrimination law—namely, that the position of the person discriminating is immaterial—which, of course, is what the noble Lord says is stated in Clause 46(1). For example, as the noble Lord has made clear, it does not matter if a woman is discriminated against by a man or a woman; it does not matter whether a Chinese person is discriminated against by a Somali or a Welsh person; it does not matter if discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is shown by a person of the same sexual orientation. In all these cases, what matters is that the person has been discriminated against. I believe we are at one on that issue.
	The reason for the amendments, therefore, seems to be to ensure that the person's own religious or other beliefs cannot be used as a justification for discrimination or harassment on the grounds of religion and belief. If that is partly what the noble Lord seeks, I understand and sympathise with the intention behind the amendments. I should like to take the opportunity to place on record that it is neither the intention nor the effect of the clauses as currently drafted to allow discrimination or harassment in such cases.
	Clauses 46(2)(a) and 47(2)(a) would cover where a person discriminates against or harasses any person contrary to a clause in Part 2 because that individual does not share his beliefs. This would include situations where both people expressed different beliefs within the same religion, as the noble Lord has indicated. So an Orthodox Jew providing a good facility or service could not lawfully discriminate against or harass another more secular Jew on the grounds that he was not religious enough.
	I understand the complexity of the matter and I know that the noble Lord wishes to get it right. From everything that he has said I take the view that he wants to do exactly what we want to do, save that he is not sure that the wording will achieve what we both aspire to achieve. We believe it does, but I am very happy to take it away, look at it further and ensure that we are as confident as we can be that the matters that should be covered are covered.
	As to Amendment No. 172, the wording we have used in the provision—which reflects the wording of religion and belief regulations and other regulations implementing the employment directive—is taken directly from the employment directive itself. The wording of the race directive is the same. It seemed right to us, particularly in this sensitive area, to rely on the courts to develop the concept in line with EC law and not risk embodying in this legislation constraints which might conflict with that.
	The concept of dignity is, as the noble Lord says, wide, but it also has a vital depth. It is recognised widely as significant; it does not refer to trivial slights or minor rudeness but to something much more basic, and we wish to protect that. I hope that I am right in thinking that there is not much distance in the intention between ourselves and the noble Lord in that respect, although we may disagree about the wording and its effect. It is not our intention that harassment could be successfully claimed over trivial matters, and we do not think that our current wording has that effect. As I say, it reproduces existing legislation.
	If we have misunderstood the noble Lord's concerns on the matter, we will of course be happy to continue to listen. We think that the amendments are not merited but I will look at this before Report and hope that we will either be able to satisfy ourselves that the wording is fit for purpose or to come up with wording which may better express our joint intention.

Earl Ferrers: Perhaps I may add one point of a general nature. I did my best to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, but I am afraid I got lost after about two minutes. That is due to my own incapacity, not the noble Lord's. I was very excited that his amendment sought to leave out Clause 47(1)(a) which refers to "violating B's dignity". That brings us back to the very beginning; the commissioner will have a fundamental duty to create a society in which,
	"there is respect for the dignity and worth of each individual".
	I remember saying earlier that I could not see how any court of law could say what a person's dignity is. We all know what is meant by "dignity", but saying that someone has offended against your dignity will be enormously difficult to prove. I was excited when the noble Lord, Lord Lester, put down his amendment because I thought that the provision would be removed, but the effect will remain.
	Will the noble Baroness think very carefully about how a court will decide about a person's dignity? It is a nebulous thing—we all know what is meant by it but it is quite another matter for a person to go to a court and a judge to say, "Your dignity has been affronted". I hope that the noble Baroness will think about that carefully.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I can assure the noble Earl that we will give, and have given, this a great deal of thought. That is why we have tried to replicate the current legal position—the jurisprudence that we are comfortable with—because the courts have been able to interpret this in a way that makes sense. So we are not seeking in this provision to make the position either more complex or more opaque.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I wonder whether the Minister could help me. She has just said that we are seeking to give effect to case law. This is a filthy question and I apologise for asking it because I expect that she will need to take further advice, but the noble Baroness has not given us a single example of what would be within the notion of violating dignity and what would not. Nor has she referred to a single case—I do not know of any—in which this concept has been interpreted. I shall comment in my reply, but if she could give us examples either side of the line to hang on to, I would be happier. If she could say of a single case, "This is where the courts have given guidance", I would be even happier. If she needs to write to us about it, that is fine, but before I reply, I would like her to have the opportunity of helping if she can.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am now desperately scrabbling in my mind to think of a case. I must be absolutely open with the noble Lord and say that not one case springs to mind. I hope that I have not been precipitous. I will certainly scour the records. As I said in my earlier comments, this is a difficult area. It will be complex and that is why we want to take this matter away and make sure that the legislation will be workable and will do that which we seem, jointly, to want to deliver.

Earl Ferrers: The Minister might have been a little precipitous in what she said. She said to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, that she could not think of one case where this matter had been brought up and proved, yet earlier she said that the courts understood perfectly well how to translate the provision. It would seem that the courts do not know how to translate it because they have not had to. Not only do the courts need to know, but the individual has to know. If someone says, "You are a horrible old Earl", or something, I could say that my dignity had been violated. However, it is difficult to have that proved. I hope that the Minister will give this matter a lot of thought.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I make it plain that I have never at any stage laid claim to omnificence. Therefore, I am absolutely confident that although not one case comes to my mind, there will be a legion of wonderful legal experts who will teach me how clearly obtuse I am on this subject.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am extremely grateful to everyone who has taken part in this debate, both the Minister and in particular the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers. My first point is purely technical and I am sure that I was unintelligible to any person of reasonable intellect because it is a ghastly, horrible subject. However, if the Minister will go away and think about what I said I will be grateful. On the second point about dignity—

Earl Ferrers: Does that all-embracing phrase "person of reasonable intellect" include me?

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Without question. So far as the dignity of an Earl is concerned, I can tell the noble Earl that he would have a remedy only if the purpose or effect of whatever was on the basis of his religion or belief. I do not think that he would have a remedy otherwise. But I would never dream of violating his dignity any more than he would mine—if I had any, and I am not sure that I do.
	I know this measure comes from European law in the employment field. One can just about get away with this vagueness in the employment field because the dignity of a worker is somehow something that one can get used to interpreting. But we are discussing goods, services and facilities—services to the public.
	This is the kind of thing that worries me. A member of my Chambers wears a headscarf. We have no problem about her wearing a headscarf in court, but suppose she found herself in the Netherlands. There, decent progressive female judges have told me that they would never dream of allowing a court official to wear a headscarf because it would violate the notion of equality before the law.
	What worries me—especially in the sensitive area of religion and belief and especially in the terrible times in which we live—is that this is creating a civil wrong of a very vague kind. If the concept of dignity is so broad that it could include such a sensitive area, just like that, the exceptions in the clause do not tackle that problem. This is why I am unhappy about Part 2 being included in the Bill at all because I wish that there had been much more time for thought on these kinds of issues.
	I find myself sympathising with the noble Earl. What I am really concerned about is, apart from anything else, reasonable legal certainty. I see the problem about achieving reasonable legal certainty, but I shall leave the matter at this point by saying that when we come back at Report, we will need something much more concrete to guide us as to what "dignity" does and does not mean. If it was left entirely for the courts to decide, what we are really saying is that the courts could invent a tort for civil wrong and the exceptions to it. As much as I admire our judiciary, that is not a fair thing to do. It is Parliament that ought to get it right—and I suspect that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, and I are absolutely at one on that.
	I hope that we can think more about the matter, and come back to it on Report with more guidance from the Government. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: moved Amendment No. 171:
	Page 25, line 35, leave out "requirement, condition" and insert "provision, criterion"

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: This is another amendment from a lawyer, I am afraid—in this case about the definition of indirect discrimination. It is my attempt to make the law user-friendly, to simplify it, and not to create work for lawyers or have to pay for judges to deal with inconsistent definitions but to have a single user-friendly definition of what constitutes indirect discrimination—in other words, the equal rule with unequal effect. Here we are dealing with indirect discrimination in relation to religion or belief in access to goods, facilities or services.
	Clause 46(3) applies when a "requirement, condition or practice" would put someone at a disadvantage. That is narrower than the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended by the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, which refer to "provision, criterion or practice". That suggests that different standards apply to religious discrimination in employment and in goods, facilities or services.
	The Joint Committee on Human Rights said that,
	"it appears to us desirable in the interests of clear and effective protection against discrimination that the terms of the Bill should be consistent with existing legislation".
	Justice—and I should declare an interest as a member of that body's counsel—is concerned that institutional discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief may arise from unwritten procedures and practice which may be insufficiently fixed to be caught by the definition of a requirement or condition.
	There is really no justification that I can think of for using different words in different statutes. That could result in the position of a court seeking to distinguish between indirect discrimination in relation to Jews and Sikhs and those relating to Muslims and Hindus, to which different definitions would apply.
	When I had the privilege of working on the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Bills with the late Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, we saw immediately that the definition that parliamentary counsel had written into those Bills would lead to acres of litigation. We tried unsuccessfully to get a user-friendly definition—and sure enough, the provisions led to acres of pointless litigation. The result is that the law on indirect discrimination is in a real mess, because there are different definitions, and the case law differs according to whether British or European standards are being considered.
	Even if I do not persuade the Government to accept this amendment, I beg them, with regard to the discrimination law review and creating a single equality Bill which is fit for human use, to get a consistent definition of discrimination that applies to all strands. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I understand the point that the noble Lord is trying to make in relation to this amendment—to bring the drafting of Clause 46 into line with the wording currently used in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, with regard to the definition of indirect discrimination.
	I wish to explain to the noble Lord why we think that the definition we now have does that and brings clarity. The change in the wording did not seek to narrow the definition of "indirect discrimination" but to clarify it for many of the reasons to which the noble Lord just alluded.
	The wording used in the 2003 regulations incorporates the words "provision" and "criterion" because those words come directly from the European directive which the regulations implement. As the noble Lord knows, there are, however, other words used—for instance, "requirement" and "condition"—in discrimination law which has not been affected by the directives; for example, parts of the Race Relations Act 1976.
	I understand that the drafting in this Bill is felt by those responsible for that onerous task to be clearer than that in the 2003 regulations and to provide a more satisfactory indication of what is intended by these provisions.
	It is a point worth raising and discussing, and may be we shall come to it again as part of the debates on a single equality Bill. For now we resist the amendment, but I say to the noble Lord that the aspiration of the draftsman is that this definition will become the preferred definition because it harmonises what was in the directive and what was in our law in a way that will bring the two together.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am grateful but I am not persuaded. This definition is narrower than the one that I seek. The Bill speaks of a requirement or a condition. The words "requirement" or "condition" are precisely the problem in Section 1(1)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act and in Section 1(1)(b) of the Race Relations Act. My words, "provision" or "criterion", which reflect other sources, are broader and more generous and capture what indirect discrimination is really about. The fact that the Government's version refers to the practice has no substantial effect at all. That simply means more than one act; a series of acts. Therefore, I am dismayed to think that those who have advised the Government believe that they have given a more generous definition than mine and that they think it is a model for the single equality Bill. I hope to persuade them to the contrary. However, in the mean time—

Earl Ferrers: Before the noble Lord, Lord Lester, withdraws the amendment, he let slip a very alarming prospect. I believe he said that when he and the late Lord Jenkins of Hillhead discussed the Sex Discrimination Bill and the Equal Opportunities Bill—that is what I think he called it—they discovered that certain words were wrong. However, I understood the noble Lord to say that the parliamentary draftsman insisted on keeping those words. Presumably the late Lord Jenkins was then Home Secretary. I find it rather alarming that the Home Secretary could not overrule the parliamentary draftsman as a result of which the legislation that was put on the statute book was wrong. Does the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, think that the current parliamentary draftsman—who, presumably, is not the same parliamentary draftsman that we have been discussing—is any less obdurate and any more likely to be right than his predecessor?

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: The noble Earl leads me into a bit of sinning, and I shall now sin. I am not sure whether I am allowed to say this, but I shall say it as it is more than 30 years after the relevant events and I am self-authorising myself under what was then the Official Secrets Act. The position is quite simple. I had to attend before the then Attorney-General who agreed with me that the drafting was wrong. I said, "That is fine. I shall report back to the Home Secretary". The Attorney-General said, "That is not fine because I have no authority over parliamentary counsel". I asked, "What do I do now?". He replied, "You will have to go to the Prime Minister". At which point, I went back to the Home Secretary and said, "I do not think that you can go to Harold Wilson on a drafting point on Section 1(1)(b) of the Bill. We will have to accept it". It is fair to say that current parliamentary counsel have told me that they do not behave in that way any more, but that is what happened at the time, and we tried really hard.
	That is why, having looked at the appalling, avoidable litigation, the words "requirement" and "condition", with case law being an absolute bar on that kind of thing, have been extremely restrictive against black people and women and ought not to be continued.
	I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 171A not moved.]
	Clause 46 agreed to.
	Clause 47 [Harassment]:
	[Amendments Nos. 172 and 173 not moved.]

Baroness O'Cathain: moved Amendment No. 173A:
	Page 26, line 34, at end insert—
	"( ) Action by A shall not be regarded as having the effect described in subsection (1) if it involves allowing religious objects, books, practices and observances to remain in place."

Baroness O'Cathain: I raised on Second Reading my concerns that the Bill, well intentioned though it may be, could be used by those who are hostile to our Christian heritage. I am absolutely sure that is not the Government's intention. This is a probing amendment, giving me the opportunity to press the Minister to explain how we can be sure that this will not be so. We really need a safeguard in the Bill, and this amendment is almost certainly not up to the job. If the Government agree with me, I am sure that they can produce something that is up to the job.
	Why am I worried about Clause 47? I am concerned about the way in which it could be interpreted by the courts, local authority legal officers, other public bodies and private companies. Clause 47 makes harassment on the grounds of religion unlawful. That sounds fair enough, but it defines harassment in a very broad way. It covers:
	"creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment".
	That definition is taken from employment law. The legal advice from harassment law specialist Neil Addison suggests that the definition is too wide for use outside the workplace. It certainly seems to create a real risk of vexatious litigation.
	We would probably see examples such as the case in Australia, where a witch by the name of Fletcher is suing the prison service and the Salvation Army over the Alpha course, which is a well-known introductory course for those interested in the Christian faith. Mr Fletcher said that the course vilified his pagan beliefs by suggesting that Christians should get rid of any books on witchcraft that they owned. Incidentally, Mr Fletcher is currently in prison for sexually abusing teenage girls in pursuit of his pagan beliefs. A paedophile witch suing under religious vilification law—you really could not make it up.
	The harassment provision would be a gift to people such as Mr Fletcher. I fear that those who object to Bibles in hospital wards or in private hotels will attempt to claim that the presence of the Bible created a "hostile", "intimidating" and "offensive" environment for them. Remember that we have already had the cross removed from a crematorium in Torbay. That is local authority officials taking a belt and braces approach—playing it safe. Frankly, who can blame them? Will we see more local authorities banning Christmas and renaming it "Winterval" as was done in Birmingham some seven years ago?
	I worry that the all-powerful commission might decide that a proper interpretation of harassment requires the removal of Christian symbols. Will we end up like the US, where there is a constant stream of litigation from anti-religious groups seeking to erase all public reference to the Christian faith? Will it be even worse, since the provisions in the Bill apply to the private as well as the public sector?
	The Christian Institute, which has briefed me on this matter, sent out a briefing listing seven examples of precisely the sort of thing that concerns me. They include the case that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, mentioned at Second Reading, of Barnabas House in Norfolk, where the local authority said that the presence of Bibles and saying grace offended other faiths. It also cites two universities that tried to ban Bibles or prayers, two hospitals that thought the Christian faith offensive to others, and a local authority that was urged to drop Christian prayers because they were not "equally welcoming" to other religious groups.
	To most people, such cases represent a clear attack on our Judeo-Christian heritage. It is not only Christians who are concerned. For example, when it was reported in June that the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust was considering banning Bibles from bedside lockers to avoid offending other faiths, Resham Singh Sandhu, the Sikh chairman of the Leicester Council of Faiths said:
	"I don't think many ethnic minority patients would object to the Bible in a locker".
	Suleman Nagdi of Leicestershire's Federation of Muslim Organisations said, in the Daily Telegraph on 3 June 2005:
	"This is a Christian country and it would be sad to see the tradition end".
	My concern is not so much about action under the Bill by other religions, but action by public officials who are so concerned to appear non-discriminatory that they end up upsetting everybody.
	I am proud to live in a country where we enjoy religious tolerance, of which many other countries can only dream. I am a Christian and believe that Christ's words that he is the only way, the truth and the life are true, but I respect people holding different religious beliefs. Fundamentally, I believe that we must all be vigilant about preserving their freedom of worship. However, that does not imply that we should ditch our country's Christian heritage, nor that we hide or be ashamed of it. We are proud of it and celebrate it. It is the Christian tradition that has created the society in which people of all kinds of religions from all over the world can worship freely and openly.
	As I mentioned at Second Reading, in the most recent census almost three-quarters of the United Kingdom population claimed that they were Christians. I fear that the Bill as it stands could cause more problems than we could ever imagine. I firmly believe that both the harassment offence and the general discrimination provisions should be circumscribed by wording in the Bill that makes it plain that Part 2 should not be interpreted in this way. Our Christian heritage is important. We should treasure it, as I know that many noble Lords throughout the House do. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. I beg to move.

Earl Ferrers: I agree very much with what my noble friend Lady O'Cathain said. She referred obliquely to the fact that many local authorities are nowadays frightened to send out Christmas cards or put up cribs because people will say that they are proselytising one form of faith, and that that may give offence to others. We are being far too squeamish. Anything that the law does to encourage that, now or in future, is not correct.
	My noble friend also referred to Barnabas House, which I mentioned. The noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, was kind enough to say that she would look into that. There are other cases about Bibles in hotel rooms.
	My fear is twofold. The first is that, in the case of Barnabas House, the threat was that a grant would be removed. That gives huge power to officials in local authorities to say that a certain organisation will not henceforth have a grant. That is not because officials are being dictatorial, but because they are carrying out what they think is the law. They have a duty to carry out the law as they see it. My fear is that we may so construct the law that officials will feel that they ought to act in such a way. That is wrong.
	It is also wrong that people should have their religions put in the dock for the following reason. A hotel may put Bibles in a room and a person with extreme views may say, "This is proselytising and offending me", and might take the matter to the Equal Opportunities Commission, which then prosecutes that hotel. What is the result? The hotel will say, "We don't want to go through all the business and huge expense of going to court and engaging barristers and so on. So we will take the easy way out. We will remove those 'offending' Bibles from the hotel rooms".
	That would be a huge miscarriage of justice, caused by the existence of such a law. It is our duty to ensure that any new Bill that becomes law should not allow such a possibility whereby people who, rightly, exercise their religious views, suddenly find that they are obliged to close up on them and not allow people to know what those views are, due to a fear of prosecution.

Lord Waddington: I support what my noble friends have said. I hope that the Minister will not say, "Well, this form of words is quite unnecessary", because that is really not the point. There is enough evidence already that local authorities and other bodies over-react to the present law and there is a real fear that unless something is put on the face of the Bill, Bibles in hotel rooms and other places will disappear, simply because people will misinterpret the intention of the legislation.
	I would like the noble Baroness so say that no possible harm could be done by adding the words in the amendment and that they may be helpful in making it plain to local authorities and others that something is going seriously wrong when Christians in this country feel that religious objects and books are being removed due to the unreasonable fear that they might cause offence to others.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I certainly think that the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, raises profound questions to which I do not have profound answers. One problem is that in our delightful, flexible and unwritten constitution, we have never properly defined the relationship between Church and state and separated them in the absolute way that is done, for example, in the United States. As people have read in newspapers, and as I have done in documents here, the Supreme Court in the United States has to decide whether bringing the Ten Commandments into a court house or on to the highway is or is not a violation of Church and state. Its reasoning is fascinating and some day, some judge may have to do something similar.
	My problem is that when the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, referred to the Christian Church—a point which I entirely understand, because we have an established Church that is well represented in this House by people more competent than I to speak about—we are looking at the matter from a Christian or a Judeo-Christian point of view.
	All of us feel that there are some contexts where proselytising is wholly inappropriate and should not be permitted. All of us feel that there are some religious contexts where there is nothing remotely offensive or improper in religious objects or instruments of religion being present. But the amendment refers to,
	"religious objects, books, practices and observances".
	Those words could apply equally to the Koran or to the works of Ron Hubbard—the Scientology books. The Scientologists claim to be a religion—and there is no definition of religion—and we who are not Scientologists or Muslims might find it a little odd, maybe strange or even offensive, if the religious objects that we were talking about out of context were in place, but were in the wrong place at the wrong time.
	Trying to find a way of distinguishing between improper and inappropriate proselytising and appropriate deference to religious diversity is a difficult problem. This is another reason why I regret that we are dealing with this in Part 2 of the Bill, rather than looking at it over a much longer period.
	I shall finally retreat, and sit down, by reminding myself of the last words of Ludwig Wittgenstein's great work:
	"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent".

Earl Ferrers: Surely the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, would not be surprised if he were to stay in a hotel owned by the Church of Scientology and found books about scientology in the room. Surely he would not wish that, under this law, those people should not be allowed to put their books in their own hotels, even though he might not like them.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I said nothing of any kind that is intolerant. All I have tried to do is to say that this raises a difficult and important subject. No doubt, the Minister will say that how a line can be drawn between what is and is not inappropriate proselytising is something that the judges can sort out. I do not think that that is a wholly satisfactory answer. I am very glad that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, has raised this matter and I look forward to the Minister's reply.

Baroness O'Cathain: I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Lester, particularly for his point about scientologists. I am sure that I am not the only Member of your Lordships' House who gets regular documentation from the Church of Scientology. I always look at it with a great deal of interest and sadness. I think, "Goodness, I don't like that", but it does not offend me. I do not think that I have been proselytised. It is the Church of Scientology's view. That is tolerance and is what I said about being tolerant of all beliefs and religious worship—I do not actually call it religious worship, but that is the way it is. It goes to my point that we live in a country where that is allowed and I want to make sure that we continue in that way.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I perfectly agree.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: There is something to be said for not being quick in jumping up but allowing other people to get in before you. It means that practically everything you had intended to say has already been said. I am absolutely positively certain that the Government have no intention to do anything in the Bill that would be harmful to any religion. But there is no doubt that this clause raises problems.
	I was of the view that it was just officials doing this, as my noble friend Lady O'Cathain described, but my noble friend Lord Ferrers spoke about local authorities doing it too. I think that people have gone slightly mad with political correctness. The idea that Bibles should be taken away from bedside tables because they might be interpreted as offending somebody and that some sort of defence for that action might be found under the Bill is beyond belief. I suggest that the Minister should consider taking this provision away and looking at the wording as noble Lords on all sides of the Committee have had difficulty with it. It seems to me that something ought to be corrected.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I hope that noble Lords will allow me to express the pleasure I feel at having agreement between the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, the noble Lords, Lord Waddington and Lord Lester, and the noble Baronesses, Lady O'Cathain and Lady Miller. I think we have a first!
	I hope that I shall be able to sort out some of the worries of noble Lords. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, has a point, but not quite the point that other noble Lords may think.
	First, I make it absolutely clear that the harassment provisions in the Bill will apply only to the work of public authorities in the letting and management of their premises. They will not apply in the provision of goods, facilities or services by non-public bodies. The noble Earl needs to be content that private hotels do not fall within this definition. I am talking about what public authorities do and the discharge of their duty.

Earl Ferrers: Will the noble Baroness explain what a "private" hotel is?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is a hotel run not by a public authority. Her Majesty runs a certain type of hotel, at which many offenders enjoy a proper rest, but we are talking about hotels which are generally available to the public to go into and are run as private establishments. They are not included. But the noble Baroness raises an issue for this reason: we are together trying to encourage many different agencies—non-governmental agencies, charities, religious bodies—to engage in the provision of public services. That is an issue at which we will have to look.
	Faith groups delivering public functions may have to be looked at. We seek to encourage faith groups and all others—those of faith and those not of faith—to join in because we think they can make a valuable contribution to providing such services, and they have of course, particularly the religious groups, historically played a major role in the area.
	There is, however, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, a line to be drawn here. When delivering public functions to the general public, we do not believe that it would be right for a faith group to discriminate or harass members of the public on the ground of their religion and belief. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, agrees absolutely with us in that regard.
	We do not therefore believe that it is acceptable for prayer to be a prerequisite of receiving a public service or for members of the public to be preached to when receiving a public service. I anticipate that no one in this House would disagree with that either. It would be wrong if faith groups delivering public functions refused to provide services to people of a particular religion, or if they set conditions or requirements for receiving such services that led to indirect discrimination against people of a particular religion or belief. I see the noble Baroness nodding her assent to that statement.
	Faith groups should not harass members of the public when undertaking public functions. We would not want them to do that. That does not mean, of course, that Bibles and other religious texts cannot be made available by faith groups when performing public functions, if—I emphasise "if"—someone requests them, or that facilities cannot be provided for worship on a voluntary basis. These should not be part of the offering of the public service and no element of compulsion should be involved.
	I accept, however, that there is an issue about religious objects. I can see situations where pubic functions are carried out in church halls or other places associated with worship where objects on display in those premises, such as crucifixes, might conceivably lead to accusations of harassment.
	Similarly, there may be cases where a display on Diwalli in the local library or the use of religious objects as part of religious education might be considered harassment. That is absolutely not what we intend. I am willing to give a commitment that we will look at the issue further to see whether there is any way in which we can exempt the display of religious objects from the definition of harassment.
	Therefore, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. I understand that it is a probing amendment. I think that she has raised an important point. We will look at this and see what can be done.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: Before the noble Baroness sits down, I have listened with enormous interest to what has been said. The noble Baroness has tried to answer the concerns, and she says that she will look at the matter. I would just say to her that if one goes as a Christian to a funeral at a crematorium and finds that there is no cross to look at as one puts one's loved one to the flames, it is very distressing.
	It may well be that it is distressing to a person of some other religion—perhaps a Muslim—to find a cross there. Is there is solution to that? The Government, having got into the issue, must confront it. For a number of years I was responsible for the religious policy of the Girl Guides Association. Girls were encouraged to deepen their own faith, whatever it was—faiths from all over the world. Ways had to be found to solve the problem. Often, they had to do with objects—visual aids or whatever.
	A great deal of work needs to be done. Having got into this issue, the Government must confront it. Public authorities can cause offence in that way and, in trying to be politically correct and stick to the legislation, they will get it wrong. It is up to the Government to face up to that and try to find ways round. I cannot think how they will do it, but they must. I hope that the noble Baroness, who I know understands these matters deeply and herself minds very much, will be able to find a way.

Earl Ferrers: Before the noble Baroness answers that, I listened carefully to what she said, because it was a very important statement. Unfortunately, I do not think that I gathered it all correctly. I think that she said that you would not expect to be preached to when receiving something supported by public funds. I understand that point of view, but will she address her mind to a certain type of business such as Barnabas House, which I mentioned and mention again simply because it is an organisation of which I have slight knowledge and is a good example? That is a hostel set up by a Church—the Baptist Church—to look after people in distress. There are about 15 or 20 people there. Of course it receives public funds to keep it going. It is doing an immense amount of good to people in the locality and funds are correctly given to it to support it.
	When a local authority says, "Yes, but you must not have bibles there. You must not say grace before meals because someone there who is not of that faith might be offended. Therefore"—the argument goes—"you must not do that or you will have your grant removed". That is a tremendously dictatorial thing for any local authority to say or do, but it would say that it is doing it because that is what the law says. It is perfectly right for that Church or any other to run its hostels as it thinks fit and for such hostels to incorporate any kind of religious belief that they may have been set up to have.
	I am sure that the noble Baroness would not think that such an arrangement should result in the hostel losing its support from public funds and the people whom it helps no longer being helped.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Perhaps I may deal with the final issue raised by the noble Earl. He knows that my noble friend Lady Ashton said that she would look into the matter. I reiterate that promise. I tried to make it clear that the provision of service should not be dependent on an individual complying. For instance, it would be wholly improper to say, "Unless you pray or do the following, you will not be fed or get a bed". That is what I was talking about. I see several noble Lords nodding their agreement that we should not agree to that; that is not proper. There is another issue of things being available for those who want to participate. We need to consider that.
	On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, I have said that we will take the matter away to consider, but some local authorities have behaved very practically to meet the needs of their disparate communities. For example, if there is a cross at the crematorium and a Muslim family has come to cremate a loved one, the cross is sometimes taken down or covered for that ceremony and put back up when the family has gone. So there are practical, sensitive things that one can do to encourage and enable people to take advantage of public services in a way that offends no one.

Baroness O'Cathain: I thank everybody who has taken part in this useful debate. It has gone on for quite a long time, but it has enabled us to air issues and shown where we are all coming from. I am grateful to the Minister for her response; as usual, it was measured, listening and gracious. I appreciate that she wants to reassure me but a word in the statute is worth 1,000 words of measurement in Hansard. The courts do not tend to go to Hansard; they just look at the wording of the Act.
	I do not think that this amendment is great but I would like the noble Baroness to see whether she can improve it. We have had certain problems. Her point about removing a cross for a particular circumstance such as a Muslim cremation is perfectly valid—so long as it is put back again. But Torbay Council's decision to rename the chapel of a crematorium a "ceremony hall", seemed a bit over the top. I repeat that we are a Christian country. If Christians were being cremated in a Muslim country, would we want them to change the name of their crematorium hall to suit us? Certainly not. I fear that we will see challenges to our Christian heritage relying on this Bill, and that they might even succeed, unless we place on the Bill some recognition and protection of our heritage. That is the aim of my amendment.
	I should like to trade with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, who ended with a very good quotation from Wittgenstein. I do not have a copy of the Bible with me, but the noble Lord should look at chapter 11, verse 1 of the Letter to the Hebrews alongside Wittgenstein. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 47 agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 173B not moved.]
	Clause 48 [Goods, facilities and services]:

Lord Pendry: moved Amendment No. 174:
	Page 27, line 21, after "for" insert "play,"

Lord Pendry: The amendment would include play in the list of goods, facilities or services where it would be particularly unlawful to discriminate. As the Minister knows, play is of great importance to children, and this amendment would include play firmly in this part of the Bill. By so doing, it gives value to play to help to ensure that young people have equal access to play services.
	Play is critically important to all children and is the most natural form of behaviour that any child can indulge in. As I said during the passage of the Children Act 2004:
	"One matter is certain—wherever they are and whoever they are with, children will always engage in play. Put them in an empty room and they will play. Give them an empty cardboard box and they will play. Children engage in play as an involuntary instinct, like the blink of an eye, whether they are in the back of their parents' car, on an open beach or even in a classroom".—[Official Report, 30/3/05; col. 1235.]
	What I said then is true today. We must protect the opportunities in society for all children to play, as it is so important in their development.
	Part 2 deals specifically with religion and belief, and there are particular issues for children of black and minority ethnic communities. In December 2004 the Greater London Authority published The State of London's Children Report, which highlighted play as a key issue for black and minority ethnic children. The report highlighted a significant lack of use of play facilities for those children. It also found that community schemes are the most effective in reaching those children.
	I hope that the Minister will agree with me and shares my hope that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will take up equality issues relating to play. I firmly believe that that can be assured only if play is referred to in this legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I think that the matter has been covered already, but I would be grateful for reassurance.
	Clause 48(2) gives a non-exhaustive definition of the matters to which the clause refers. It says that subsection (1) applies in particular—that is, not exhaustively—to, among other things,
	"facilities for entertainment, recreation or refreshment".
	"Recreation" means play, so there is no need for the amendment.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I give the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, the reassurance that he seeks, but I say to my noble friend how important the play issues that he raises are.
	I strongly believe that access to play facilities and services should be provided to all children without discrimination on grounds of their religion or belief. Play can be an opportunity for children to develop their relationships with other children of any belief, race or colour. We should strive to enable children to benefit from that opportunity. I understand why my noble friend wished to raise the issue so strongly.
	I assure my noble friend that the list in Clause 48(2) corresponds to that in Section 20 of the Race Relations Act 1976. It was included for no reason other than to provide consistency with that Act. That is because the Race Relations Act already provides protection to Jews and Sikhs, and addressing that anomaly is one of the major reasons behind Part 2 of the Bill.
	We would not want the list in Clause 48 to be seen as anything other than illustrative. Accepting the amendment might suggest that it carried more weight than it does and that, for some reason, it was important that particular facilities or services were mentioned in the list. It might suggest that absence from the list meant that a particular type of service was not covered or was less significant. That is not the case, and we do not wish to give that impression. I am confident that that would not be the desired effect of my noble friend's amendment.
	We agree with my noble friend that play is an important area. It is already covered by Clause 48, and, because of that, the amendment is not necessary. However, I thank my noble friend for giving me the opportunity to say, without any fear of contradiction, that it is included and is very important.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: The Minister said something that needs to be clarified. She said that one of the main reasons for Part 2 of the Bill was to give Muslims the same protection as is given to Jews and Sikhs. Does she agree that, under the Race Relations Act 1976, Jews, Sikhs and Muslims are equally protected, if any of them are discriminated against because of their ethnicity, not because of their religion?
	Part 2 gives new protection to Jews, as well as to Sikhs and Muslims, as it extends the protection of the Race Relations Act beyond ethnicity to religion. If, for example, a Jew or Muslim is discriminated against not because of their ethnicity but because of their religion, they are equally protected. Is that the position?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is the position, but I made no mention of Muslims. I mentioned only the issues relating to Jews and Sikhs. Those two religions are specifically covered; no other religion was. Therefore, the provisions apply equally to Christians, Hindus, Jains, Buddhists and all the others. I did not specifically mention Muslims.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: The noble Baroness has not got my point. She referred to those "religions". Jews and Sikhs are protected not because of their religion but their ethnicity. The same is true of Muslims. That is the only point that I was making.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I say without any fear of contradicting anyone that the noble Lord has accurately referred to the law as it stands and the purpose for which we now seek to address the issues.

Lord Pendry: I am grateful to the Minister for her very thoughtful response to my amendment and to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for his intervention. I make no apologies for putting down the amendment. I recognise that many others may wish to join the queue of those who want to be mentioned in the list on this part of the Bill.
	I hope that some of those "play" groups will make representations after this debate. Before Report stage, perhaps the Minister will think of a way in which to appease their problems. I certainly recognise the strength of the arguments against the amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 48 agreed to.
	Clause 49 agreed to.
	Clause 50 [Section 49: exceptions]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 175:
	Page 28, line 17, leave out "49" and insert "49(1), (2) and (5)"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: In moving government Amendment No. 175, I shall speak also to government Amendments Nos. 177 and 178. In doing so, I will resist Amendment No. 176 standing in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Dholakia, with which they are grouped. The intention and effect of our amendments and Amendment No. 176 are very similar: essentially, they are that small-scale landlords as defined in Section 50 should not be able lawfully to harass occupiers or those applying to be occupiers of premises.
	In bringing forward the amendment, we are responding to the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We believe that by making such harassment unlawful, while continuing to protect the right of the small landlord lawfully to discriminate in deciding to whom he will let his property, we are improving the balance of our proposals. No one will be obliged to share his home with or let it to someone whose beliefs are antipathetic to his own, and we continue to believe that that is right. Nor will he lawfully be able to harass an occupier or applicant on those grounds.
	That may mean that there is potential difficulty where the beliefs of one party to such an arrangement change, so that they feel harassed by something which formerly they accepted. But we are confident that in those circumstances the definition of harassment, and particularly Clause 47(3)(b) that contains a stipulation that action should only,
	"be regarded as having that effect having regard to—
	(a) B's perception, and
	(b) all the other circumstances",
	means that our proposals allow for such circumstances to be resolved sensibly.
	I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has to say on Amendment No. 176. As I see it, in addition to what we have proposed, it would allow a person managing premises to harass an occupier, which would avoid the potential difficulty that I have just mentioned. Having considered that, as I have said, we have come to the view that our proposals offer adequate protection in that respect. For that reason, subject of course to the discussion that we will have, I ask the noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Dholakia, to reconsider Amendment No. 176.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am extremely grateful to the Minister and the Government for meeting the point of the amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. Their amendment seems to be well designed. I shall therefore not move my amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 176 not moved.]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendments Nos. 177 and 178:
	Page 28, line 17, after "disposal" insert "or management"
	Page 28, line 37, leave out "49" and insert "49(1) and (5)"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 51 agreed to.
	Clause 52 [Section 51: exceptions]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 179:
	Page 29, line 37, leave out "51" and insert "51(1)"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I know that some people would like to use this Bill as an opportunity to pursue a separate agenda to do with the existence of faith schools and their place in a largely secular society. Others here are deeply engaged in and committed to faith-based education. For that purpose, I should declare my own interest as a practising Catholic whose son attends a faith-based school.
	I need to make it clear that the Government are firmly of the view that faith-based schools make an important contribution to the diversity of our education provision. Therefore we do not intend this Bill to affect the status quo in terms of their continued existence and their ability to operate in accordance with their particular ethos. The exemption for faith schools in Clause 52 was intended simply to reflect the fact that faith schools will necessarily and reasonably be involved in acts, such as giving preference in admission to children of their faith and providing pastoral care within the school tailored to the needs of children of that faith, which would otherwise be made unlawful by the Bill.
	It has been argued by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others that the exemption as it appeared in the Bill was too sweeping—it was described as giving these schools a "licence" to harass children. No one is seeking to give a green light to unacceptable behaviour of that kind, although I should stress that we have no evidence that anything like this is happening in schools at the moment.
	This amendment is therefore intended to tighten up the exemption and to apply it to faith schools. The blanket exemption from harassment provisions is removed. In its place we propose a much more limited exception which applies only to acts which are necessary, having regard to the purpose of the faith school.
	The reason we are retaining this much more limited exemption is that we want it to be clear that the presence in a faith school of evidence and symbols of its religious ethos cannot in itself be regarded as creating an "intimidating" or "offensive" environment for a pupil not of that faith and therefore legitimately be claimed to constitute harassment. "Necessary" is a high test and strikes, we think, an appropriate and proportionate balance between a pupil's right to be treated with respect and consideration and the right of a faith school to function as such—and indeed the rights of the pupils sharing the faith of the school to manifest their faith collectively in this way. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: This is neither the time nor the place for a debate about faith schools or the existing pattern that has been established under our education legislation. I personally am not in agreement with the settlement that has now been reached.
	There are severe dangers to our secular society in the proliferation of faith schools unless strong measures are taken to ensure that our secular society combines together religious tolerance, freedom, equality, diversity and privacy. I recommend to anyone who thinks that that is easy a case I took in the Privy Council last year. In Tengur v Bishop of St Louis, Mauritius the Catholic schools were held by a unanimous Privy Council to have been acting unconstitutionally in imposing a religious quota in favour of Catholics rather than on the basis of merit in order to preserve the ethos of their schools. I believe that that kind of problem will arise under the Human Rights Act in some future context. But we are not here to debate any of that today. It is, however, very important for obvious reasons.
	Coming to the point, I welcome the introduction in the government amendment of the test of necessity—what is necessary having regard to the purpose of the establishment—which is a well-recognised test of proportionality. That is a welcome cutting down of the scope of what would otherwise have been a blanket exception for faith schools.
	I am sure that the Joint Committee on Human Rights will also be glad that its views have been taken into account. I hope that when we come later to other exceptions we can carry forward the same concept of proportionality. Meanwhile, I strongly support the Government's amendment, subject to my broader reservations about the educational and faith school background.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 179A not moved.]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: moved Amendment No. 180:
	Page 30, line 20, leave out subsection (2).

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Clause 52(2) creates further exceptions that allow harassment or discrimination in connection with the content of a school curriculum or religious worship. The British Humanist Association has said that this would allow a girl in a Church of England school to be ridiculed by a teacher for not believing in God. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considers that this may engage Articles 9, 8 and 3 of the European convention and be contrary to the Human Rights Act. It states:
	"There is a risk that Clause 52(2) would be found by the courts to be incapable of interpretation in accordance with Convention rights".
	Our amendment would remove Clause 52(2) as an exemption on the ground that allowing the harassment of school children is repugnant. We welcome the Government's Amendments Nos. 179, 182 and 183, which, as I have said, add the necessity threshold to discrimination and harassment, but they do not go as far as our amendment. Part of my concern is whether the use of the term "religious worship" in Clause 52(2) and Clause 54(4)(h)(iii) is precise enough or whether it might be open to the wrong interpretation.
	I hope that the Government's intention is that the exemptions for religious worship should apply to the daily act of collective religious worship. An exemption for collective worship I find easier to understand because, unless it is exempted, a non-Christian child at a Christian assembly could claim that he or she was being discriminated against because there was no equivalent act of a broadly Hindu, Muslim or Jewish character being provided by the school; or even harassed because she or he felt that the daily act created a hostile or offensive environment for her or him as a non-Christian child.
	However, on the face of the Bill the wording "religious worship" could be used to defend an act of harassment against a pupil because of his or her religious worship. For example, a devout Muslim boy might be taunted because he persisted in praying in school several times a day. Would the Minister consider amending the Bill to refer specifically to "collective worship" to make that distinction clear?
	I could go on but I shall not. I beg to move.

The Lord Bishop of Newcastle: I make the general point that the Church of England would not seek nor support an exemption permitting any kind of harassment, as outlined in Clause 51(2).

Lord Monson: A great many years ago, I was at a boarding school in the United States where at least 10 per cent of the boys were Jewish. We had a short morning assembly, as schools do, at which the Lord's Prayer was said. I do not remember any of the Jewish boys objecting to coming to this assembly.
	I also know a Muslim—it must be 20 years since I have seen him—who went to an English public school. His parents are practising Muslims. He went to chapel because his parents thought, "When in Rome, do as the Romans do".
	Why are people now so ultra-sensitive as to object to the religion of the host country? It is quite extraordinary. People were easy-going and relaxed then about attending other people's worship provided it was not forced down their throats; why should not this remain the case?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: As the noble Lord, Lord Monson, indicated, there is sensitivity in relation to this issue, particularly in the area of education. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle said on behalf of the Church of England that it is important that the Church should not harass those of other religions. We must keep that strongly in mind.
	The amendment would remove the exemptions for schools from the provisions on discrimination and harassment on the grounds of religion or belief for anything done in connection with the content of the curriculum or collective religious worship. I am sure the Committee will appreciate that education gives rise to special considerations in the way that we need to balance the important general prohibitions on religious discrimination and harassment in education against specific areas where a measure of discrimination may be acceptable and practical. Clause 52 is an attempt to strike the balance in the right place.
	It is important that we ensure that schools are able to deliver education priorities, including a balanced and broad-based curriculum, and the opportunity for pupils to worship collectively at school. I was very much encouraged by the indication of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that he would feel more comfortable if what we were describing was curriculum and collective religious worship. We believe that the curriculum and collective religious worship need to be exempt from both the discrimination and harassment provisions of the Bill.
	Let us consider some situations which might arise without such an exemption. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, has referred to some already. It is a fact that the United Kingdom is a predominantly Christian country. It is therefore perfectly understandable that existing legislation provides that acts of collective religious worship in schools are broadly Christian in character. However, the law already recognises that different arrangements may need to be made in respect of some schools, including faith schools. Consequently, that principle may not be applied if a standing advisory council has determined, under Section 394 of the Education Act, that the requirement for Christian worship is not appropriate in the case of a particular school or in the case of any class or description of pupils at that school.
	This can take account of any circumstances relating to the family backgrounds of pupils which are relevant for determining the character of collective religious worship in any particular case. In addition, parents are free to withdraw their children from collective religious worship in school if they so wish, but schools should not be obliged to make equivalent provision for collective worship for children from minority faiths, or risk the accusation that they are discriminating unlawfully against such children. For this and similar reasons we need the discrimination exemption.
	I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that in many, many schools children perfectly happily continue to share these opportunities to be together without it causing difficulty.
	We also need the harassment exemption to protect schools which are delivering the broad-based curriculum to which all our children are entitled but where some of what they do may clash with the strongly held religious views of a minority of parents. Such parents are, of course, entitled to their views, but we do not intend to let them use this legislation to impose those views on the majority.
	It is important to remember that the definition of "harassment" in the Bill is quite a broad one. At its least extreme, harassment may be claimed by a person who feels that a school has created "a hostile or offensive environment" for them. Such a claim might come in relation to a child whose parents belong to a sect which believes that computers are the work of the devil or who argue that their very presence in the school is offensive. Creationists might make the same claim in relation to the teaching of evolution within the science curriculum. Some religious groups have been known to take exception to many works of literature or of drama, not least the Harry Potter books, with their description of magic and witchcraft.
	Some religiously conservative groups or sects within religious groups may object to mixed-sex classes or to sports activities. Some religiously conservative groups also object to sports provision for girls. Some groups may attempt to undermine the very diversity which the curriculum seeks to maintain and which the legislation seeks to protect.
	Schools need to be confident that they can follow the curriculum without being challenged. No subject should be squeezed out of the curriculum because schools feel vulnerable under the Bill. They should not be required to justify practices which might constitute indirect discrimination on harassment merely because they are properly abiding by education law and following a reasonable and balanced approach to the curriculum.
	Religious education is also an important curriculum subject. However, provision is already made which can protect individual beliefs. Parents can request that their child be withdrawn from religious education lessons. Indeed, parents can take their child out of school to attend alternative religious education as long as it does not interfere with the child's attendance at school other than at the beginning or end of the school day.
	We believe, therefore, that the exemptions provided for in this part of the Bill are necessary to ensure that the school curriculum remains broad-based and inclusive. That is consistent with the duties which the Secretary of State for Education and Skills has under Sections 78 and 79 of the Education Act 2002 to ensure that LEAs, governing bodies and head teachers provide a curriculum which is balanced and broad-based, which promotes spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at school or of society, and which prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experience of later life.
	Options are already available for parents who seek a different form of education for their children. For example, they may look at faith schools which meet their needs or single-sex schools, including those in the independent sector.
	For these reasons, we are unable to accept the amendment, but I understand what the noble Lord says about collective worship.

Lord Avebury: The noble Baroness mentioned the teaching of creationism. I am sure she is aware that there has been considerable anxiety about a case in which a city technology college was said to be thinking of putting creationism in the curriculum. Although that may have been scotched by the widespread public discussion that took place, will the noble Baroness assure us that nothing in this clause would allow the incorporation of the teaching of creationism in the normal curriculum or its insertion by way of religious teaching in some other part of the curriculum?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The Bill does not in any way change our current structure and approach in relation to the teaching of the curriculum. The provision seeks to preserve the nature of the curriculum so that it can be taught properly to all pupils in a way that is currently deemed to be satisfactory. We are not changing anything by virtue of the provision.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Can the noble Baroness make one thing clear? In her very important statement, which I shall read, she helpfully mentioned that she agreed with me about collective worship being the meaning of religious worship. Is it the Government's intention to make that clear in appropriate language at some point during the passage of the Bill?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We believe that we have made this clear but I am happy to look at the wording and see whether it does exactly what we believe it does. I apologise for that rather inelegant way of expressing it. I was grateful to the noble Lord for indicating that he accepted that collective worship was important and for identifying some of the difficulties which I went on to expand if we were not to include the curriculum and if we were not to have expressed it in the way that we have.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness. Her statement is important and will I am sure contribute to a lot of understanding about the relevant issues. It would be desirable to amend the Bill to make it clear that religious worship means collective worship, but that is a minor point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: moved Amendment No. 181:
	Page 30, line 20, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
	"(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the filling of unfilled places in schools with a religious character, which shall be filled in accordance with the "Codes of Practice—School Admissions 2003"."

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: The amendment deals with the issue of unfilled places. It would provide that Clause 52(1) does not apply to the filling of unfilled places in schools with a religious character which should be filled in accordance to the School Admissions Code of Practice issued in 2003. Let me explain what that means.
	With the repeal of Section 91 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, it is no longer possible for foundation and aided schools with a religious character to agree special arrangements with their local education authority by which they can keep places empty if they do not have enough applications from their particular faith or denomination. The position is regulated by the codes of practice referred to in the amendment.
	The code says in paragraph 3.9:
	"Schools designated by the Department as having a religious character may give preference in their admission arrangements to members of a particular faith or denomination (as may be required by their Trust Deed), provided this does not conflict with other legislation such as race relations legislation. Where they do, their admission arrangements should make clear whether a statement of religious affiliation or commitment would be sufficient; whether it is to be 'tested' for admission purposes and if so, how; and what, if any, references would be required from the family's priest, Minister or other religious leader and how they will be used to decide on the application".
	Paragraph 3.10 contains this important statement:
	"Faith schools can contribute to community cohesion by having admission arrangements that are inclusive of other faiths and of all elements of the population of their local area. Some faith schools already achieve inclusiveness by designating a proportion of places for which children of their own faith or denomination will be given priority, and the remainder as community or open places for which local children will be given priority. Note: this is quite different from 'quotas', which would reserve places solely for particular groups, and would mean leaving places empty if not enough members of those groups apply".
	Finally, it says:
	"With the repeal by the Education Act 2002 of section 91 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, it is no longer possible for foundation and aided schools with a religious character"—
	I have already mentioned this—
	"to agree special arrangements with their LEA by which they can keep places empty".
	My amendment seeks to make sure that what is in the code of practice will apply to the unfilled places. It is extremely important that that be so. The blanket exception allowing discrimination in admissions reflects the repeal of Section 91 of the 1998 Act.
	I welcome the Government's Amendments Nos. 186 and 188, grouped later, which amend the Bill so that local education authorities cannot harass in respect of the admission procedure. However, I seek a guarantee in the Bill that the code of practice's very sensible multi-faith and no-faith approach to unfilled places will apply, notwithstanding the provisions in the Bill. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I understand the noble Lord's concern about the unfilled places in faith schools and his intent that they do not remain unfilled and are offered to children of other faith. I agree with him—faith schools should not be allowed to keep unfilled places simply because there are not enough applications from children of their particular faith. However, we would respectfully suggest that the amendment to this Bill is unnecessary since the area of unfilled places remains a matter governed by the code of practice to which the noble Lord referred. Moreover, there is no indication that schools are acting inappropriately in this area. On the contrary, many faith schools choose to hold a proportion of their places for children not of the same faith as the school, in order to ensure diversity in the school.
	The exceptions to this Bill relate only to the new provisions on discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief made in the Bill. They are not intended to, and will not, affect the way in which schools are already required to follow any other legislation or existing statutory code of practice—such as the code to which the noble Lord referred. That code is revised from time to time and versions will naturally take account of the legal framework in place at that time, as does the current version in relation to existing equality legislation.
	I hope that I have given the noble Lord the reassurance that he seeks that this amendment is not necessary. For the reasons that I have given, I cannot accept it and I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw it.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am grateful and reassured. I also remind myself that the Human Rights Act 1998 could apply in certain circumstances because discrimination in access to state-funded education could trigger that Act as well.
	I only have to mention Northern Ireland for everyone in the Chamber to be aware of the danger that could arise in totally faith-segregated education, which has unfortunately afflicted that Province with consequences that we all know about. I am reassured that my amendment is not necessary provided that the code of practice continues in the way that it has done—or something like it. That is not a cast iron guarantee because we do not know what might happen to a future code, but if a future code were to go back on the present code, I daresay that there could be a human rights challenge. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendments Nos. 182 and 183:
	Page 30, line 23, at end insert—
	"(2A) In the application of section 51(2) to an educational establishment falling within subsection (1) above, conduct shall not be unlawful if it is necessary having regard to the purpose of the establishment."
	Page 30, line 25, leave out "or (2)" and insert ", (2) or (2A)"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 184:
	Page 30, line 38, leave out "such" and insert "the Scottish Ministers, the National Assembly for Wales and such other"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I rise to speak to Amendment No. 184. Noble Lords will know that this Bill applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales because equality, as your Lordships know, is a reserved matter. However, education is a devolved matter in Scotland. Any changes made to the education provisions of the Bill under the powers in Clause 52(3) will therefore have particular implications for the devolved authorities. Because of the relationship here between what is reserved and what is devolved, we think that the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Assembly will inevitably need to be consulted before regulations are made which affect their provisions. This amendment makes that explicit. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 53 [Local education authorities and education authorities]:

Baroness Turner of Camden: moved Amendment No. 185:
	Page 30, line 44, at end insert "—
	(a)"

Baroness Turner of Camden: In moving Amendment No. 185, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 190, which also stands in my name. I raised this matter at Second Reading and had the impression that the Minister was prepared to look very carefully at what I said. It appeared to me that there had been some unfortunate drafting, which had had the opposite effect to what had originally been intended. The first subsection of Clause 53 states:
	"It is unlawful for a local education authority . . . in the exercise of their functions to discriminate against or harass a person".
	Of course, that is all right, but subsection (2) then sets out a list of functions when it is perfectly all right for a local authority to discriminate or harass. Discrimination may be necessary in the exercise of certain functions, but surely it can never be all right for anyone to be harassed. My amendments separate discrimination from harassment. The legalising of harassment is repugnant and I am certain that that was not the intention. I am very pleased to see standing in this group government Amendments Nos. 186 and 188, which attempt to deal with that question.
	In Amendment No. 190, I have sought to delete paragraph (b) from the list of functions where it is possible for a local authority to discriminate. Why should there be discrimination in the provision of school transport? If any service should be provided on an entirely non-discriminatory basis, surely it should be school transport. Those of us who live in London are not at all happy about the congestion on the roads caused by many parents taking their children to school by car. I am advised that a provision of this kind, as set out in the Bill, could well be contrary to the Human Rights Act.
	In its report on the School Transport Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights persuaded the DfES to amend the prospectus to make it plain that current widespread discrimination against non-religious parents seeking to send their children to the nearest school not of a religious character was contrary to the Human Rights Act. Therefore, I believe that this paragraph should be deleted from the Bill.
	Returning to Amendment No. 185 and similar amendments standing in the group, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in relation to the government amendments standing in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer on the whole issue of harassment and discrimination. I beg to move.

Baroness Whitaker: I support my noble friend's amendments for the reasons that she has given.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank my noble friend Lady Turner for returning to these issues. I turn, first, to Amendments Nos. 185, 187, 189 and 191, to which my noble friend spoke. She seeks to ensure that education authorities are not given an exemption allowing them to harass in the course of exercising their functions. I agree with her and shall, in due course, wish to move Amendments Nos. 186 and 188, tabled in the name of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, which will have precisely that effect.
	In making this amendment, we are responding to comments made on the Bill by the JCHR, among others. Local education authorities and their Scottish counterparts will need an exemption from the discrimination provisions of the Bill if they are to continue their support for faith schools in its current form. The Government have made it clear that they do not wish to undermine the status quo for faith schools in any way. However, we are happy to accept that nothing that education authorities do in this context requires or should permit them to harass anyone on grounds of religion or belief. The amendment confines the exemption to discrimination only, and therefore I invite my noble friend to withdraw her amendment in due course.
	I now turn to Amendment No. 190, which I fear I am not able to accept. I have already made it clear that the Government do not intend this legislation to undermine the status quo in relation to the operation of faith schools within our education system. I fully accept that any exemptions should be drawn as narrowly as possible, but they do need to be wide enough to protect current practices which are reasonable in the context of faith schools. We have therefore put forward our own amendment to make it clear that harassment in relation to school transport is not permissible. We considered carefully the case for the remaining exemption from the discrimination provisions, but without it, we believe that local education authorities and their Scottish counterparts would be vulnerable to challenge in properly carrying out their responsibilities in this area.
	LEAs must provide free home-to-school transport for pupils who are attending their nearest suitable school, provided that the school is beyond the statutory walking distances. Over and above that, LEAs have considerable scope to decide when transport is necessary. They are expected to consider each pupil's case on its merits, taking account of all relevant factors including, when appropriate, a parent's wish for their child to attend a school of the religion or denomination to which they adhere.
	Subsidised transport will generally be provided only to a school which is the nearest suitable school to a pupil's home, but LEAs have the discretion to provide a subsidy for transport to a faith school which may not necessarily be the pupil's nearest suitable school. I know that the British Humanist Society in particular regards that as unacceptable discrimination in favour of those with a religious faith—but that is an issue to be argued out at another time. It is really not for this Bill. Any suggestion that policy in this area ventures into the area of violation of the human rights of children is frankly misplaced. It is the responsibility of education authorities, in using their discretion, to ensure that their policies are compliant with human rights legislation. Our view is that they should treat parents of strong anti-religious beliefs and views equally and equivalently to those with a strong religious faith. Nothing in this Bill cuts across that.
	As far as this Bill is concerned, our policy is to allow existing systems which support the continued existence of faith schools to continue, without LEAs being vulnerable to challenge when carrying out this policy. It is for those reasons that, with the greatest regret, I cannot accept this amendment. I invite my noble friend not to press it.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I hope that I am not out of order in saying, since I have not spoken to the amendment or to any in the group, that I am very grateful to the Government for having removed the harassment exception. That accords with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I welcome that very much indeed.

Baroness Turner of Camden: I thank the Minister for that response and will of course withdraw Amendment No. 185. As for Amendment No. 190, I listened very carefully to what she had to say; of course, I shall not press it this evening. I noted that she emphasised that it was the duty of local authorities to treat parents equally, in complete equality, whether the parents are religious or non-religious. That is important. I shall read her remarks in Hansard and will not press the amendment this evening. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Viscount Simon: In calling Amendment No. 186, I advise Members of the Committee that if it is agreed to I cannot call Amendments Nos. 187, 189 or 191, due to pre-emption.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 186:
	Page 30, line 45, leave out "or harass"
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 187 not moved.]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 188:
	Page 30, line 45, at end insert—
	"( ) It is unlawful for a local education authority (in England and Wales) or an education authority (in Scotland) in the exercise of their functions to harass a person."
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 189 to 191 not moved.]
	Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 54 [Public authorities: general]:

Baroness O'Cathain: moved Amendment No. 191A:
	Page 31, line 28, at end insert—
	"(1A) For the avoidance of doubt the prohibition in subsection (1) shall include—
	(a) requiring a registrar or any other person to arrange, officiate at or otherwise participate in the registration of a civil partnership under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (c. 33),
	(b) requiring a registrar or any other person to arrange, solemnise or otherwise participate in the registration of a marriage involving a person whose gender has become the acquired gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (c. 7),
	(c) requiring any person to participate in any placement under section 18 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38) (placement for adoption by agencies), or any application under section 49 of that Act (application for adoption) where the placement is with, or the application is made by, a couple who are not a married couple, or one applicant is part of a couple within the meaning of section 144(4)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (general interpretation etc.),
	where the person concerned has a conscientious objection on the basis of his religion or belief."

Baroness O'Cathain: The amendment would extend the principle of Clause 54 to create a conscience clause for civil marriage registrars and social work staff when they have a conscientious objection based on their religion or belief. My amendment would prevent them being forced to take part in homosexual civil partnership ceremonies, in weddings involving transsexual people, and in adoptions involving unmarried or homosexual couples.
	As Members of the Committee know, this is not the first time these issues have been raised. The late Baroness Blatch, whom we miss so much, called for a conscience clause for adoption staff in the Local Government Bill in 2003. I in turn raised the issue of registrars last year during passage of the Gender Recognition and Civil Partnership Bills. I know that some people get very angry when these issues are raised. Believe me, it would be easier for me not to raise them. But surely in a free society people should be entitled to hold different views, even when they relate to cohabitation, homosexuality or transsexualism.
	Many people are motivated in their views by sincere religious conscience. These are extremely controversial issues in our society about which people have genuine and deeply held concerns. Parliament has legislated in recent years to change the law in these areas, but it did so—as we all remember—in the face of considerable opposition from the public. That opposition came from sincere people, often Christians and Church leaders, but also from non-Christians, who conscientiously believed that what Parliament was doing was immoral, counter to the sanctity of marriage and detrimental to the family—which is, as many of us believe, the backbone of our society.
	Such people cannot support civil partnerships because they believe that they give marriage-like status to what they consider immoral relationships. They cannot support transsexual marriages, where one person has changed sex in law, because they actually do not believe it is possible to change sex in fact. They cannot support placing children for adoption with unmarried or homosexual couples, because they earnestly believe that it can never be in the best interests of children to do so when there are many married couples willing to adopt.
	For most of these people, the issue of freedom of conscience does not arise, as they are not required to be involved in any of these issues. But what if you hold these views and you work in a registry office? What if you work in social services? Sadly, we know what sometimes happens: you are told that you have to take part; pressure is exerted on you to go against your conscience; you can be intimidated because of your religious views; indeed, you might even be threatened with dismissal. This is not merely hypothetical or theoretical—there are examples.
	Angela Sartin is a superintendent registrar at Bristol City Council. She has worked for the service for 19 years. When she joined, there was not the remotest prospect that her job would ever involve uniting homosexual couples, but since the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, she has been told that this is what she must do. She has recently been advised that guidelines from the General Registrar's Office indicate that the duty to provide civil partnerships is on the local authority, rather than on each individual registrar. Statutory officers do not have to take part. But this does not extend to Miss Sartin's position. She is therefore applying for a demotion and taking a £10,000 a year pay cut, in order to be able to stay within the service and retain freedom of conscience not to take part in civil partnerships.
	Others have left the service. There are many long-serving people around the country who are not happy; but they are leaving the service quietly. They are being accused of homophobia and bigotry and they doubtless feel intimidated.
	Clause 54 protects all religious beliefs, not just those that are politically correct. Are people whose religion teaches that homosexual practice is wrong protected by the Bill, or not? It is a natural extension of the principle of the Bill to say that we will seek to protect freedom of religious conscience for people like these.
	The issue of transsexual weddings, addressed in paragraph (b) of the amendment, is more complicated. Under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the registrar will have no right to know whether a person who applies to marry has changed sex. But even if the registrar did know, there would be no right to withdraw from officiating. If a registrar refused to issue the marriage notice, the result would be instant dismissal.
	I turn to paragraph (c) of my amendment. The Committee may recall that the late Lady Blatch cited the case of the long-serving adoption workers, Dawn Jackson and Norah Ellis—a case which made the national press at the time. Sadly, this is not the only case. Dawn and Norah worked in the adoption service of a local authority. Between them they had 50 years' experience in adoption and fostering, but because they had a conscientious objection to same-sex couples adopting, they were forced out of their jobs.
	Some noble Lords will point to the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. They will say that any employee already has religious non-discrimination rights. However, if they are so effective, why are religious people being forced out of jobs in registrars' offices even as we speak? Clearly, the 2003 regulations are not enough. Unless we do something specifically to protect these posts, Christians, Muslims and others with traditional religious views will increasingly be forced out of these professions in a form of religious apartheid. I beg to move.

Earl Ferrers: I hope that the noble Baroness will—as I am sure she will—give a great deal of thought to my noble friend's amendment. I personally hope that some phraseology such as this will be accepted in the Bill. In the past 10 years or so we have come across the problems of transsexual marriage, marriages between people of the same sex, homosexual marriages and so on. These are new concepts that bring with them their own problems.
	We have an Equality Bill saying that all these people should be equal. However, as my noble friend said, people who have religious convictions often find that they are discriminated against if they do not want to take part in these marriage ceremonies. My noble friend gave the example of a person who took a pay cut of £10,000 in order not to have to do that. In an Equality Bill there ought to be equality for those people. Those people ought to be able to continue with their profession but exempt themselves from conducting that part of the ceremony with which their conscience does not agree, in the same way that nurses who have strong views about abortions do not have to carry them out.
	As I say, this is an Equality Bill. It is very important that those people who have strong views should not find themselves being made unequal or being threatened with dismissal.

Baroness Turner of Camden: I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not feel disposed to accept this amendment. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, is not surprised that I am not very happy about it. For one thing it seems to me that we are talking not about religious ceremonies here but civil contracts. These are civil contracts entered into on the basis of legislation that has already been passed by this House and the other place.
	Moreover, as I am sure we all know, there are religions that disapprove of divorce, but that does not mean to say that registrars who happen to be religious can refuse to remarry divorced people. Yet, as I say, many religions object to divorce. The amendment lists a number of Acts: the Civil Partnership Act, the Gender Recognition Act, the Adoption and Children Act, all of which have been approved by Parliament. Civil arrangements are available for people to carry out what the law allows them to do. In a situation where religious ceremonies are not involved, I do not understand why individuals should be able to say, "I will not do that because I have a religious objection even though it is my job to do it".

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Some Members of your Lordships' House do not at all approve of the Civil Partnership Act or of the Gender Recognition Act. Indeed, that was made clear again and again during the passage of those important pieces of legislation. They were designed—as was the change in adoption law—to give effect to basic human rights, equality and personal privacy anchored in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act while at the same time respecting religious freedom. Religious freedom was respected in the Civil Partnership Act by making it quite clear that this was a matter of civil partnership—as the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, has just said—a status secured by statute which did not in any way affect the refusal of any Church to treat the civil partnership as tantamount to marriage. It was made absolutely clear that it was a special status with many of the advantages but also obligations of marriage, but that it was not marriage and did not in any way trespass upon the relationship between Church and state.
	I refer to a doctor bound by a professional code of conduct. In relation to carrying out an abortion there is quite rightly a conscience clause because in that context it is vital that a doctor or a nurse should not be obliged to act against their conscience. That is an entirely different context from that of a public officer, a registrar, who is there to carry out the law of the land as enacted by the sovereign Parliament. To take an extreme example, let us imagine a registrar with a conscientious objection to registering a marriage between a black woman and a white man, who believed that miscegenation was against the law of nature as laid down in the Bible. There have been such creatures in the American south and in South Africa who had deeply held but bigoted convictions. In this country one could not possibly contemplate a registrar, however deeply held his or her beliefs, being permitted by a conscience clause not to carry out the law of the land.
	Exactly the same applies to civil partnership. We as a Parliament have decided—rightly or wrongly, but it is the law of the land—that homosexual same-sex couples who can never marry should be encouraged and allowed to enter into permanent relationships with all the rights and obligations of those relationships. We cannot have a homophobic registrar with deeply held and sincere religious convictions saying to the two men or the two women who come in front of him or her, "I will not register your relationship because I think you are sinning and I regard what you are doing as evil according to my faith, and here is the Bible to prove it".
	The same applies to gender recognition. We passed the Gender Recognition Act because the European Court of Human Rights made it quite clear that we could no longer go on denying recognition to that very small group of people—I believe that there are about 8,000 in the country at large—who go through the horrible experience of a series of painful operations to secure their true gender identity. Let us imagine a woman such as Mrs Bellinger—my client at the moment in Strasbourg—who had gender reassignment 30 years ago arriving with her prospective husband and being told by the registrar, "You were born a man. I have a conscientious objection to recognising your change. Whatever Parliament says, I will not allow you to marry". That would be quite intolerable.
	Therefore, I am afraid that I have to say to the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, for whom I have great respect, and whose faith and deeply held convictions I respect, that public officers cannot be permitted to defy the law of the land, albeit in the name of religion or conscience.

Earl Ferrers: If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, has the wrong end of the stick. He says that it would be wrong where, for example, two homosexuals were to be married, that a homophobic registrar—as he put it—could say, "I will not marry you because I do not believe in this. However, here is the Bible; I will marry you according to the Christian tradition". That is not the case. I am glad that the noble Lord signifies dissent but that is what I gathered he said.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Before the noble Earl demolishes me altogether, that is not what I am saying. Homosexuals cannot marry and they cannot rely on the Bible. It is a civil partnership registration, and that is what one is speaking about in the amendment.

Earl Ferrers: I accept the correction, but the fact is that what is being said here is that a registrar who feels that he simply cannot marry two men who are homosexual because he does not believe in it due to his religion may wish to opt out and say, "I am sorry I cannot do it—let someone else do it". The fear is that person will be discriminated against and possibly downgraded or even threatened with the dissolution of his job because he is not going to do that. All he is saying is, "I do not want to do that, even though it may be part of my job. Someone else can do it".

The Lord Bishop of Newcastle: I reiterate in response to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that a civil partnership is not—I underline not—a marriage. We keep using the word "marriage" in relation to civil partnerships; and they are not marriages. It is a civil contract. Nor should we assume that civil partnerships necessarily have any kind of active sexual component. I know of several couples who are intending to register partnerships, when that is possible, where there is no sexual content whatever in their relationship. It is too easy to assume, first, that we are talking about same-sex marriage—which we are not—and, secondly, that we are talking about active sexual relationships—which we are not.
	I want to draw a parallel, if it can be drawn, with those people who have undergone gender reassignment and present themselves for marriage in their new gender identity. As things stand at present, they have the right—and I rejoice that they do—to present themselves at their parish church for marriage, but there is a clause that suggests that the parish priest concerned can decline to officiate at that marriage if he or she finds it difficult to do so. The right to marry in the parish church remains, and the parish priest simply must find another person to officiate. I wonder whether that provides a possible comparison with subsection (b) in the amendment.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle for his comments, not least for the underlining of the fact that civil partnerships are not marriages. It is important for us to remember that there are those who do not recognise civil marriages between heterosexual couples because they, too, are not marriages in the eyes of God. There are those who do not recognise divorce, because they believe that marriage is a union of one man and one woman for life, which cannot be divided by an Act of state or by any other person. Those are firmly-held religious beliefs that many may have.
	The right reverend Prelate is right to give the example of a parish priest who, for good conscience, may decline to officiate at a blessing, or some would say a marriage, of those who have previously been married and who come before the Church for further sanction. There are practical ways in which one can deal with some practical problems.
	I have already declared, and I make the declaration again, that I am a practising and firmly committed Roman Catholic. Therefore, I understand absolutely the difference of views, which are shared by a number of committed members of other faiths. The noble Baroness mentioned those of the Muslim faith and of the Jewish faith, and many others who share those views. We are talking about civil recognition of civil partnerships and civil contracts, which the sovereign Parliament has endorsed, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, as being lawful and valid and therefore something to be honoured.
	In the end, a public authority has a duty, in our view, to provide a service without discrimination. While an authority may of course take what practical measures it can to respect the private views of its staff, we do not feel that it is right to forbid the authority—which is what we would be doing in the provision—to require those staff to perform their functions if it is necessary.
	I shall address the issue of registrars. Civil partnerships, and marriages contracted by transsexual people once their change of gender has been legally recognised, will both be valid events carried out in accordance with the law. In such circumstances, registrars and other officials would have no legal grounds on which to refuse to provide the service, and it would be expected that the service is provided to the same high standards as other services. Many people in their public office must undertake functions that they may not always, in every single respect, agree with. That is part of being a public office-holder and a public employee. We see no reason why a registrar or any other official who did not agree in conscience—although one would respect that—should have the liberty to inquire into and refuse to exercise his function.
	There are, of course, often practical solutions to some of those issues, as the right reverend Prelate made plain. It will often be the case that there would be sufficient registration officers or other officials available to avoid either an embarrassing situation for the transsexual person or a registration officer being placed in a position of personal difficulty.
	In relation to adoption, Amendment No. 191A is similar to amendments debated and withdrawn both in Committee and on Report during the passage of the Adoption and Children Act in 2002 and the Local Government Act in 2003 respectively. At each stage, we explained why the amendment was inappropriate. I am afraid that we intend to continue to resist the amendment, and I will again set out the reasons why that is so.
	Amendment No. 191A seeks to ensure that no person shall be under any duty to participate in adoption placements or processing adoption applications to which they have a conscientious objection. That refers to cases where children are to be placed for adoption with an unmarried couple or with one person who is in fact part of a couple living together as partners in an enduring family relationship. It also covers the processing of those adoption applications.
	The Adoption and Children Act 2002 allows, for the first time, unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, to apply to adopt a child jointly. However, it has long been possible for a person in an unmarried relationship to apply to adopt as a single person. Noble Lords know that there were many cases, and one parent would have the parental rights and the other person who was the de facto parent would not. The Adoption and Children Act does not therefore raise any fundamental new issues, so there is no need to make any special provision in terms of "conscientious objections" as a result of the change to enable unmarried couples to adopt jointly. Arguably, the key benefit for children of the change in the 2002 Act is that it enables a child adopted by an unmarried couple to have the permanence and security of having two legal parents.
	The amendment raises employment issues, which are matters more suitably addressed by existing protection in employment legislation and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. I know that the noble Baroness has mentioned those; she knows that they are there, and they are there to be rigorously enforced if the need arises. The regulations prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in employment and vocational training. That answer, I hope, will give some modicum of comfort to the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, who rightly asks what protection there is for those who have different beliefs. That is why we have the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.
	I absolutely understand the noble Baroness's concerns, and the concerns of all those who have strongly held religious beliefs. However, there has to be an understanding that those beliefs are not shared by everyone and, in a situation in which we have to have tolerance, understanding and enforcement of the law, this is the best way forward. With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, for those reasons we are not able to change our position.

Earl Ferrers: Is the noble Baroness saying that, although we must have tolerance, understanding and everything like that given the fact that other people have views different from ours, a registrar who holds certain beliefs, feels that they cannot carry out that part of their duty and says so will not be threatened with dismissal? As I understand it, they can be, for not doing their work. That is just as intolerable and non-understanding as the other way round.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: There are the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, which should preserve the opportunity for those who work to adhere to those religious beliefs. When many public functions are performed, there are a number of people of different beliefs, orientation and structures who can fill the place.
	Those who manage such situations sensibly if there is a conscientious genuine belief usually make alternative practical arrangements so that there is not embarrassment for the people who come forward for the service, and so that there is not the struggle of conscience for the person who legitimately wants to carry out a good job. Usually, both can be accommodated. In terms of delivery of a service in accordance with the law, public authorities must be able to make provision to enable the law of this land to be enforced.

Baroness O'Cathain: I sincerely thank all Members of the Committee who contributed to the debate. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, because she mentioned the fact that a conscience clause could not be available in civil contracts. However, abortion is not a civil contract—I thank the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, for mentioning abortion—and people are allowed a conscience clause.
	The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, brings up all the issues too. I ask him and the Minister about people who joined an occupation and have been there for many years, and then because of Acts of Parliament there are changes in their terms of employment. Is it valid for them not to have some tolerance given to them, so that they have an ability—a practical solution, to use the same words as the Minister—to make sure that other people are available?
	The right reverend Prelate reiterated—we all know—that civil partnerships are not same-sex marriages. Equally, he must know that every time the Act is referred to, they are called same-sex marriages. The people who do not use that term write official documents and are in Parliament. That is just the way it is. No matter what the Act says, people do not think that it means that.
	Of course I accept that Parliament has passed the three Acts that I mentioned. They are the law of the land and we all abide by them and accept them. But people for whom, when they were first employed there was no such thing as civil partnerships, adoption by same-sex couples or—I cannot even remember what the third example was. Ten, 15 or 20 years down the line, they now find themselves in positions where they are faced with those issues. Surely there must be some way of showing equality or tolerance to them, as the rest of us who have strong religious convictions show tolerance and a sense of justice to everyone else.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I want to answer the question put to me before the noble Baroness ends her important remarks. When the then Sex Discrimination Bill and Race Relations Bill were coming in, some in the Home Office and police did not approve at all of the legislation that we were enacting. However, it would have been intolerable if those public offices had said, "We want to remain an office but not comply with the duty not to discriminate". It would also be intolerable for those concerned with registrars to have to poll them for their views and conscientious beliefs to see whether they would carry out their public functions in accordance with the law of the land.
	It would not be intolerable, however, to do as the right reverend Prelate indicated and have, so far as possible, a flexible system that would do its best to ensure that one could accommodate different views. That is a matter of flexibility, not obligation. The obligation is to obey the law of the land.

Baroness O'Cathain: I thank the noble Lord. Of course I understand the obligation to obey the law of the land, but there should be some flexibility in terms of a practical solution for people employed beforehand. It is not exactly the same as thousands and thousands of police people. It would involve many fewer people. I would have thought that there could be some flexibility.
	I am disappointed but not surprised that the Government are not willing to accept my amendment. I do not intend to divide the Committee. Other issues were raised by each Member of the Committee who spoke, for which I am grateful. I shall take away my amendment, give it due consideration and consider whether I ought to return to the issue on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 192:
	Page 32, line 8, leave out paragraph (f).

Lord Dholakia: The amendment is in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Lester and Lady Falkner. The clause states that,
	"'public authority' includes any person who has functions of a public nature",
	but that excludes the authorities specified under subsection (3). It is an interesting list that mentions,
	"the House of Commons . . . the House of Lords . . . the authorities of either House of Parliament . . . the Security Service . . . the Secret Intelligence Service . . . the Government Communications Headquarters, or . . . a part of the armed forces of the Crown which is, in accordance with a requirement of the Secretary of State, assisting the Government Communication Headquarters".
	We understand the reason for and do not intend to question the exclusion or prohibition in relation to those authorities.
	However, the clause goes further and exempts certain functions under subsection (4). The amendment is in relation to subsection (4)(f). We have difficulty with that paragraph because, under the clause, it is unlawful for public authorities to commit any act that constitutes discrimination or harassment. "Public authority" is defined in similar terms to the definition in the Human Rights Act 1998, but is subject to a number of exceptions, with the result that the protection afforded by Part 2 falls short of protection under the Human Rights Act. This is not the first time that those of us in this part of the House have drawn attention to that aspect of law. My noble friends and I took up our serious reservations about the matter during the passage of the then Race Relations (Amendment) Bill.
	The JCHR is particularly concerned about Clause 54(4)(f), which states that any decision of a public authority to refuse entry clearance or leave to remain, or anything done in pursuance of such a decision, is exempt from duties of non-discrimination and harassment under the Bill. Given the obligations under the Human Rights Act of public authorities that perform immigration functions, including obligations not to discriminate on grounds of religion and obligations to respect rights to private life and physical integrity, the committee is concerned that the Bill applies lesser standards to such public authorities on these matters. I simply cannot understand why the Government can justify this exclusion.
	The Immigration Act is being implemented by immigration officers and I see no problem with that. But I see problems if the Immigration Act is being implemented in a way that is discriminatory against certain sections of the community. The analogy with stop and search is important here. If, for example, people are stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence reports, I have no difficulty with that. But if they are simply being stopped on the ground of their race, colour, national or ethnic origins, one should be seriously concerned. I cannot understand why the Government need to include those functions.
	While the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended, also contains an exception from non-discrimination for certain immigration functions, we favour removing Clause 54(4)(f) altogether. That would be the effect of the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I wish to add a few words to those of my noble friend, because the amendment raises a serious matter, which cannot be dealt with simply in a few moments. The Race Relations Act 1976, which we amended in 2000, allows racial discrimination in relation to immigration control. Section 19D creates a blanket exception, but with, at least, a pathetic safeguard that Ministers of the Crown, acting personally, must provide relevant authorisation for a particular class of case, stating that they authorise the immigration authorities to discriminate.
	For example, there was an authorisation of a most unsightly and, I believe, unlawful and unconstitutional kind that authorised express and direct race discrimination against Roma, Pontic Greeks and one or two other categories of minorities. That relevant authorisation was personally signed by the Minister, who had to take personal responsibility in Parliament for having authorised that invidious form of discrimination against a vulnerable group in relation to immigration control.
	I declare an interest, because I argued the Prague airport case before the House of Lords and elsewhere, where it appeared that that authorisation was being relied upon to discriminate racially against Gypsies who were seeking to fly from Prague airport to London to claim asylum. The Law Lords unanimously decided that there was, indeed, unlawful race discrimination in that practice. That was in relation to race discrimination and although it was offensive and odious, ministerial responsibility has, at least, been written into a particular category of case.
	This provision does not deal with race discrimination but with religious discrimination and, moreover, with religious harassment. Whereas in the next group of amendments the Government are rightly removing the blanket exception for religious harassment for other provisions, they are not doing that in relation to immigration control. So this House is being asked to approve a blanket exception that allows the immigration authorities to discriminate or to harass on religious grounds persons seeking to enter or remain in this country.
	I can perfectly understand that when an extremist cleric of any faith seeks to enter this country and is a bad man, because he preaches violence, extremism or hatred or stirs up anything of that kind, the immigration authorities must have the power—and they do—to refuse entry to or to deport that person or to refuse leave to remain. But that is not on grounds of religion or belief but of the conduct of that person. There must be a power to do that, and there is. Here, a blanket exception allows any religious discrimination and harassment in respect of any of the functions.
	If noble Lords look at how that is defined in Clause 54, the language is astonishing, because it goes further even than the allowance of racial discrimination by allowing anything to be done under the exception in relation to religious discrimination or religious harassment, as regards the immigration functions of entry control or leave to remain.
	That is deeply obnoxious, completely unnecessary and there are no safeguards against abuse. There are even no safeguards in relation to the Human Rights Act in large measure, because the European Convention on Human Rights does not itself guarantee anything to do with immigration controls in relation to leave to enter or remain under normal circumstances. We on these Benches would require cogent justification for this provision and would not be satisfied with general assurances. Of course, the Joint Committee on Human Rights unanimously expressed its own concerns, as my noble friend said, but this provision is not necessary and should, therefore, be firmly removed from the Bill.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I should say straight away that I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Lester, for bringing forward the amendment, which enables us to discuss the concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I understand their concerns. We are willing to consider the principles behind the amendment, even if we cannot accept that the wholesale removal of Clause 54(4)(f) is the right way forward. It is a matter for discussion.
	In preparing the exception for immigration decisions, we did not intend that immigration officials would be able to harass anyone on the grounds of religion or belief. We had in mind two particular instances where we wished to protect the ability of the immigration service to take decisions on our behalf. The first of these was the exercise of the discretion to exclude an individual from this country on the grounds that his presence would be prejudicial to good order—something to which the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has referred. I am sure that noble Lords can think for themselves of individuals who they would wish to see so excluded. We would not wish to see that discretion hampered by the fear of an allegation of discrimination on grounds of belief.
	The second area with which we were concerned was the need to recognise some individuals as ministers of religion for entry purposes, while refusing to recognise others who might represent different organisations from access to this immigration category. We wish to retain the ability to withhold privileged access to the UK in that way. At the same time, it is important to allow genuine religious groups access to ministers and other workers of their faith, for the support and encouragement of their belief.
	So, we accept that the current wording of Clause 54(4)(f) is wide and are considering, in the light of the JCHR report, whether we can improve it. I am not able to accept Amendment No. 192 as it stands this evening, but we will continue to give thought to the matter, and I hope that in the mean time the noble Lord will be persuaded to withdraw his amendment. We will try to come back with something that meets our joint purpose. Having heard the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Lester, I think we have the same intent and purpose. It may be that Clause 54(4)(f) does not quite deliver what we jointly seek.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister for the explanation she has given. There is ample time between now and Report, and we hope that we will be able to come to a conclusion on this matter. I am delighted that the Minister has gone some way in meeting our concern. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 193:
	Page 32, line 18, at end insert "(but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment)"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: In speaking to Amendment No. 193, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 193, 194, 195 and 196. These are further amendments to do with the extent to which exemption from the harassment provisions of this Bill may be necessary.
	We have already considered the question of a general exemption for matters to do with the curriculum and religious worship in schools, and have taken an amendment to remove too wide an exemption from harassment for education authorities. These amendments bring provision for other public authorities into line with these other areas.
	Thus, while we propose that the full exemption in relation to matters to do with the curriculum and religious worship should continue to apply to action taken by public authorities for the reasons I set out earlier in this debate, when I explained them in relation to schools, we see no reason why in any other situation they should need to be allowed effectively to harass anyone. Their position in this respect is no different from that of education authorities. We want to make it clear that exemptions allowing harassment within the terms of the Bill are limited to those areas and cases where they are absolutely necessary. These amendments accordingly make it explicit on the face of the Bill that harassment is not protected in relation to the other exemptions in Clause 54(4)(h). I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: We welcome these amendments.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: Concerns have been expressed to me about whether these provisions might be used as a weapon by disgruntled parents whose children fail to get to into a religious school because questions about their religious beliefs or practice amount to some sort of harassment. I understand from the people who have brought this matter to my attention that officials at the DfES have not consulted the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church about these amendments. If that is so, it seems somewhat remarkable that such an important matter has not been discussed with them.
	If that is the case—I am assuming that the Government do not wish to withdraw these amendments at this time—can the Minister give us an assurance that consultations will take place with the religious bodies that run schools so that further consideration can be given to this matter before the next stage. I shall be grateful to hear what the Minister has to say on this matter.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We do not believe that these issues will cause difficulty. We have acknowledged that there has not been the opportunity to have extended consultation prior to the passage of this legislation. That is why Clause 52(3) contains certain regulation-making powers in relation to the education provisions that enable the Government to amend or repeal an exception or, if necessary, provide an additional exception. They also enable us to set out in more detail the way in which the definition of indirect discrimination will affect practice in schools.
	Before using these powers, the Secretary of State will consult education stakeholders in detail. That will include Church of England, Roman Catholic and other denominational schools. Any regulation that we make will need an affirmative resolution of both Houses, so your Lordships' House and the other place will have an opportunity to debate it and to consider whether it is right and proper.
	Our intention is to review the working of the legislation in practice and to consult widely with schools and other stakeholders. These regulation-making powers will enable us to make any necessary changes to the scope and nature of the exceptions and to clarify the working of the legislation in so far as indirect discrimination is concerned, subject to parliamentary agreement. I understand that there may have been perceptions of insufficient consultation, but this is the vehicle that we have to make sure that we get these issues right.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: Just to make sure that I understood the Minister correctly, I think that, when she first responded, she said that it was true that there had not been extensive consultation. From the brief that I received yesterday, I understand that up until yesterday morning there had been no consultation. I want to ensure that there will be some consultation with and explanation to the religious authorities. I think the Minister spoke about consultation with the schools. I presume that she was talking about religious schools and that that would be considered consultation with religious authorities.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I said that there has not been an opportunity for extended consultation. I do not know whether the noble Baroness is right that there has been no consultation at all. I do not believe that that is the position, but it may be. I was trying to indicate that we understand that there will have to be further consideration of these matters and that we will consult. The noble Baroness is absolutely right: many faith communities have schools that provide these services and we will want to consult with all those in the sector who may be affected, whether adversely or positively, by these provisions.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendments Nos. 194 to 196:
	Page 32, line 21, at end insert "(but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment)"
	Page 32, line 22, after "institution" insert "(but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment),"
	Page 32, line 24, at end insert "(but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment)"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 197:
	Page 32, line 31, leave out "or" and insert "other than section 48, or by virtue of a provision"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Amendment No. 197 is a minor technical amendment that resolves an infelicity in the drafting of the Bill. It is the intention of the Government that goods, facilities and services provided by public authorities should be subject to the provisions of Clause 54 of the Bill, reflecting the standards that we believe are rightly expected of public authorities. In order to achieve this, Clause 48(4)(a) includes an express exception from that clause for goods, facilities and services provided by a person exercising a public function. The difficulty arises from the exception contained in Clause 54(4)(j)(ii), which excepts from Clause 54 any action which would be unlawful by virtue of another provision of Part 2 or of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, but for an express exception. Clause 48(4)(a) is such an exception. Our amendment makes it clear that Clause 48 is not covered by the exception at Clause 54. It ensures that the provision of goods, facilities and services by public authorities is covered under Clause 54. The amendment corrects a technical error in the Bill. I suggest that the amendment should be accepted and I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 54, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 55 [Discriminatory practices]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 198:
	Page 33, line 28, leave out paragraph (a).

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: In moving Amendment No. 198, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 199 and 200 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. I hope I can deal with the matter shortly; I have a long and a short note and I shall take the short one.
	The amendments would bring the provisions in respect of discriminatory practices in Clause 55 into line with other equality legislation by ensuring that it relates only to practices which may lead to indirect discrimination and not direct discrimination or harassment. It will be unlawful under Clause 55 only for a person to operate a practice, which is likely to lead to unlawful discrimination, if applied to persons of any religion or belief.
	The CEHR would not, therefore, have the power to bring a case in a situation where a restaurant said that it would not serve Muslims unless it received a complaint, which would be direct discrimination, although it seems unlikely that the CEHR would be aware of such a case in the absence of a complaint.
	These issues are relatively straightforward and I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendments Nos. 199 and 200:
	Page 33, line 34, leave out "or harassment".
	Page 33, line 35, leave out "or harassment"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 55, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 56 to 58 agreed to.
	Clause 59 [Organisations relating to religion or belief]:

Baroness O'Cathain: moved Amendment No. 200A:
	Page 35, line 16, leave out "or main"

Baroness O'Cathain: Clause 59 is a welcome exemption for religious groups from Part 2 of the Bill. However, subsection (2) excludes a religious group if it has a commercial emphasis. My Amendment No. 200A would widen Clause 59. It would ensure that religious organisations with mixed commercial and religious purposes are protected. Only those that are "solely" commercial would be excluded.
	I have tabled the amendment because I am concerned that subsection (2) might be too restrictive. The Government have taken great care to draft Clause 59 and the other religious exemptions in Clauses 60 to 64. However, I still see a problem. Clause 59 allows religious groups to focus their ministry on fellow believers and to restrict membership on the basis of religion.
	That is the way religious groups have operated, quite properly, for centuries. These are common-sense protections. Without them the work of thousands of Christian and other religious groups around the country would immediately become unlawful.
	There is no evidence that religious selection by Christian groups is any kind of social evil. There is ample evidence that these groups have an overwhelmingly positive impact on our culture, including through their many welfare projects. This is why I believe it is right to protect them. Indeed, it would be most regrettable if a religious group were held in breach of Part 2 over some perfectly reasonable practice aimed at protecting the doctrines of furthering its ministry.
	I understand the reason behind subsection (2). We do not want commercial organisations getting round the law by pretending to be religious. But what about truly religious organisations that operate in a way which appears to be mainly commercial? For example, there is a company which supplies, on a commercial basis, the organising of Christian ceremonies for weddings, funerals and baby-namings, as they are now called. Would that be regarded as solely or mainly commercial?
	There are Christian book distributors, which are very large organisations. They exist primarily for religious reasons, but are they safe under Clause 59? There is an organisation called Autosave, which supplies cheap cars to ministers and missionaries, and one called MasterSun, which organises Christian holidays. They can doubtless prove, under subsection (1)(d), that they exist to,
	"enable persons of a religion or belief to receive any benefit, or to engage in any activity, within the framework of that religion or belief".
	But, if a court decides that their main purpose is "commercial" their work would be deemed unlawful.
	The amendment is intended to probe how the Government believe that the exclusion for commercial organisations will operate and why they have decided to introduce it.
	Specifically, I would like the Minister to give judgment on the theoretical scenario from the Christian Institute's briefing. It talks about a Muslim taxi firm that is set up specifically to supply cheap taxis to local mosques on the day of worship to help elderly and infirm Muslims to get to the mosque for daily prayers. The firm also supplies taxis on an ordinary commercial basis to other customers. This side of the business expands, but the original side of the firm business remains unaffected. Would the court take the view that the main business of that taxi firm is commercial? If so, an ordinary customer could successfully allege religious discrimination because the elderly Muslims would get cheaper rates than a normal non-Muslim passenger.
	It seems that that would be a harsh and undesirable consequence of the Bill, and I wonder what the Minister thinks about that scenario.
	Before I sit down I should make it clear that the Christian businesses that I encounter are very keen to supply services to anyone who wants them. Their very purpose is to give a positive portrayal of the Christian faith to people who are not themselves Christian. But they are not proselytising. I do not say that all such businesses are restrictive about who benefits from their work or that they are restrictive all the time. But if, for sincere religious reasons, some religious businesses do give different treatment to fellow believers, I ask what is wrong with that? I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Amendment No. 200A raises again the difficult balancing act between protecting individuals from discrimination and continuing to allow the legitimate activities of faith groups to continue, as the noble Baroness made clear in her remarks. Clause 59 provides exceptions for religion or belief organisations to enable them to limit their membership, participation in activities, the provision of goods, facilities and services and the use of their premises. That is the whole purpose.
	The exemptions do not apply to organisations whose sole or main purpose is commercial. Indeed, it is difficult to see how some of these exemptions, for example on restricting membership, might be relevant to commercial organisations because of course they will want to sell as many things to as many people as possible.
	The amendment would, however, allow organisations whose main, but not sole, purpose is commercial to benefit from the exemption. The effect of that would be that some commercial organisations, which have a religious or belief element, could claim the benefit of the exception and could therefore lawfully discriminate in the way set out in Clause 59, for example by limiting access to their activities.
	Although we are sympathetic to the idea that religious groups, in particular, need to be able to express their faith through a range of activities, we believe that this amendment could alter the balance of our provisions too far and that it could be open to abuse by commercial organisations who might seek to discriminate against certain religions. Our current provisions would not prevent Christian groups, for example, from restricting access requiring payment, such as concerts or church lunches, if they decided to do that. Nor would we wish to interfere with activities in that way. But where an organisation is offering a commercial service open to the general public, that should be done without discrimination, whether that service is offered by a religious or secular service. Under our current proposals, if the main purpose of the organisation is to support a particular religious community and the commercial purpose is ancillary to that, it will be covered by our exception.
	Furthermore, where a commercial organisation occasionally undertakes charitable work—for example, where a Christian firm of solicitors provides pro bono work to the local church—we do not believe that its activities would fall within Part 2, because it would not be its main purpose. However, we do not accept that a commercial organisation that, as a by-product, supports a particular community, should benefit from the exemption in Clause 59.
	Were we to accept the amendment, any organisation that had a belief or religion element could claim the benefit of the exception for a service that was overwhelmingly commercial. There will be a number of areas where the court ends up having to determine whether that is the main or subsidiary purpose. In the generality of cases, it is relatively easy to say which is the main purpose and which is the subsidiary purpose. We do not claim all wisdom in this area, but we do not believe that the amendment would improve the balance of the Bill. That is why I must resist it.
	I hope that the explanation that I have given has enabled the noble Baroness better to understand why we have struck the balance that we have and think that it is about right.

Baroness O'Cathain: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. It has been useful to probe the matter to see what Clause 59 might mean in practice. I was also keen to represent the interests of the many Christian businesses who have a rightful place in our society and should not be made scapegoats. I will carefully read the Minister's reply, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Turner of Camden: moved Amendment No. 201:
	Page 35, line 23, at end insert "but only in so far as these activities are conducted in pursuance of one or more of the purposes in subsection (1)"

Baroness Turner of Camden: I shall speak also to the other amendments standing in my name in this group. Clause 59(1) defines the purposes of organisations that will be accepted as relating to religion or belief. Clause 59(3) states:
	"Nothing in this Part shall make it unlawful . . . to restrict membership of the organisation . . . participation in activities undertaken by the organisation or on its behalf",
	or,
	"to restrict the provision of goods, facilities or services",
	or,
	"to restrict the use or disposal of premises owned or controlled by the organisation".
	It is customary for organisations whose main purpose is religious to conduct activity that is not solely related to religion and that may have a wider import. As an example, there are many places where the parish church hall is, in effect, a community hall—a facility available to the whole neighbourhood. As such, it may well receive some public funding. The aim of the amendment and others in the group is to specify that restrictions should apply only in relation to religious purposes and beliefs, as set out in subsection (1). In that case, it is surely quite reasonable to restrict participation in activities who are members or supporters of its religious religion or belief.
	However, where a public function for the whole community is being performed, it does not seem reasonable that that restriction should apply. Whatever public facility is available should be available without restriction. Subsection (5) again refers to restrictions, and I do not understand why the word "expedient" has been included. "Necessary" should be quite sufficient. The inclusion of the word "expedient" could give religious organisations wide discretion. They could discriminate because they believed it expedient not to cause offence.
	Turning to Amendment No. 204, if a religious organisation is performing a public function, it seems reasonable that the provisions applying to other organisations performing public functions—in other words, the provisions in Clause 54(1)—should also apply in respect of the performance of that function. That subsection makes it,
	"unlawful for a public authority exercising a function to do any act which constitutes discrimination or harassment".
	I turn to the amendments to Clause 60, which deals with charities relating to religion or belief. Again, similar arguments apply. If public duties are carried out, the charity should be bound by Clause 54(1), which intends that no public authority exercising a public function should do any act that constitutes discrimination or harassment.
	There are good reasons for the amendments—I have of course spoken to the other amendments in this group—so I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My name is added to the amendment and I will speak also to Amendments Nos. 203, 205 and 207 in my name in this group. I shall not repeat anything that the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, has said so clearly. I just want to focus on one point, which is the wretched word, "expedient". This is an addition to the Bill. In the original Bill before the general election and as presented to the other place, the words "or expedient" were not present. In the Bill as re-presented in this House after the election the words, "or expedient" were added. I imagine that that must be because belief organisations lobbied very hard and persuaded the powers that be to include them.
	The good thing about the word, "necessary", which has been added by the Government in earlier amendments dealing with education is, as I said at the time, that the concept of necessity imports proportionality. That is a well known concept to our law and means that the means must be proportionate to the aim. The aim must be legitimate, but the means must be reasonably proportionate and necessary to achieve that legitimate aim. The courts interpret that very flexibly. Going by existing case law here and in Strasbourg, courts defer to the specialist expertise or other qualities of the decision-taker—in this case, the faith organisation—and do not seek to substitute their discretion, except where the decision-taker exceeds the discretion allowed by the concept of necessity/proportionality.
	So that is an entirely flexible standard in which context is everything. The courts have said so in all the great cases since the Human Rights Act came into force. What about adding the words, "or expedient"? What does that mean? It is what lawyers would call standard-less. There is no standard. "Or expedient" simply means, "It pleases me. I like it. I want to do it." It is beyond the scope of any court to review that. If Parliament says, "Anything goes", and the courts give effect to the will of Parliament, anything will go. That is what "or expedient" means. I defy the Minister to come up with any definition of "or expedient" that gives a standard that the courts could interpret.
	In the bad old days, under the old Official Secrets Act, there were exceptions that used the language of "expediency" in the serious areas of national security and official secrecy. But in 1989 the government of the day—they were of a Conservative hue—amended the official secrets legislation and tightened up the test, even in the area of national security and official secrecy, to make it a test of necessity.
	It is unacceptable that the words "or expedient" should be left in the Bill as a standardless justification, a cop-out, allowing faith organisations to discriminate at large, when the Government's original intention, before the previous general election, was quite rightly that the test should be that of necessity. For those reasons, I hope that the Government will substitute for the words "or expedient" either nothing at all or something fairly strict that the courts can interpret and apply.

The Lord Bishop of Newcastle: I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for their comments. I shall try at least to make a case for retaining "expedient". Whether I succeed remains to be seen.
	I must confess that I do not like the amendments because they seem excessively regulatory; in other words, they seek to over-regulate. They do not seem to recognise that often it will be unclear whether a religious organisation can say that a restriction is necessary having regard to the purposes of the organisation.
	The purposes of local religious groups are often defined in somewhat unspecific terms, and even when they are defined with precision, they may then be defined in general and open terms. For example, the primary function of a parochial church council, which is the legal entity of the Church of England at parish level, is,
	"to co-operate with the minister in promoting in the parish"
	the word "parish" is underlined—
	"the whole mission of the church, pastoral, evangelistic, social and ecumenical".
	In view of that, it would often be difficult to say in practice that a restriction was necessary in the light of the body's purposes, even though it would be widely recognised to be appropriate and consistent with those purposes.
	Secondly, in so far as the purposes of the organisation were clear, it is hard to see how a view could be taken on whether a restriction was necessary without some examination of the tenets of the religion or belief in question as regards the extent to which members of other religions or beliefs should be able to participate in the services in question. I doubt whether, even if they were equipped to do so, courts or tribunals would welcome being called upon to undertake that kind of task.
	I am told—although many noble Lords will know far better than I—that courts have a well settled practice of declining jurisdiction in matters that turn on interpretations of religious belief, on the grounds that they are non-justiciable. So it seems that the choice of the word "expedient", even allowing for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that it does not mean very much at all, allows for flexibility in interpretation and is therefore to be welcomed.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: In a game of chess, if not here, a rook and a bishop are of equal value as pieces on the board, and that is why I have the temerity to ask the right reverend Prelate a couple of questions about what he has just said.
	First, he said that the amendment was excessively regulatory, but does he appreciate that what our amendments mean is "a sense of proportion"; that is to say, do not take a sledgehammer to crack a nut? Does he regard a sense of proportion as inconsistent either with the Christian tradition, common sense or fairness, given that this is an exemption from the individual's right to equal treatment without discrimination?
	Secondly, the way in which the right reverend Prelate has put his point is very interesting. I think that he agrees with me that the words "or expedient" mean that the courts could not review the fundamental right to equal treatment in this context because the words are standardless. So is the right reverend Prelate saying that there should be a blanket immunity here because judges should be deferring and not reviewing, and therefore the words "or expedient" should be inserted for that purpose? If so, he and I are in fundamental disagreement.

The Lord Bishop of Newcastle: I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that a sense of proportion is central to the Christian faith, practice and common sense. In response to his second question, I think that we are in fundamental disagreement.

Baroness Whitaker: I support these amendments because, perhaps more than ever now, we need to preserve the tolerant and anti-discriminatory nature of our society with regard to religion, as to other matters. Exceptions to that principle should be as narrow as possible, so I agree that they should be narrowed as the amendments provide.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The amendments in this group attempt to restrict in various ways—I understand why—the exceptions that we have made available in Clauses 59, 60 and 61 for faith and belief groups, charities and faith schools. It is an important and sensitive area, and we recognise the need for balance and the difficulty of getting that balance right.
	Amendments Nos. 2001—I meant 201, but it feels like the 2001st—and 202 would tighten the restrictions on an organisation relating to religion or belief. Such a change would be unnecessary and would have a potentially damaging effect on the confidence with which religious and belief organisations perform their many valuable functions. It is unnecessary because it is already clear under Clause 59(5) that any such restriction must be necessary or expedient with regard to the purpose of the organisation or to avoid causing offence to members of the religion or faith group. It risks having a harmful effect because, if agreed to, the amendment would cause religious and belief groups to have to ask themselves two questions: not just whether restricting access to the activity concerned was necessary or expedient for its function, but also whether the activity concerned was carried out in direct pursuit of its purpose.
	We seek to avoid such a "chilling" effect as it might have. It is right that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle should mention the breadth of activities participated in by religious groups. As noble Lords know, sometimes the groups are very small, comprising no more than a handful of people and quite often they do not have a formal constitution. It seems to have caused huge concern and difficulty.
	The list of purposes that we provided in Clause 59(1) is broad but this amendment might cover, for example, purely social activities of such a group. Why should we require that such arrangements be open to all comers? While I recognise the importance of getting the balance right, I am unable to accept the two amendments.
	Amendments Nos. 203, 205 and 207 seek to ensure that the exceptions in Clauses 59 to 61 will apply only where the groups concerned can show the necessity of a restriction having regard to the purpose of the organisation or to avoid causing offence to members of the religion or belief group. They would do so by removing the words "or expedient" from the clauses.
	It is a particularly difficult area, and we are prepared to consider change. At the same time, however, we feel that the test of necessity is too stiff a test to rely on alone. Again, we have discussed the matter with many stakeholders, and we feel that the test of necessity alone would risk causing great difficulty to religious and belief groups who currently offer valuable services.
	I can see from the expression on the face of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, that he will immediately think, "What about proportionality? Proportionality is the curer of all ills, and surely it would mean that some of the issues could be dealt with de minimis". It will not deal with the chilling effect.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Am I right in thinking that the noble Baroness does not agree with the right reverend Prelate, who said that the words "or expedient" were desirable or necessary to immunise the organisation against judicial scrutiny? Does she agree that there must be a legal test that can be applied in practice, given that one is dealing with a fundamental right and an exception to that right?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I agree that there has to be a legal test. The Government would argue that expediency is a test that could be applied. I see the noble Lord shaking his head, but that is why it was settled on as something that was compliant. As a result of the conversations that we have had in this debate and elsewhere, I also understand that there is anxiety that expediency is too low. So, we have an interesting challenge: "expedient" is too low, but "necessity" is absolutely too high. The challenge for us is to find something that is not "necessary" but is more than "expedient". We will try to rise to that challenge, but it may be that we will find it expedient to come back to where we are.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Could the noble Baroness consider whether the words "reasonable necessity" might meet her needs?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Some would say that that would be tautologous. If it is necessary, it is necessary; if it is reasonable, some would say that it was otiose. You would say that reasonableness was inherent because it was necessary.
	There is a lovely semantic argument to be had on that—but not tonight. I notice that everyone is looking at the clock. However, we will put our mind to the issue to see whether we can find some more felicitous word than "expedient". We will see.

Baroness Turner of Camden: I thank my noble friend for that explanation of the Government's position. The intention of the amendment was to ensure that, when a public function was performed, restrictions should not apply. I note that my noble friend feels that the amendment would be too restrictive. I am not certain that I agree with that. Never mind, I do not intend to pursue that this evening.
	My noble friend acknowledged that the question of the word "expedient" was a difficult area and said that she was willing to think about what was said. One cannot really expect anything more than that. I am grateful to the Minister for what she has said this evening. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 202 to 204 not moved.]
	Clause 59 agreed to.
	Clause 60 [Charities relating to religion or belief]:
	[Amendments Nos. 205 and 206 not moved.]
	Clause 60 agreed to.

Baroness Crawley: I beg to move that the House do now resume. In doing so, I suggest that the Committee stage begin again not before 8.34 pm.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.

Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) Order 2005

Lord Bassam of Brighton: rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 14 June be approved [First Report from the Joint Committee].

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, before I begin, I shall take the opportunity to pay tribute to the outstanding way in which the emergency services and the general public responded to the tragic events of last week. I am sure that all noble Lords would agree that the response was truly exemplary. It demonstrated not only the value of years of detailed contingency planning, investment, training and exercising but the remarkable personal commitment of emergency services personnel and the resilience of the general public.
	The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and supporting regulations and guidance establish a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. It will enhance further the resilience of the United Kingdom by setting out a clear set of responsibilities for organisations with a role in preparing for and responding to emergencies at a local level; delivering greater consistency in local civil protection activity; and establishing the basis for robust performance management.
	Schedule 1 to the Act lists the organisations that are subject to its provisions. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) Order 2005 will amend that list to ensure that the legal framework captures all relevant bodies that have a role to play in local multi-agency civil protection work and to ensure that it appropriately reflects the devolution settlement.
	The order will achieve that by doing two specific things. First, it would bring strategic health authorities within the legal framework. It should be remembered that strategic health authorities play a crucial co-ordinating role in emergency planning and response. The order will enable them to play a full and active role in the regime established by the Act. Secondly, it will correct a defect in Schedule 1 by providing that the Act applies to the Health Protection Agency only so far as its functions relate to Great Britain.
	The proposal to bring strategic health authorities within the scope of the legislation was developed in close consultation with and commands the full support of the strategic health authorities themselves and a range of other health bodies. Furthermore, the public consultation on the draft Civil Contingencies Act regulations and guidance, which included a series of 11 road show events in England and Wales, demonstrated clear support for the measure across the civil protection community.
	The proposal to amend the territorial extent of the HPA's duties under the Civil Contingencies Act has been discussed and agreed with the Northern Ireland Administration.
	All that remains for me to say before I sit down is that I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, to the Dispatch Box for the first time on this subject. I look forward to—I was going to say "locking horns with her", but that would be unnecessarily conflictual—engaging with her. I beg to move.
	Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 14 June be approved [First Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

Baroness Wilcox: My Lords, I thank the Minister for welcoming me here. I feel churlish now about having to ask one or two questions.
	I start by saying that we support the change. Of course, we would not stand in the way of the Government making changes to the nation's civil contingency plan in the context of last Thursday's bombings in London—exactly the sort of event that the Civil Contingencies Act was put in place to deal with. In agreeing not to stand in the way of the change, we have one or two questions to ask. I join the Minister in paying tribute to the splendid work of our emergency services.
	The first obvious question is whether it would have made any difference on Thursday if the strategic health authorities had already been included in the category 2 responders.
	The second question that I would like to ask in the light of events relates to the SHAs, and I hope that I am not repeating anything that the Minister said. My question is about the expected reduction in the number of SHAs. What impact will the uncertainty have on their ability to act as category 2 responders and to provide assistance in the event of an emergency? Would it be helpful for the Department of Health to make a decision soon on whether it will establish a single health authority for London, given that the capital is, sadly, likely to be the centre of any future attacks?
	Thirdly, we think that the fact that the Government are having to amend the list of responders so soon after the Civil Contingencies Act was passed—November 2004—is a cause for concern. This is extremely important legislation, as last Thursday's events have already shown. It is vital that it is right. Are the Government confident that the lists of category one and two responders are complete and correct? I hope that the Minister is able to put my mind at rest on those questions. I repeat that we support the order, given the terrible events of last Thursday.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, on behalf of the Liberal Democrat Benches, I echo the words of the Minister in paying tribute to the emergency services, which performed in a way which impressed the rest of the world. Clearly, they helped a large number of people who needed help.
	I am afraid that I cannot guarantee that I will deal with these matters in future, alongside the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox. This evening, all my colleagues are at a celebration. I am left as the duty odd-job man, which is a role that I have performed in the past and no doubt will perform in the future. Therefore, I have the duty to respond on behalf of these Benches to something about which I do not know very much. I do not apologise for that because I pay tribute to the work that my noble friend Lord Roper did for our party as Chief Whip, which is the celebration quite rightly taking place today.
	However, I have taken due advice from my noble friend Lord Garden who knows more about these matters than I do. He assures me that, within the context of the Act, this is a sensible measure. I am therefore given leave to nod it through the House on behalf of our Benches, and I so do.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I did not expect the order to excite great passions, but I thought that it might excite a little more interest. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support and encouragement to those involved in contingency planning and civil protection. I am also very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, for her response and generosity. The noble Baroness asked a number of questions, with which I shall try to deal in turn.
	The first question was whether this would have made any difference last week. In practical terms, the answer has to be "no". In essence, all that the order does is codify the role of the Strategic Health Authority in emergency planning and response, so it gives effect to what was being undertaken in any event. It is to give greater confidence and certainty to the process that we have brought the order forward.
	The noble Baroness also expressed a small concern that we were bringing an order forward so quickly after the Bill. Perhaps that could have been reflected more widely in concerns about the accuracy of the responder's list and so on. The noble Baroness does not need to worry too much about that. The process was always set up to provide the legislation with some necessary flexibility, so that if it seemed appropriate to add to the responder's list at a later stage we could do that.
	As I have basically said, a minor technical change is necessary in part because of the evolution of the SHA's co-ordination role in relation to emergency planning and response since the introduction of the Bill to Parliament. It is worth adding that it has strong support from stakeholders and the health responder community—to describe it in a slightly jargonistic way. It demonstrates the Government's continued commitment to ensuring that the regime itself keeps apace with wider developments in the health services.
	One could also fairly reflect that it says a lot about our commitment to listening to those who are involved. If those who are involved are saying to us, "Look, we think you need to make this change now", then here we are. We have listened; we have thought about it; we have consulted; we have asked people; and we are bringing forward that change.
	Perhaps it is worth adding that we gave some consideration at the time of the legislation to including SHAs in the responder's list. But we took a decision at that stage not to do that because we wanted to have more systematic discussions with the stakeholders and also wanted to enable the SHA role to emerge and settle down. That is really why we have done it now and have included them in the category 2 responder's list in the way in which we have.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, also asked about a single service for London. The answer to that is "no". Arrangements work well at the moment. One SHA taking the lead as a matter of practice works well with the others. So we are happy with arrangements as they are. I am very happy to respond to those points. If there are any other issues that the noble Baroness thinks are important and relevant, and wants to come back later, she is very welcome to drop me a note asking for further particulars and insights. I make the offer today that if the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, in his transitory role, want further briefing from the Civil Contingencies Unit within the Cabinet Office, they are welcome to take up that offer.
	We want to spread the knowledge and to advance people's understanding of how it works. We can all be proud of what was achieved last week in terrible circumstances, but we are not complacent about what we and the services have achieved. I give a commitment to the House today that we will seek to ensure that we ratchet up levels of improvement so that there is preparedness for any unpleasant, unforeseen or unpredicted circumstances that might arise in the future when services are put under pressure in emergencies in the way in which they were last week when they responded so magnificently.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Water Act 2003 (Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2005

Lord Bach: rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 8 June be approved [First Report from the Joint Committee].

Lord Bach: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall speak at the same time to the Water Supply Licence (Modification of Standard Conditions) Order 2005.
	The Water Act 2003 introduced a number of changes to the Water Industry Act 1991. Among these was the introduction of new provisions for competition in the supply of water services to large users of water. The Government believe that the properly managed development of competition in the water industry in England and Wales should lead to greater efficiencies, keener prices, innovation and better services, to the benefit of customers. To that end, and following extensive consultation, the Water Act 2003 amended the Water Industry Act 1991 to enable licensed water suppliers to access water undertakers' supply systems in order to supply water to large non-household customers.
	The Government, together with the Welsh Assembly Government and Ofwat, have been working closely with industry stakeholders, including prospective licensees and customers, on preparations for the implementation of the new regime. Prospective licensees will be able to apply to Ofwat for a water supply licence from 1 August 2005. Large water users that are occupying eligible premises with an annual water consumption of not less than 50 megalitres, will, from 1 December 2005, be able to switch to a licensee for their water supply.
	The licensees will be bound by conditions determining rights and obligations similar to those applied to statutory water undertakers through their instruments of appointment. Those conditions will be prescribed by the Secretary of State, after consulting the National Assembly for Wales, in the form of standard conditions in water supply licenses.
	The Director General of Water Services will be able to propose amendments to standard conditions by individual agreement or by a process of collective modification, without the need to obtain the agreement of each individual licensee. Ultimately, if he is unable to obtain agreement he may refer the proposed modification to the Competition Commission to take a view on whether the amendment would be in the public interest.
	However, certain conditions must be satisfied before an amendment may be made under the collective modification procedure. Following public consultation and input from stakeholder advisory groups, this order prescribes the percentages that apply to those conditions. The consultation sought views on the detailed policy proposals for collective modification of standard licence conditions. Some 34 stakeholders were invited to comment on the collective modification proposals and 18 of those provided individual responses.
	One of the conditions that must be satisfied before collective modification may proceed is that specified percentages of licence holders, by number or by market share, do not object to the modifications. The order provides for the percentage in both cases to be 20 per cent and for market share to be assessed by reference to volume of water supplied to premises based on historical data from the last 12-month period. We believe that the threshold is low enough so that if a significant proportion of licensees objects, the modification would not proceed; but not so low that they give undue power to any licensee to block proposed modifications agreed by the majority of licensees.
	Until now I have been discussing the modification order, so I turn now to the first of the instruments before the House, the consequential and supplementary provisions regulations. These make a number of changes to both primary and secondary legislation to give full effect to the introduction of the new water supply licensing regime, the establishment of the Consumer Council for Water and abolition of the Ofwat Customer Services Committees, the establishment of the Water Services Regulation Authority, the transfer of functions to the authority and the abolition of the office of the Director General from 1 April 2006.
	The regulations make amendments and supplementary provisions to water and sewerage undertakers' conditions of appointment and to the Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2000 and 2001 to take account of the establishment of the Consumer Council for Water. They amend the Water (Meters) Regulations 1988 so as to take licensees outside the regime, since issues about the accuracy of meters used by licensees to charge their customers will be a matter for the contracts between them. They disapply the provisions of the Food Safety Act 1990 to water supplied by licensees, as water quality will be subject to the requirements of the Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2000 and 2001. Further, they disapply regulations prescribing guaranteed standards of service in respect of licensees, which are more appropriately a matter for licensees' contracts with their customers. They also ensure that regulations governing water fittings, undertakings about water quality and some requirements of water quality regulations are applied to licensed water suppliers. This establishes the general and important principle of ensuring appropriate protection of drinking water quality to protect public health, regardless of whether supplies are provided by water undertakers or licensed suppliers.
	Finally, in Part 2 and Part 4 of the regulations, amendments and supplementary provisions are made in various statutory instruments and in water and sewerage undertakers' instruments of appointment. These are simply to reflect the setting up of the Water Services Regulation Authority and the Consumer Council for Water which are replacing the office of the Director General of Water Services and the customer service committees. I beg to move.
	Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 8 June be approved [First Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Bach.)

Baroness Byford: My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the orders so clearly and I hope that I shall do the same. I, too, shall take them together. He stated that large users will now have the opportunity to seek different water suppliers. The noble Lord was not in his current office when we took the Bill through the House. Perhaps I may gently remind him that we had a long discussion on the whole question of water suppliers coming into the market.
	We were concerned that if 2,000 larger users were able to move outside the current system, the fact that they would have to take less than 50 megalitres was not the problem, but the result would be that cherry picking would arise among those already taking supplies from water undertakers. I have to say to the noble Lord that it was one argument we did not win, but I still think that our concern is realistic. I am also aware that when we were taking the Bill through its stages, it was made clear that it would not apply to domestic users. I have no argument with that, but if 2,000 large non-domestic users are taken out of the system, the result will be a reduction of income for the undertakers, income they had formerly enjoyed. I do not think that the Government will argue the point; it is a fact. This may jeopardise some smaller users, be they business users or otherwise—and I do not include domestic users—even under the conditions applying today. When the Minister responds, I would be grateful for clarification of this point. I know, too, that my honourable friend Bill Wiggin put the same question earlier today at the other end.
	The Explanatory Memorandum to the order states that:
	"No regulatory impact assessment has been prepared in respect of this Order".
	So I looked at the regulatory assessments available in the Library, but I was not enormously encouraged. The Explanatory Memorandum policy background states at paragraph 7.2 that:
	"The Government believes that properly managed competition should lead to greater efficiencies, keener prices, innovation and better services, to the benefit of customers. The potential benefits of competition must at the same time be balanced against the Government's wider objectives to protect public health, protect and improve the environment, meet the Government's social goals, and to safeguard services to customers".
	That links in closely with what I said earlier. Since the regulatory impact assessment was completed, can he give us any figures on the costs that will accrue as a result? I ask that because clearly there will be costs.
	Paragraph 3.2.3 of the regulatory assessment states:
	"We expect that there will be some increased costs to administer the guidance. There is a danger that where guidance is not completely prescriptive, parties to an access agreement might not be able to agree all issues and so refer the dispute to us".
	The paragraph refers to the commission.
	"This could increase our costs as more resources could be needed to deal with a large number of disputes. However, we expect that as our experience of dealing with disputes develops, and precedents are set, our costs for this area of work would decrease".
	Again, I would be glad of a response on those statements.
	Earlier I referred to our concerns about cherry picking. I draw the attention of the Minister to the contribution made by my noble friend Lord Elliott of Morpeth at the Second Reading of the Bill. He has been involved with water undertakers for many years. In his speech he stated that,
	"they will attract large customers from the incumbent company in each area. Large customers are always important to every company. Water is a regulated, price-capped industry with income set in advance. Therefore, if large users leave a company, prices for domestic customers will rise".—[Official Report, 6/3/03; col. 982.]
	I give due credit to Philip Fletcher, the Director General of Water Services on his responsible handling of the economic regulation of the water industry. We pay tribute to him for his very good work.
	The Minister referred earlier to the fact that the percentage of licence holders who may object to the collective modifications may be up to 20 per cent. If the percentage of objections is 15 per cent, is the provision so rigid that only the 20 per cent figure will activate the modifications? If a percentage lower than 20 per cent, but close to it, were to object, that might be of concern to the Government. Will he explain why this percentage was chosen? It may be that it proved to be the common denominator when this went out for consultation. I do not know, and I seek clarification on the point. Obviously we want a settled and regular future for the industry. I have already referred to the consequential and supplementary provisions in the 2005 regulations.
	I am sure that we all believe in an open market—I have acknowledged that the legislation does not affect the domestic market—but obviously the water companies prepare their budgets and set their prices for something like five years in advance. Does the Minister recognise that there are likely to be repercussions for some water undertakers? What is the Government's view on that?
	Under these new circumstances—and if my suggestion that cherry-picking will be reflected in price increases in future years proves to be accurate—how will the voice of the consumer be dealt with? What is the Government's view on how to keep such costs down to the minimum?
	While we welcome the order and the regulations, I have raised one or two particularly important issues. When we debated the legislation previously, my noble friend Lady O'Cathain, who is a director of South East Water, commented that she felt the arrangements in the statutory instrument were cumbersome, overly bureaucratic and potentially very costly. I come back to the costs. I hope that the Government can convince and reassure us that the charges laid out here will be beneficial to both the water industry and the people of Britain, who are the consumers of the water, and improve the quality and supply of our water.
	As regards the point that was raised earlier this week, given the new building programme that is to take place in the south and south-east and the great stress that that will place on the water supply, and given the forecast water shortages, is the Minister confident that the water companies will be able to fulfil their obligations, as has been suggested by his colleagues? That matter is also very much tied up with these regulations.
	I thank the Minister for introducing the legislation. I look forward to his answers to my questions.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, I find myself on slightly more familiar ground with this order and these regulations. This legislation provides some of the means for implementing Section 56 of the Water Act 2003, which amended the Water Industry Act 1991, and its most contentious part—that is, the introduction of competition in the supply of water for large customers only. It gives effect to the new water supply licensing regime.
	We have no quarrel with the Water Supply Licence (Modification of Standard Conditions) Order 2005, nor with Parts 2 and 4 of the Water Act 2003 (Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2005, which introduce the means of setting up the consumer council and the regulatory authority. However, there are questions still to be asked about Part 3, which concerns the new competition regulations.
	The Minister said that applications for licences under the new regime would start on 1 December this year. In the light of further discussion and consultation since the Act became law, do the Government have any feel for how many licences are likely to be applied for over a period of, say, two or three years; what proportion of the supply these may include; and how many of the possibly 2,000 or more large customers are likely to be interested in finding new suppliers under this system?
	The principle is very clear—that is, to introduce a degree of competition in order to bring prices down—but whether it is sensible in the present circumstances is a different matter. The principle was agreed when the legislation was passed, but nevertheless it is still worth commenting upon.
	Some interesting and useful explanatory background notes have been circulated to Members of the House. Paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum sets out the dilemma which the Government are in. It states:
	"The Government believes that properly managed competition should lead to greater efficiencies, keener prices, innovation and better services, to the benefit of customers".
	Well, to the benefit of some customers, perhaps.
	It goes on to state:
	"The potential benefits of competition must at the same time be balanced against the Government's wider objectives to protect public health, protect and improve the environment, meet the Government's social goals, and to safeguard services to customers".
	In other words, it is all things to all people.
	"Balance" is a weasel word whenever it is used in this way because it avoids the fundamental question of what the priorities are. Of course, there has to be a balance between everything—but a balance of what? How much of each particular element do you feed into the balance, or is it a case of "Let's see where the scales end up"?
	The effect of this legislation on the environment is minimal and negative. As far as we can see, no environmental benefits are likely to accrue from this new system. It would be interesting if the Minister could tell us what environmental benefits will arise, as opposed to lower costs for larger customers.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Byford, made the point, as did my honourable friend Colin Breed in the House of Commons earlier today, that if the existing water undertakers—not the new suppliers—find that some of their most profitable business is being, in the words of the noble Baroness, cherry-picked, they will have to recoup those costs from somewhere. What guarantee do the Government have that those costs will be recouped by greater efficiencies or, indeed, by a reduction in the water undertakers' profits, which they would not want? What guarantee is there that this will not result in higher prices for ordinary domestic consumers in the medium term? Under the new regulatory system, are the Government issuing strong guidance to the regulator that any increase in costs due to this competition must be discounted when it comes to setting and approving prices for domestic customers? That is a fundamental question.
	Another fundamental question goes back to the environmental point. In the present circumstances, are reductions in water prices desirable, given that we are always talking about using the market to produce environmental objectives when, whether we like it or not, water is becoming a commodity in increasingly short supply? Without other serious incentives to conserve water, will not reducing prices simply result in the large customers paying little or no attention to the need to conserve water when their costs may already have been cut without their having to do that?
	Finally, I refer to the Question which my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer asked last week about whether adequate measures are in place to deal with the resulting water shortages. This is all clearly part and parcel of the same problem. While we are in a potential drought situation, there is some dispute about whether drought is a short-term or longer-term thing. Let me quote the Minister's words back at him. He said,
	"it is important to draw a distinction between the short-term issue of drought and that of longer-term demand".—[Official Report, 7/7/05; col. 737.]
	Given what appears to be happening to the climate generally and the extra demand for water, it seems to us that the need for water conservation is not just a short-term drought matter, but a medium and long-term problem we must face up to. At the very best, the proposal to introduce competition into the industry does nothing towards that objective.

Lord Bach: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, and the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for their contribution to this short debate. Their expertise in this field is much greater than mine. I shall do my best to answer all their questions, or as many as I can.
	The principle of introducing competition into this field in this way was established in the 2003 Act. We are deciding the details of the decisions that were made when the Bill was debated in both Houses.
	We believe that in general, a controlled approach to competition in this field is justified, and this is a pretty controlled approach. It is right, as the noble Lord and the noble Baroness suggested, to be careful when dealing with public water supply. If the regime works well, perhaps we can look at it in the future to see what we should do.
	One question that arose was whether the figure of 2,200 potential larger customers was too many. Indeed, I was quite expecting to be asked whether such a number was too small. The noble Baroness, not for the first time, took me slightly by surprise. We think that the figure is about right. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, asked the sensible question of how many we think will take advantage of this. As he is probably expecting me to say, we do not know at this stage. We have no clear idea of numbers. Five prospective licensees have been taking a role in developing the regime with Ofwat. It depends, too, on how many undertakers set up associate companies to become licensees. In this case, the proof of the pudding will very much be in the eating.
	I was asked about the impact on household or other customers' bills. If a valuable customer is lost to a licensee, there is unlikely to be any need for household customers' bills to rise as a result because of the cost principle set out in the legislation. The cost principle requires undertakers to set wholesale or access charges—the charge for using the undertakers' network—in such a way that their net revenue loss from losing a large customer matches their net reduction in costs from not having to do things that will in future be done by a licensee—in other words, meter reading and billing or, in the case of combined licensees, water abstraction and treatment.
	The noble Baroness asked whether the provisions for competition have a detrimental impact on the future provision of water supplies to the domestic consumers in the south east. That question was also asked in the Chamber last week. The answer is no. Water undertakers have a duty to supply domestic consumers and must make provision for this in their 25-year water resource plans. We do not believe that competition will result in any net increase in water demand.
	I shall do my best to answer the other questions that were asked. We agree that we need to ensure that other customers do not suffer. That is why the legislation in the Water Industry Act 1999 says that the regulator must have special regard to the interests of customers outside the competitive market. That is set down.
	What costs will result from competition? The answer will not be a surprise—no figures are available. The answer depends on a number of factors and on the extent of competition. It will be a matter for the review which the regulators of various types will undertake in due course.
	The noble Baroness asked why the threshold was set at 20 per cent. As I hope I said in my speech earlier on, the thresholds are low enough that if a significant proportion of licensees either in number or market share object, the modification will not happen. However, the thresholds are not so low that it gives undue power to any particular licensee to block a modification agreed by the majority of licensees. Thresholds of 20 per cent are consistent with the current modification thresholds in other industries—the electricity and gas industries—and 20 per cent will certainly be kept to.
	I was asked about the consumer voice, which is an important issue. A new independent consumer council for water is being set up on 1 October 2005. It will be able to hold companies, regulators and the Government to account. It will have responsibility to look at the competitive market as well as the monopoly sector, so it will have quite wide powers.
	The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, asked how many customers would partake. As I said, there is no clear picture yet; it depends very much on the extent of licensee activity. He questioned whether there would be any environmental benefits as a result of these orders. We believe that the cost savings, of which there will be some, will allow Ofwat to take greater account of the cost of complying with environmental requirements when setting water prices—it allows Ofwat a greater margin for reflecting environmental costs. Therefore, we may expect the regulator to be tougher with the statutory undertakers as a consequence of the cost savings that will be made.
	I was asked whether competition would encourage over-abstraction and stress on water resources. The existing and proposed controls over abstraction will apply to undertakers and licensees. We think that competition should lead to the more efficient use of water resources.
	I have already dealt with the question of how many licensees there will be. I remind the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, that licensees can apply for a water supply licence from 1 August. From 1 December, large water users will be able to switch if they choose to do so.
	I hope that the House will give this new competitive regime a fair run to see whether it works or not. If we find that there are difficulties with it, powers are available to deal with the situation as we then find it. In all the circumstances, I ask the House to accept these orders. I commend them to the House.

Baroness Byford: My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I wish to say that we favour competition, as he knows. The point that we were trying to raise and which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, when we were going through the debate, was our concern that the Government's system—not the competition—could jeopardise some smaller users. That was our particular concern, which is why I pursued it throughout.
	I note that the provision does not include domestic users, but smaller users and smaller businesses might find that their bills go up correspondingly. The challenge was to see whether the Government were convinced that the system that they have put in place is justified and will work well. I am grateful for the Minister's clarification that if there are problems we will return to the matter.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Water Supply Licence (Modification of Standard Conditions) Order 2005

Lord Bach: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 8 June be approved. [First Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Bach.)
	On Question, Motion agreed to.
	[The Sitting was suspended from 8.19 to 8.34 pm.]

Equality Bill [HL]

House again in Committee.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: moved Amendment No. 206A:
	After Clause 60, insert the following new clause—
	"EXCLUSION ON GROUND OF RELIGIOUS ETHOS ETC.
	( ) Nothing in this Part shall inhibit the right to exclude a person from any organisation or employment on the grounds of his belief (as defined in section 45(b)) or lack of belief where the holding of a particular belief is fundamental to the ethos of that organisation or employer."

Baroness Miller of Hendon: My noble friend Lady Wilcox, who joins with me in proposing this amendment, is a vice-president of the organisation now called Girlguiding UK, whose patron is Her Majesty. I, too, have a former interest to declare—quite apart from the fact that I was a girl guide. My later interest is that I was, formerly, a lady Cub master; we were called "Akela". I spent about 10 years drumming into the heads of boys aged from eight to 10 the same concepts of good citizenship, patriotism, decency, and all other forms of respect for each other. I am very proud to say that in the many years since then, I have never come across any of "my" boys—as I still call them—now grown men with families of their own, who have ever let me down.
	Now both in the Cubs, the Scouts, the Brownies and the Guides, a promise is required from every member and is repeated at every meeting. It is called a "promise", not an oath. In the case of the Guides, it says:
	"I promise to do my best to love my God, to serve the Queen and my Country and to help other people and to keep the Guide Law".
	The Cub and Scout promise is similar. I understand that Freemasons require candidates for initiation to attend an interview where the first question is:
	"Do you believe in a Supreme Being?".
	Unless the answer is an unequivocal "yes", the interview is over, then and there. It does not matter whether it is the God shared by Christians, Jews or Moslems, or whether it is the God or Gods or the supreme being worshipped by Hindus, Sikhs, or any other religion whatever.
	I recall the wonderful World Scout Jamboree held in Britain in August 1957 when young people from all round the world, of every religion, every race and every colour gathered together in united friendship. One of the things they shared in common was their belief in their personal god. It is not possible to accuse such an organisation of either racialism or any other kind of prejudice.
	There is another problem thrown up by the provisions of this Bill under Part 2. There are occasions when it may be reasonable and proper for there to be discrimination on the grounds of a person's religious beliefs or, indeed, the lack of them. I am talking about the employment of someone by a religious organisation. I believe it is not unreasonable for a mosque to wish not to employ someone to work, even in a menial position, say as a cleaner, about their premises and to handle religious objects unless he is of their faith. Although I know that synagogues almost invariably employ non-Jewish caretakers for a variety of reasons, they obviously have to have the right to impose rules as to what food may be brought on to their premises. Surely Catholics and Protestants alike are entitled to decline to employ non-believers in their schools. I say nothing of the Plymouth Brethren, who do not want to recognise trade unions because of their genuine religious beliefs.
	Religious belief is possibly the most delicate of subjects with which the commission is going to have to deal. But the rights of a person who is reasonably refused a job on the grounds of his conflicting religious belief, or the lack of any religious belief has to be balanced against the equal right—confirmed by the Human Rights Act—of the employer to practise his religion without disturbance. The amendment I propose is not a licence to practice discrimination for reasons of pure, unacceptable prejudice. It is to be even handed on a matter of pure conscience, and I hope that the Government will find it possible to accept it. I beg to move.

Baroness Wilcox: My name is added to this amendment along with that of the noble Baroness, Lady Cox. I apologise for not being present at the start of proceedings after the dinner break but I was trying to locate the noble Baroness, Lady Cox. She wishes to apologise to the Committee that she was unable to get here this evening. However, she supports the comments that I now expound.
	Girlguiding UK, of which I am a vice-president, has an equal opportunities policy which is based on a belief in being fair, open and inclusive. Membership of the association is open to any girl or young woman irrespective of faith, race, culture, nationality or any other circumstance provided they are able to understand and are able to make, or work towards making, the promise—the promise which my noble friend Lady Miller enunciated so beautifully. She obviously remembers it from many years ago when she was an Akela.
	The Brownie promise and the rainbow promise, in simpler terms for the junior sections, both include the phrase "to love my God". Where in a religion God has a name which is more commonly used, that name may be substituted to make the promise more meaningful to each girl or woman.
	From the very beginnings of the Guide Association, nearly a century ago, the promise has been fundamental to its aims and ethos, and it is still regarded by the membership of the association as an element of girl guiding of particular significance and importance. It is a very precious asset in girl guiding and one which is treated carefully and with respect.
	There is recognition that a very few may consider themselves excluded from girl guiding membership because, by reason of a lack of faith in God of any kind, they are unable to make the promise. While that is sad, girl guiding is a members' organisation which is designed, however broadly, for its membership—for example, being a single-sex organisation. It is morally legitimate to balance the interests of the many who regard the promise as being an essential part of guiding with the fact that this may exclude a very small number of individuals whose, or whose parents', stance on the matter would not allow them to make the promise and so be admitted to membership.
	Clause 48 makes unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief—which Clause 45 defines as including lack of belief—in the provision of goods, facilities and services by a person whose business or concern it is to provide them to the public or section of the public. It will therefore be unlawful under the Bill, if enacted, for such a person, on the grounds of religion or belief, to refuse to provide services to a person who seeks to obtain or use them; or to provide services in a different manner than they would normally be provided to members of the public; or to provide services on different terms than those on which they would normally be provided to members of the public.
	Certain examples of areas in which discrimination would be unlawful are given in Clause 48(2). These, taken together, would appear generally to encompass services of a commercially provided nature, and apart from the reference to facilities for entertainment, recreation or refreshment, there is nothing which is immediately identifiable as being allied to the kind of services provided by a voluntary organisation concerned with activities for children. On the other hand, the examples are not exhaustive. There are certainly aspects of girl guiding activities that could be said to involve entertainment, recreation or refreshment. Subsection (5) makes it clear that it is immaterial whether a charge is made for the provision of the services concerned.
	I am concerned that the proposed legislation would unreasonably interfere with the ability of the Guide Association to adhere to the traditions and beliefs of its membership in general by making it unlawful to continue the requirement to include that an intending member make the promise as a condition of membership. I hope very much that the Minister will look favourably on this amendment.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I am a bit more of an old stager in that I cut my political teeth as the sixer of the elf six in the Brownies. I was then a Guide, and I ended up as the training adviser for Guides responsible, as I said, for religious policy.
	I am glad that the amendment has been proposed, because organisations such as the Guides need a bit of clarity about how the Bill will apply to them. It is not only the Guides; the Scouts, the Boys' Brigade and the Girls' Guildry must all have the same problem. I pity any government or any Human Rights Commission that takes on 300,000 British Brownies and tens of thousands of leaders. Any government simply would not survive it.
	I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to confirm to the Guides and the other organisations that they have nothing to fear, particularly in relation to employment. That must be a trickier issue than the membership of the young people. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I rise with the greatest of trepidation, because I am ashamed to say that although I was a Brownie I was a very ineffectual Guide. I did not rise to the dizzy heights of the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, or the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, or the noble Baroness, Lady Miller. In fact, I was a Shabbas goy, so maybe I fulfilled some purpose.
	I am of course sympathetic to the need to enable organisations such as the Guides to carry on providing their particular kind of opportunity for children. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, that the Government have no intention of taking on 350,000 Brownies, much less the rest of the Guide movement—we will come quietly.
	We believe, however, that Clauses 59 and 60 already protect the Girl Guides and Scouts in that they allow children to engage in activity within a clear framework, including religious belief. Therefore, they will be able to restrict membership of the organisation when they need to do so. If the relevant associations are not satisfied that they could benefit from those provisions, we will be more than happy to discuss that with them, but we believe that they do benefit from the provisions.
	The amendment contains a far wider exemption. Under the amendment, an organisation that could claim that a particular belief was fundamental to its ethos could discriminate in membership. It would allow discrimination irrespective of the function of the organisation or the role of the person concerned. There would be nothing to prevent any organisation that had some claim to a belief ethos from benefiting from that clause. That is a very wide door indeed, and I fear that it is too wide. We do not believe that organisations that have a genuine belief purpose need wider protection than we have already provided, and organisations such as the Girl Guides already benefit from that protection.
	In addition, the reference in the amendment to "or employment" would appear to have no practical purpose. The Bill does not cover discrimination in the field of employment. Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in employment or vocational training is prohibited by the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.
	I understand why the noble Baronesses have raised the issue. I hope that the clarity of my answer will mean that the Guide movement will feel assured that they can continue untrammelled by any self-respecting humble government's interference.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I remember when I passed the noble Baroness in the Corridor before dinner. I am not quite sure whether she meant it, but she was kind enough to say that there was not much that I could say that did not seduce the House into thinking that I was correct. Listening to the noble Baroness in those last few moments, I could say the same to her. The way she talked about the amendment certainly made me feel that everything in the garden was perfect. I am sure that it probably is so far as the Guides are concerned. I tabled the amendment on the Guides' behalf, but I mentioned other organisations and will clearly read very carefully what the noble Baroness said.
	Although there is not much to mention across the Dispatch Box about the Shabbas goy, I think that I am probably as familiar with that phrase as anyone in the Committee. I thank the Minister for her reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 61 [Faith schools, &c.]:
	[Amendment No. 207 not moved.]
	Clause 61 agreed to.
	Clauses 62 to 64 agreed to.
	Clause 65 [Amendment of exceptions]:
	On Question, Whether Clause 65 shall stand part of the Bill?

Baroness O'Cathain: It is fair to say that the Government have tried harder than ever before to devise exceptions for religious groups that protect their principal activities. I have referred to that on several occasions already this evening.
	The Government have sought to ensure that legitimate religious activities do not suffer as a result of legislative innovations. They have negotiated the exceptions with a wide range of religious groups including the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference, which I presume have seen the final wording of the Bill. That would make Clause 65 all the more surprising, as it gives the Secretary of State power to amend or remove any of the religious exceptions by order. All the good work achieved by devising those exceptions could therefore be undone almost at a stroke.
	The only opportunity that Parliament would have to consider the implications of abolishing or amending one of the exceptions would be a time-limited debate on a ministerial order on a "take it or leave it" basis. Honestly, it seems absolutely extraordinary that exceptions essential to protect freedom of religion can be limited or deleted by secondary legislation. If a future Secretary of State decided that Churches should be stripped of the protections of Clause 59, so that the law required them to alter their membership conditions, surely the proposals would be deserving of proper scrutiny and be capable of amendment.
	If a future government decide to vary an exception and it is not clear what the effect of the wording will be, we should have the opportunity to submit amendments and have our concerns properly debated. It has been said on many occasions that governments are certainly not infallible in their drafting, and when the subject is fundamental religious rights, we cannot afford mistakes.
	Subsection (2) says that the Secretary of State must consult first with the commission, but he is not bound to take its views into account. Consulting the commission is no substitute for proper parliamentary scrutiny. We have seen quite enough of this sort of Henry VIII clause. If the Government conclude that there is a problem serious enough to warrant legislation, let them bring forward a Bill and make their case. Secondary legislation, even by affirmative resolution, is simply not good enough.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I assure the noble Baroness that we understand the concern expressed on the issue, and that expressed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the power in Clause 65 is too wide-ranging. As a result, we are seriously considering how to amend the order-making power so that it is more focused. We hope that that will address the committee's concerns, while retaining some ability to amend the exceptions without the need for primary legislation.
	Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is a sensitive and complex subject—and this debate has demonstrated that. We cannot be certain, therefore, that we have identified all the implications of legislating in this area. It is quite possible that experience of how the law works in practice will highlight areas where the exceptions are too wide or where they are too narrowly drawn. Therefore, it is important that some means is available to amend those exceptions in future.
	The current Clause 65 reflects the potential sensitivity of this issue and of making the changes in this way, because it requires the CEHR first to be consulted and that the order be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I know that the noble Baroness says that this matter is difficult, but in relation to these orders it is possible that that procedure may be effective, because there are usually a number of issues where the House can say, "We accept them en bloc", or, "We reject them". It is a bit of a curate's egg, because both sides have to decide what they put forward and it gives the House appropriate time to debate such issues and to make decisions about them.
	Furthermore, I hope that the noble Baroness and the House will accept that we have approached these issues with appropriate sensitivity. We understand how complex they are and we would be loath to put forward changes or exceptions that were not fully understood by those who we would subsequently invite to support them. I hope that we have demonstrated that by the manner in which we have responded to the proper concerns that a wide spectrum of noble Lords have expressed. We framed the legislation in that way. A number of religious groups have told us that they are comforted by the fact that these matters are not set in stone and that if we need to change them there is an ability to do so.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Is the Minister aware that in the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts similar powers were given for the reasons that she has just expressed, but without the safeguard of a commission first to consider such matters. I recognise that times have changed and that we are more sensitive to Henry VIII clauses than in those days, but would the Minister take a look at those statutes when she examines how best to comply will the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I shall be happy to do that. I hope that I have made clear that we understand the sensitivity of this issue. We know that we must ensure that what we devise results in what we all want. These debates have made clear that the House has mainly been of the same mind and we have been discussing how we deliver on such provisions to ensure that they happen.

Baroness O'Cathain: I am extremely grateful to the Minister, but I am still concerned. We might as well admit that the real problem is that most Members of the House take a rather flexible or cursory attitude towards statutory instruments. We do not get into the meat of them. Perhaps we do not use them in the way that we should and maybe we all need to learn how best to make our views known when such orders are debated. We tend to scrutinise Bills line-by-line, but we do not do the same regarding orders—at least I do not, nor do most Back-Benchers.
	That is why I feel so strongly about this issue and we will need to give proper legislative scrutiny to any changes to these clauses.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The noble Baroness is correct in relation to ordinary orders, but my experience from the Dispatch Box is that where there is a level of sensitivity—and this is such an area—the House is astute at highlighting those orders in which the House has a genuine interest.
	Due to the interest expressed in this House, this is an area where I, on behalf of the Government, anticipate the most rigorous scrutiny. We will bear that factor in mind before we bring it back. I reassure the noble Baroness that this is not an order that is likely to go by without proper notice. It will be the first time if it does.

Baroness O'Cathain: I thank the Minister. However, I think that the onus is on people like me to scrutinise everything on the Order Paper. There is no doubt about it: I tend to let these things go by default. I take the point that our antennae will be alert to this. I absolutely believe that the Minister is totally sincere in her intention that there should be proper scrutiny. My only problem is that I am sure that the noble Baroness will move on to even bigger things and her place will be taken by somebody else. Will we have the same faith in her successor? I am almost certain that the answer will be "No" because she has built up such a reputation.
	I had every intention of testing the opinion of the Committee, but in view of the Minister's wonderful emollient words, I shall take this away and look at it. There is still time to bring it back again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clauses 65 to 71 agreed to.
	Clause 72 [National security]:

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: moved Amendment No. 207A:
	Page 40, line 33, leave out from "solicitor" to end of line 35.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: In moving Amendment No. 207A I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 218 and 219 which are consequential on it. This is a small point, but I suggest that there may be just a small mistake in the Bill. I do this with trepidation, as the Minister is nearly always right.
	Clause 72 provides for rules of court to be made regarding hearings on issues of national security. In the case of Scotland, those hearings will be in the sheriff court only. In the sheriff court, all solicitors have rights of audience. Clause 72(3)(b) provides that when the Advocate General for Scotland appoints a solicitor to appear for a claimant in the sheriff court he would have to appoint:
	"an advocate, or . . . a solicitor who by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 (c.46) has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary".
	That is not necessary because any solicitor can appear in the sheriff court.
	I am told by the Law Society of Scotland that there are a number of highly experienced solicitors who would be eminently suitable for this role but who do not have rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary. On asking, a name was given to me. There are in fact a number of people who would be obvious candidates to do this job.
	I hope that the Government will accept this amendment and leave out that qualification so that Clause 72(3)(b) simply reads,
	"in relation to proceedings in Scotland, if he is an advocate or a solicitor".
	That would be all that is required in the view of the Law Society of Scotland. I beg to move.

The Duke of Montrose: I support my noble friend Lady Carnegy. She has put the case admirably. I suppose that the Government could argue that the Bill as it stands would leave only people of inadequate experience. But as my noble friend has explained, there may be people of great experience who could be included. In this clause we are dealing with who the Attorney-General or, in Scotland, the Advocate General, may appoint. Surely, we ought to leave to their discretion whom they wish to chose.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: I support these two amendments tabled by my two noble friends.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, and the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, for bringing forward these amendments. The intention behind the amendments is the same as our intention in providing Clauses 72(3)(a) and (b), 85(3)(a) and (b) and 87(3)(a) and (b); that is, that solicitors should have the same rights to be appointed as special advocates under these provisions in Scotland as they will in England and Wales.
	Our intention is the same. We are not sure that we can accept the amendment as drafted. There is a little bit of doubt about that, but I can certainly undertake to take away the proposal, consider it and, if appropriate, to bring back our own proposals at a later stage to ensure that the purport of the clause is achieved. As I say, I thank the noble Baroness and the noble Duke for bringing the matter to our attention.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I thank the noble Baroness for that. I am rather surprised that it is not possible just to accept the amendment. Of course the noble Baroness will always want to look and be quite sure that we have the provision right. The point is that any solicitor can appear in a sheriff's court, providing he has the right experience. It is not necessary to say what this clause says. It may be that the consequential amendments have complications. I did not have time to look at that as the noble Baroness was speaking, but I look forward to her bringing government amendments at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 72 agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 208:
	After Clause 72, insert the following new clause—
	"VALIDITY AND REVISION OF CONTRACTS
	(1) A term of a contract is void where—
	(a) its inclusion renders the making of the contract unlawful by virtue of this Part,
	(b) it is included in furtherance of an act which is unlawful by virtue of this Part, or
	(c) it provides for the doing of an act which would be unlawful by virtue of this Part.
	(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a term the inclusion of which constitutes, or is in furtherance of, or provides for, unlawful discrimination against or harassment of, a party to the contract; but the term shall be unenforceable against that party.
	(3) A term in a contract which purports to exclude or limit a provision of this Part is unenforceable by a person in whose favour the term would operate apart from this subsection.
	(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to a contract settling a claim under section 67.
	(5) On the application of a person interested in a contract to which subsection (1) applies, a county court or sheriff court may make an order for removing or modifying a term made unenforceable by that subsection; but an order shall not be made unless all persons affected—
	(a) have been given notice of the application (except where notice is dispensed with in accordance with rules of court), and
	(b) have been afforded an opportunity to make representations to the court.
	(6) An order under subsection (5) may include provision in respect of a period before the making of the order."

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Amendment No. 208 ensures that discrimination and harassment on the grounds of religion or belief cannot be undermined by a contract which involves, results in, or provides for, an act which is unlawful under Part 2. The equivalent provision already exists in other equality strands. It would clearly be wrong if otherwise unlawful actions could be subject to enforceable terms in a contract. We say that this is a sensible measure, which I hope will get the resounding support of the Committee. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clauses 73 and 74 agreed to.
	Clause 75 [Police]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 209:
	Page 42, line 3, at end insert—
	"(5) In section 56(4) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (c. 15) (application of discrimination legislation to seconded staff) after paragraph (f) insert—
	"; and
	(g) section 74 of the Equality Act 2005."

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Amendment No. 209 is intended to ensure that the actions of staff seconded to the Serious Organised Crime Agency are held to be the responsibility of the agency if they breach the provisions of Part 2 of the Equality Bill in respect of the agency's public functions.
	The agency is already responsible for actions of staff seconded to it which breach other equality legislation. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 75, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 76 agreed to.
	Clause 77 [Employment Equality Regulations]:
	[Amendments Nos. 210 and 211 not moved.]
	Clause 77 agreed to.
	Clause 78 [Crown application]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: moved Amendment No. 212:
	Page 42, line 32, at end insert—
	"(4) The provisions of Parts II to IV of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 shall apply to proceedings against the Crown under this Part as they apply to proceedings in England and Wales which by virtue of section 23 of that Act are treated for the purposes of Part II of that Act as civil proceedings by or against the Crown; but section 20 of that Act (removal of proceedings from county court to High Court) shall not apply to proceedings under this Part.
	(5) The provisions of Part V of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 shall apply to proceedings against the Crown under this Part as they apply to proceedings in Scotland which by virtue of the said Part are treated as civil proceedings by or against the Crown; but the proviso to section 44 of that Act (removal of proceedings from the sheriff court to the Court of Session) shall not apply to proceedings under this Part."

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The intention behind the amendment is to bring the provisions of Part 2 into line with other equality legislation, as regards the position of the Crown. It replicates Sections 75(6) and (7) of the Race Relations Act and Sections 85(8) and (9) of the Sex Discrimination Act.
	The effect will be to ensure that any proceedings against Her Majesty under Part 2 of the Bill are subject to the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. I am sure that the Committee will agree about the importance of ensuring provisions of Her Majesty's Acts of a private nature are in line with established and accepted equality legislation. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 78, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 79 [Interpretation]:

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: moved Amendment No. 212A:
	Page 42, line 37, leave out from "a" to end of line 39 and insert "Scottish charity within the meaning of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005"

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: This concerns a small point and is just to ensure that everything is in order. Clause 79(1)(b) states that in relation to Scotland, charities mean what they are said to mean in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1990. Recently, the Scots Parliament has again legislated for charities and has a new definition. I understand that the Bill has been passed and had Royal Assent. It has not yet come into effect.
	The Law Society of Scotland is anxious to know whether the Government appreciate that and whether the old definition is in the Bill because the new Act has not come into effect or whether it is a small mistake. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am again grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, for tabling the amendment. It is of course right that the definition for charities in Scotland used in Clause 79 should be updated to reflect the Charities and Trustees Investment (Scotland) Act 2005. We believe that the Act is expected to receive Royal Assent in the near future—it is not quite there yet. It will come into force before the Bill.
	I would therefore very much have liked to have accepted the amendment without change, but I am advised that further consideration needs to be given to the exact wording that should be used. I will therefore ensure that a government amendment is tabled at the earliest opportunity to achieve the same effect. I would therefore be grateful if the noble Baroness would consider withdrawing her amendment, with my assurance that we will return to the issue and ensure that it is in good order.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I thank the noble Baroness for that; I am sure that my noble friend and I will feel that we have not lived in vain today. We thank her. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 79 agreed to.
	Clause 80 agreed to.

Lord Alli: moved Amendment No. 212B:
	After Clause 80, insert the following new clause—
	"PART 2A
	DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
	:TITLE3:Key concepts
	SEXUAL ORIENTATION
	In this Part "sexual orientation" means a sexual orientation towards—
	(a) persons of the same sex;
	(b) persons of the opposite sex; or
	(c) persons of the same sex and of the opposite sex."

Lord Alli: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 212C to 212U. I also hope that I will not be speaking in vain.
	These are comprehensive amendments that would outlaw discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services on the grounds of sexual orientation and give comparable protection to that being offered to religious communities in the Bill. During Committee on 11 July, my noble friend Lady Turner of Camden moved and withdrew amendments that, in broad terms, tried to achieve much the same thing. I am grateful to her for her support, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for his enduring support.
	This is an enormously important issue—important because men and women continue to encounter discrimination in their daily lives simply because they happen to be lesbian or gay. They can receive second-class treatment from public service providers, such as the NHS; they can be turned away by businesses, such as hotels and insurance companies. That problem exists now. The evidence is before us.
	I know that the hour is getting late. I could give my noble friend many more examples, but I know that she and my noble friend Lady Ashton of Upholland share my concern. I know that they, too, would like these provisions to go through, and that what divides us is not intent but timing. I have been very grateful for the courtesy that my noble friend on the Front Bench and her colleagues have shown me and others during the passage of this Bill, particularly given the sensitivities and emotions that many of those issues involve.
	If the Minister were to follow the lead of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, when she said at the Dispatch Box,
	"there is an open door; there is no question but that this Government and this Minister wish to do this. We are simply discussing when and how to make sure we do it properly".—[Official Report, 11/07/05; col. 894.],
	then I would be more than happy to withdraw this amendment and to work with the noble Baroness and her civil servants to find a way to make progress on these issues in the Bill over the summer. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I added my name to that of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, because I agree entirely with the object of the amendments. My own Private Member's Bill sought to do exactly the same thing in a rather superficial way. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, and I have been shoulder to shoulder on these issues for many years in this House.
	I received these amendments from Stonewall and put my name to them very late. That is a shame because it meant that I had no opportunity to examine them before they were tabled. I am sorry that that has been so. Nothing that I have said about supporting the objects of the amendment should now be negated by what I propose to say, but there are some problems with the amendments. I do not say that the problems could not be removed, but I shall give two or three examples that Stonewall and others might wish to think about.
	First, I do not understand why Amendment No. 212C requires that the sexual orientation of B should be different from that of A—we have had that point before. A gay person ought to be as liable for discriminating against another gay person on grounds of sexuality. The proposal seems a wholly unnecessary limitation in the area of sexual orientation.
	Secondly, I am unhappy with how the concept of indirect discrimination is defined in subsection (3) of Amendment No. 212C, which includes those dreadful words, "requirement, condition or practice". I am unhappy that in proposed paragraph (d) there is a test of reasonable justification rather than necessity.
	I am particularly unhappy that in Amendment No. 212H proposed paragraph (f) of subsection (4) provides for a blanket exclusion allowing discrimination against gay people in relation to immigration control. I simply give those by way of examples.
	That illustrates, as does Part 2, the problems of dealing with these matters without very careful thought. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alli, that we want to apply as much pressure as possible to ensure that there are cast-iron guarantees that the pressing social need to forbid sexual orientation discrimination beyond the employment sphere in relation to goods, services, facilities and education will be brought within the law.
	The Minister will surely tell us that the discrimination law review is intended to cover sexual orientation discrimination as well as age, gender reassignment and all the other matters not covered at the moment, and that they will be covered in the lifetime of this Government, before the next general election.
	We need a step-by-step assurance of exactly how the procedures will operate to secure what the Government have in mind, if not this evening then on Report. We will need to be convinced that the Stonewall amendments, as I would call them, cannot be improved between now and Third Reading by dealing with the kind of points that I raised superficially and any other points. If it were possible before the Bill leaves this House to improve the Stonewall amendments in a way that was satisfactory— I do not believe it to be beyond the wit of the Home Office and other departments to do that, if there is enough energy—we should press the matter very hard.
	So, I look to the Minister to give a firm indication in her reply—or on Report, if she cannot do it today—of the problems with the Stonewall amendments that cannot be solved between now and Report and, secondly, a firm indication of the timetable for tackling the mischief that the amendments seek to deal with. Then, we can form a judgment on Report of what we believe to be a fair and appropriate way of dealing with the matter.
	We need to press on with this as fast as possible, provided that we get it right. Therefore, I fully support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alli.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I have listened carefully to what has been said by my noble friend Lord Alli and by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. They put the case powerfully and eloquently, and they make a somewhat unnerving alliance.
	We recognise the difficulties and disparities in today's discrimination law framework and the real effect that it can have on people's day-to-day life. The debate has been helpful in highlighting that, and I am grateful to noble Lords for their contribution. We have already made a clear commitment to the principle of addressing the difficulties. It is not a question of "Why?"; we support the reasons for re-examining the law. It is a question of "How?" and "When?". The issue is not one of principle; it is, as my noble friend rightly suggested, one of method and timing.
	I turn first to the "How?". In February, recognising the sort of issues that we have debated today, the Government launched a review of discrimination law. That review is well under way. The discrimination law review will be wide-ranging and comprehensive.
	I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for touching on some of the difficulties that are inherent in the amendments as currently drafted, even at first blush. Noble Lords will appreciate that even something that may seem like a basic step to extend the law must be preceded by an understanding of the potential impact on those who would be affected.
	The amendments would have an impact on all businesses, all voluntary bodies and wide areas of the public sector, including schools and the health service. It would be negligent and irresponsible if we did not examine the impact thoroughly and give those who were likely to be affected an opportunity to express their views. We must also ensure that discrimination law bites in the right way, providing protection that is both necessary and appropriate. Otherwise, we risk missing the target and imposing the law where it is not needed and missing areas in which it should properly bite.
	These are not simple issues. They will have to be considered thoroughly, and that is precisely the process that the discrimination law review is tasked to undertake. I know that Stonewall has already done work in the area, and I would welcome an opportunity to discuss that further with it.
	Then there is the issue of "When?". The Government were elected with a clear manifesto commitment to introduce a single equality Act. Together, the discrimination law review and its recommendations for a single equality Act will take place in the lifetime of this Parliament. That is our manifesto pledge.
	If it were in my gift to do so, I would be delighted to provide a more specific timetable for my noble friend Lord Alli and for the noble Lord, Lord Lester. But that, as your Lordships fully appreciate, is not within my gift. The Committee will know and understand why I cannot do that: I cannot pre-empt what will go in the Queen's Speech for a future parliamentary Session.
	However, I can assure Members of the Committee that the issues they have raised will be addressed; that work is under way; that we are bound by this manifesto commitment; and that we will do all we can to look energetically at these issues. On that basis, I ask my noble friend and the noble Lord to withdraw their amendment, confident that they will give me no peace until something is done and that when we come back on Report they will have trenchant questions to ask which I, or some poor, unfortunate other Minister, will have to answer.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Perhaps I may ask a question that is not trenchant, but purely for information. The Minister has told the Committee that the review which started in February is well under way. Can she tell the Committee something about the resources being devoted to that review? I ask the question because when I had to do a similar job from March to September 1974, I had the advantage of doing it with Home Office resources devoted, as a very high priority, only for gender, and then the following year for race.
	I am troubled about whether the review will be sufficiently well resourced in terms of legal and other skills. Therefore, it is a question of how many people with how many skills are doing it already. I am surprised to know that the review is well under way. I had the impression that it was not, but it obviously needs to be if we are to achieve legislation before the next general election, having gone through all the consultation processes. I hoped to get an answer to a non-trenchant question, if that were possible. If not, could we be written to about it because I regard that as key to the progress that we might make?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I can certainly assure the noble Lord that there is a whole team in place working on the discrimination law review. A clear commitment has been made to delivering the manifesto. I was trying to see whether we knew exactly how many people have been engaged in the enterprise. There is also a reference group that has met to map out future work. I am told that there are several people in the group.
	I cannot underestimate to the Committee how much energy is being put into this to make sure that we get it right. Because of the complexity of the whole area, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, would have preferred that we deal with all the issues at one time. However, I say to the noble Lord that I understand that view. But we have been able to deal with the issue in this Bill and that has highlighted how challenging it will be to make sure that the law review covers all the possible lacunae we have identified on this aspect. I will write to the noble Lord giving him such further and other details that may be available.

Lord Alli: I thank my noble friend for her reply. I, too, will study what she said during the coming days to see whether there is a chink of light that may satisfy me. But I fear that the Government have caused themselves a problem by giving these protections to religious communities and by excluding the gay community. Not giving them at the same time is the issue that is left on the table.
	My noble friend will know that I am not satisfied in terms of the speed at which these issues are to be dealt with. I have offered in a generous and humble way an olive branch. I hope that the Home Office will see fit to accept it. If not, my noble friend knows how strongly I feel about this issue and October will be an interesting time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 212C to 212U not moved.]
	Clause 81 [Prohibition of discrimination]:
	[Amendment No. 212V not moved.]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: moved Amendment No. 213:
	Page 43, line 30, at end insert "or sexual harassment"

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: We have moved to Part 3 of the Bill. The purpose of these amendments is to include sexual harassment as well as sex discrimination in relation to the duty. This is all very technical, but I shall deal with it in a non-technical way.
	The EU equal treatment directive covers sexual harassment as well as sex discrimination. Unfortunately, the Law Lords decided in their great wisdom in a case called Pearce that sexual harassment was only included within the Sex Discrimination Act if it was in fact sex discrimination. They did not recognise the separate concept of sexual harassment. Such a concept had been recognised, for example by a Scottish Court of Session in a case called Porcelli, but that did not find favour with the Law Lords.
	I understand the position is that the Government are to implement the directive in equal treatment regulations that are now in draft and are due to come into force in October. In that case, Council Directive 2000/78/EC will be implemented by the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005. When that happens, the Minister will be able to tell us that these amendments will not be necessary because harassment and sexual harassment will be included within the scope of the legislation.
	As I am sure the Minister knows, the problem is that the Equal Opportunities Commission has criticised the draft regulations for not going sufficiently far to implement the directive. I shall not go into all the reasons now, but for example the regulations talk of harassment being on the ground of sex. The EOC says that those words are not found in the directive. The regulations also refer to something being,
	"reasonably considered as having an effect".
	The commission states that the directive does not do that. It is worried that if one were to take the draft regulations as they stand, they will not properly implement the directive.
	My first question is this: are my amendments necessary in order to include sexual harassment in Part 3? I think that the answer should be "yes", but it may also be, "but not before Royal Assent because it will be dealt with in the regulations". In that case, my second question will be: are the regulations now in draft form good enough? Do they properly implement the directive? An answer needs to be given, but not necessarily this evening. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Dholakia, to the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, and to my noble friend Lady Lockwood for tabling these amendments.
	During the winding-up speech of my noble friend Lady Ashton at Second Reading on 15 June, she set out the current position on harassment under the Sex Discrimination Act, to which the noble Lord has alluded. She confirmed that it is not currently expressly covered. She also informed your Lordships that most instances of harassment already fall within the concept of discrimination because of the way in which case law has developed.
	However, as the noble Lord rightly said, the Sex Discrimination Act will be amended very soon to introduce an express statutory concept of harassment in relation to employment and vocational training. This amendment to the SDA will be achieved through regulations made to implement the Equal Treatment Amendment Directive. I am putting it this way so that we can agree where we are. These regulations are planned to come into force on 1 October.
	Following this change, it is our intention to ensure that a prohibition of harassment is expressly included alongside the provisions in Clause 81 of the Bill prohibiting sex discrimination in the exercise of public functions. We intend also to introduce a comparable provision in the gender duty in Clause 82, which introduces the gender duty, that places a specific obligation on public bodies relating to the elimination of harassment which parallels that already in place for discrimination.
	Since Second Reading we have taken advice from parliamentary counsel as to the best drafting approach to make such an express reference to the Equality Bill once the Sex Discrimination Act has been amended by the ETAD. Following parliamentary counsel's advice, we intend to bring forward on Report what we hope will be a straightforward government amendment which will ensure that both Clauses 81 and 82 contain explicit references to harassment.
	However, I am not sure whether the noble Lords' amendment is the correct form in which that should stand; I need to receive the correct wording from parliamentary counsel. As soon as we have that, I shall be very happy to write to all Members of the Committee when tabling the amendment so that everyone is informed that we have got it right. I hope that meets the questions raised by the noble Lord. When we have the wording, we will be able to move forward appropriately.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that very clear and welcome reply. The only outstanding question—I know it is not her department that has carriage of this; it is really for the Department of Trade and Industry—is the argument between the EOC and that department as to whether the amendments to be made to the Sex Discrimination Act by the regulations are generous enough to comply with the EU directive. Will the Government—not this evening—give a written response to the EOC's concerns and perhaps circulate it to interested Members of the Committee. That will happen before the Bill is amended and will set the standards for what goes into this Bill when it comes back at Report stage. It is quite important that that issue should be resolved.
	On the face of it, the EOC's points seem fairly convincing, but they are simply a part of the route to arrive at the destination. Perhaps the Minister will respond to that.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We will be very happy to do that. If I am wrong—I do not believe that I am—I shall certainly write to noble Lords. But we can work on the basis that that would be a very productive thing to do.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am very grateful. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 213A not moved.]
	Clause 81 agreed to.
	Clause 82 [General duty to promote equality, &c.]:
	[Amendment No. 214 not moved.]

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: moved Amendment No. 215:
	Page 46, line 37, at end insert ", and
	(c) to promote equality of opportunity for those with unpaid responsibilities for the care of other persons"

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: I shall be brief, given the hour. This is a probing amendment intended to explore whether, within the duty to promote equality, the caring role of men and women will be recognised by the public bodies covered by the duty in the way they design their services and employment practices.
	The Equality Commission in Northern Ireland has caring as a separate strand in itself and a positive duty on public bodies, including promoting equality,
	"between persons with dependents and persons without".
	That illustrates that such a provision is feasible.
	Like the race and disability duties already legislated for, the duty to promote will shift the balance of responsibilities from the individual to the organisation. It will be for a public body to ensure that it is promoting sex equality instead of simply for the individual to challenge discrimination after it has occurred. At the same time, it will not remove the rights of the individual in any way to challenge discrimination that might occur, but it should ensure that practices and procedures are improved for the many, thereby preventing discrimination.
	The reason for this probing amendment is twofold, covering fathers and carers. Increasingly, fathers want to play an active part in caring for their children. Yet society is still working on the assumption and the reality that mothers are main carers of children. A public service provider should correctly interpret the gender duty to mean that they have to adjust their services to reach men as well as women.
	Similarly, for those with caring responsibilities, the gender divide is more evenly split. The Government are proposing to extend the right to request flexible working to carers, and that is welcome. But because caring does not simply divide along gender lines, unless the needs of carers are spelt out, they may well still be missed. The amendment would guarantee that that is not the case, and I hope that my noble friend will see its value. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Let me immediately assure my noble friend that there is no issue between us in terms of principle. It is, once again, one of method and timing.
	The Government are aware of the sensitivities and complexities surrounding the subject of those who have to balance their working lives with their caring responsibilities. We recognise the valuable contributions carers make to society and are keen that this should have greater recognition. The Government have acted to ensure that recognition. For example, since April 2003, employees who are parents with young or disabled children have had the right to ask for flexible hours, and their employers have a legal duty to consider those requests seriously. My noble friend is right to highlight the very powerful role that fathers play, and continue to play, in their children's lives.
	The Government have recently announced that they plan to extend the law to cover carers of adult relatives from April 2007. In addition, through the Equality Bill, we will be empowering the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to carry on the important role the EOC has had in promoting equality for parents and carers. That will be done through its awareness-raising and encouragement of good practice on equality and diversity.
	Having said that, I do not believe that the amendment, which proposes laying on public authorities a duty to promote equality of opportunity for carers, is the best way forward. The case for further extension of the public sector duty is one of the issues that will be considered in the discrimination law review, which is under way, and to which we have referred quite a lot today. That is the right place to consider the complex issues that would arise in extending the duty to cover carers. We need to consider the issues in detail and consult interested affected parties, particularly in terms of the scope of the coverage of care.
	As I said earlier, the discrimination law review and its recommendations for a single equality Act will take place in the lifetime of this Parliament. That is the Government's manifesto pledge.
	I warmly thank my noble friend for the amendment but I hope that she will understand why we cannot do more at the moment and will be happy to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: I thank my noble friend for that explanation. Of course, we wait for the discrimination law review, when I know that we will have this discussion all over again. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Greengross: moved Amendment No. 215A:
	Leave out Clause 82 and insert the following new Clause—
	"PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: GENERAL STATUTORY DUTY
	(1) A public authority shall in carrying out its functions have due regard to the need—
	(a) to eliminate unlawful discrimination, and
	(b) to promote equality of opportunity between men and women, persons of different sexual orientation, different ages, different marital status, different religion or belief, and those who are intending to undergo, are undergoing, or have undergone gender reassignment and those who are or have not.
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) "public authority" includes any person who has functions of a public nature (subject to subsections (3) and (4)),
	(b) "functions" means functions of a public nature, and
	(c) the reference to unlawful discrimination shall be treated as including a reference to contravention of terms of contracts having effect in accordance with an equality clause within the meaning of section 1 of the Equal Pay Act 1970 (c. 41).
	(3) The duty in subsection (1) shall not apply to—
	(a) the House of Commons,
	(b) the House of Lords,
	(c) the Scottish Parliament,
	(d) the General Synod of the Church of England,
	(e) the Security Service,
	(f) the Secret Intelligence Service,
	(g) the Government Communications Headquarters,
	(h) a part of the armed forces of the Crown which is, in accordance with a requirement of the Secretary of State, assisting the Government Communications Headquarters, or
	(i) a person specified for the purpose of this paragraph by order of the Secretary of State (and a person may be specified generally or only in respect of specified functions).
	(4) The duty in subsection (1) shall not apply to the exercise of—
	(a) a function in connection with proceedings in the House of Commons or the House of Lords,
	(b) a function in connection with proceedings in the Scottish Parliament (other than a function of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body),
	(c) a judicial function (whether in connection with a court or a tribunal),
	(d) a function exercised on behalf of or on the instructions of a person exercising a judicial function (whether in connection with a court or a tribunal), or
	(e) a function specified for the purpose of this paragraph by order of the Secretary of State.
	(5) Subsection (1)(b) is without prejudice to the effect of any exception to or limitation of the law about unlawful discrimination.
	(6) A failure in respect of performance of the duty under subsection (1) does not confer a cause of action at private law.
	(7) An order under subsection (3)(i) or 4(e) may not be made unless the Secretary of State has consulted the Commission.
	(8) This section binds the Crown."

Baroness Greengross: in moving this amendment, I will also speak to Amendments Nos. 215B, 215D and 217. These amendments are intended to widen the duty on public bodies to promote gender equality so that they cover all other strands that are not protected by current legislation. I hope that this will stop the commission being a regulator of discrimination in public services for some equality areas, but not age, sexual orientation or religion and belief.
	It seems at the moment, particularly to the Equality and Diversity Forum, that we are not seeing the levelling up of equality law that we all want to see and I am sure that the Minister also wants to see. We want all individuals, no matter what their characteristics might be through which they face discrimination, to receive equal protection.
	This type of general equality duty already exists in relation to the devolved administrations. People in England continue to miss out on this protection, which really should be remedied. A positive duty to promote equality across all areas of discrimination would require organisations in the public sector to have due regard for equality in all aspects of their work. In Northern Ireland, where public bodies already have a positive duty, evidence gathered by Help the Aged in Northern Ireland shows that, as a result, older people for example are more likely to be involved in dialogue and are reaping benefits from the efforts made by public bodies to promote age equality.
	I am looking for clear assurances from the Government that they are committed to legislating to level the playing field by creating a general duty on public authorities to promote equality across all strands. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I have no doubt that this should be done—the problem is when and how. When I tried to achieve this in my Private Member's Bill, I learnt that one could not have a positive duty that is applied in exactly the same way to each strand for reasons of personal privacy. For example, if a duty were created on the public sector to find out as part of the positive duty what is the gender or ethnic composition of the workforce, that can be done without violating personal privacy—at least, I think that it can. However, if one asks the workforce about their sexuality or religion and tries to read it across in exactly the same way, it will not work.
	Therefore, when one comes to implement the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, it will be necessary to be context sensitive, but I have no doubt that the object is what should happen. I hope that the Minister will be able to say that that is the Government's objective as well.

The Duke of Montrose: I was most grateful to hear the way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, put the amendment. It has great sections to do with Scotland, and I note that the wording has been slightly altered. No doubt there is some good legal reason for that. My first thought on looking at the amendment and seeing the way that it extends protection against discrimination to all those other categories is that perhaps there would be an enormous extra cost involved, but the noble Baroness tells me that Scotland already has this duty and perhaps it is not breaking the bank in Scotland. However, the Government will have to look at whether or not the measure will increase the numbers of people which a public authority employs in order to ensure that none of this discrimination takes place.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I reassure the noble Baroness that we understand the issues that she has raised here. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, is also right in relation to the complexity and the things that we will have to look at. I also assure the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, that Scotland and how the measure impacts on Scotland will be an integral part of those things that we will have to assure. So the Government will consider the case for reform of the current equality duties, including the case for a single duty. However, I hope that your Lordships will understand that it is essential to consult public bodies in developing specific proposals. It is too early to say, therefore, whether all strands listed in Amendment No. 215A could be covered by a single duty; that will be considered during the discrimination law review.
	There is very little between the noble Baroness and ourselves save for timing, and we will ensure that we consider these issues thoroughly, because we shall have to ensure that all the issues that have been highlighted in relation to the other parts of the discrimination agenda are looked at in relation to these aspects as well. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand, therefore, why I cannot accept her amendments tonight, but we shall consider the issue during the discrimination law review.

Baroness Greengross: I thank the Minister for that explanation. Of course, we want this to happen—and I detect a similar feeling on the Minister's part. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 82 agreed to.
	Clause 83 [Specific duties]:
	[Amendment No. 215B not moved.]
	Clause 83 agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 215C and 215D not moved.]
	Clause 84 [Codes of practice]:
	[Amendments Nos. 216 and 217 not moved.]
	Clause 84 agreed to.
	Clause 85 [National security]:
	[Amendment No. 218 not moved.]
	Clause 85 agreed to.
	Clause 86 agreed to.
	Clause 87 [National security]:
	[Amendment No. 219 not moved.]
	Clause 87 agreed to.

Baroness Greengross: moved Amendment No. 220:
	After Clause 88, insert the following new clause—
	"PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: CARE STANDARDS
	(1) This section applies to any establishment or agency within the meaning of sections 1 to 4 of the Care Standards Act 2000 (c. 14).
	(2) Any care establishment or agency is deemed to be a public authority in relation to the provision of care services subject to the Care Standards Act 2000 for the purpose of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (acts of public authorities)."

Baroness Greengross: This is the last amendment that we shall debate. I feel strongly about it. It would extend the definition of public authority under the Human Rights Act to protect those people—usually older people—who receive care services from private and voluntary agencies, including care homes, day care and domiciliary care in their own homes. We know that more than 91 per cent of care home places in 2004 and two-thirds of domiciliary care were supplied by private and voluntary providers.
	The Human Rights Act sets out to protect the equal dignity and worth of all individuals, their right to have their life protected by law to ensure that they are able to live their lives free from inhuman and degrading treatment, and that their right to private and family life is protected. Older people are entitled to the same protection of human rights as everyone else, but they can often be victims of abuse.
	Abuse of older people takes many forms; some older people receiving care services experience bullying and a lack of respect and dignity, which we should not have to tolerate. They are very rarely in a position to make a complaint or to demand their rights because of fear of reprisal. We know this. As things stand, following the judgment in the Leonard Cheshire case in 2001, older people receiving care from private and voluntary agencies are not protected by the Human Rights Act, which only covers services provided by public authorities. The way in which case law has defined public authority under the Human Rights Act means that, contrary to the intentions of Parliament when the Act was passed, any older person in an independent care home or receiving care from an independent care agency is not protected by the Act.
	At Second Reading of the Human Rights Bill the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine, made clear the Government's intention that human rights duties should extend to private bodies carrying out public functions. That was reiterated by the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw.
	The problem relating to care users is symptomatic of a wider problem regarding the definition of "public authorities". I know that the Government were waiting for a suitable test case in which to intervene. However, we are concerned that it could be a long time before a suitable test case comes along because of all the fears and the worries. Indeed, many people are not in a position to complain anyway.
	At Second Reading the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, explained that the Government would issue guidance on how the contracts between public authorities and private organisations may seek to protect convention rights. While that would help two-thirds of older people receiving care services, they would still be at a disadvantage because they would have to claim their rights through a third party—the local authority—rather than directly. Moreover, a third of people in care homes are required to pay their own fees because they have some savings or a house to sell, and so have an independent contract with the home. They would not be covered by a contract between the home and a local authority yet they are just as vulnerable to human rights abuses.
	I seek urgent action to tackle this issue relating to care users, many of whom—usually very old people—simply cannot wait to be afforded protection in the longer term. The law really does need to be amended now to protect that very vulnerable group of people. I ask the Government for a clear statement that this issue will be considered by the discrimination law review and that the Government will take swift rather than long-term action to remedy what I consider is a very serious problem. I beg to move.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I entirely agree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, said. In its report the Joint Committee on Human Rights criticised the narrow case law of the Court of Appeal on the meaning of "public authority" under the Human Rights Act. During debates on this Bill the Government have indicated that they agree with those criticisms and that they would intervene in any suitable case to seek to persuade the Law Lords to come to a view that is in accordance with our intention when we enacted the Human Rights Act.
	I do not think that it is desirable to seek to amend Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. I think that the flexible definition in it is entirely satisfactory provided it is interpreted and applied correctly. As I do not believe that the discrimination law review will ripen into legislation for at least a couple of years, I simply throw out one possibility to think about. If there were an individual with a suitable case involving a care establishment or agency, they might think of something on the following lines. They could go to the High Court and submit to judgment. In other words, they could say that the Court of Appeal decision is binding and they are bound to lose. With the consent of the agency itself they could leapfrog the Court of Appeal; that is, not have to go to the Court of Appeal but go straight to the House of Lords from a High Court on the basis of a pure question of interpretation of a statute. They could then seek to get proper funding or probably get a prospective order that they would not be obliged to pay the other side's legal costs. I am sure that they could find public-spirited lawyers who were quite willing to take the case, if necessary without fee. It could be done quite quickly if a suitable case could be identified, and it might well be that the case could be decided by the Law Lords well before the Government introduced legislation. That is a very shorthand way of saying that if there is enough energy and creativity, this could get to the House of Lords sooner than legislation.
	Meanwhile, although I entirely agree with everything that the noble Baroness said, I would be unhappy with any attempt by legislation to change the broad, flexible definition that is in the Human Rights Act. For that reason, I hope that means can be found to do what the Government wish to do, which is to get a case before the House of Lords, if necessary with the Attorney-General intervening, in the public interest, to explain the Government's point of view.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am in the happy position of saying that I agree with the noble Baroness, and I agree with the noble Lord.
	I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising the issue, as it is a delicate and important topic. We have said previously that we recognise the difficulty that the amendment is designed to cure. We were as surprised and, I am afraid to say, as dismayed as any when the courts took the narrow line that they did in cases such as the Leonard Cheshire case.
	The amendment is designed, I know, once more to extend the protection of the Human Rights Act to more of those to whom the Government intended it to apply as the Bill passed through its parliamentary stages. It would, however, catch only a proportion of those who have lost those rights, and we are not convinced that such a piecemeal approach can be justified. I assure the noble Baroness that we are going to ask for the discrimination law review carefully to consider the definitions of public authority and public function as they appear throughout the existing equality and human rights legislation. The review's terms of reference are couched in terms that will permit us to do that.
	I cannot guess at what the conclusions will be, but I assure the noble Baroness that the Government take the matter very seriously. The current situation is unsatisfactory and, as I have said, we are taking all reasonable steps to right it. In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for what seemed to me to be his implicit offer, which I hope will make the noble Baroness feel happy to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Greengross: I thank the Minister and the noble Lord very much indeed. Of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but I would love to discuss with the noble Lord how we can take his idea forward, because it sounded extremely interesting. I was pleased to hear of the Government's commitment to get this matter right. Somehow we must get it right, because we are talking about very vulnerable people. I thank the Minister, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 89 agreed to.
	Schedule 4 agreed to.
	Clauses 90 to 93 agreed to.
	House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.
	House adjourned at three minutes past ten o'clock.